SĀṀKHYASĀRA

OF

VIJÑĀNABHIKṢU

(TEXT AND TRANSLATION WITH NOTES)

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INTRODUCTION

Sāṁkhya is one of the oldest systems of Indian philosophy. It proposed a rational and realistic approach to the problem of reality. Thus, it has served a background for other systematists to try new lines of thought in the formulation of their own philosophy. The Sāṁkhya system had found a place of honour in ancient Indian literature too. The *Mahābhārata*[1] attached the supreme importance to Sāṁkhya as a system of philosophy. It remarks there is no knowledge like that of Sāṁkhya. Even Śaṅkarācārya, the chief critic of Sāṁkhya, describes the Sāṁkhya as the chief opponent (*pradhānamalla*)[2], which suggests that the Sāṁkhya is esteemed as occupying the highest place in all the systems criticised by him.

The term Sāṁkhya is derived from the word Saṁkhyā which in turn is derived from sam+khyā. The word Saṁkhyā denotes number; philosophical investigation or the knowledge arised from such a philosophical investigation. Consequently, the term Sāṁkhya comes to mean a system which analyses the facts of experience by means of enumeration of categories or a system dealing with the consideration of twenty five categories, or, the knowledge of pure soul as distinct from the Prakṛti, Guṇaratna, however, thinks that the term Sāṁkhya is read as Śāṁkhya and is called so because it is founded by Śaṁkha.

Though it is evident that Sāṁkhya system attained the position of a full-fledged system before the other systems, yet we do not come across some ancient authentic work which

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1. *Mahābhārata* 12.304.2
2. Śāṅkarabhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 1.4.28

could contain the original form of the system. Upto the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* of Īśvarkṛṣṇa we know only some names of Sāṁkhya teachers along with a scattered reference to their theories. We can postulate the beginning of the Sāṁkhya record in the Upaniṣads and the earlier or pre-classical Sāṁkhya in the *Mahābhārata* and its contemporary literature. After Īśvarakṛṣṇa and before Vācaspati Miśra, there is a big gap in literary continuity. We have only the *Yuktidīpikā* and a few other commentaries on the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*. There is again a gap of centuries till we come to Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu. Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu presents a landmark in the history of Sāṁkhya philosophy. We do not come across any powerful author of Sāṁkhya after Vijñānabhikṣu.

The literature available on Sāṁkhya is very scanty. The earliest systematic record of Sāṁkhya is found in the Sāṁkhyakārikā. A large number of commentaries on it suggests the importance of this text. There are other two important works, viz., *Tattvasamāsasūtra* and the *Sāṁkhyasūtra*. The latter is commented upon by Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, could not incorporate all his ideas in the above commentary and gives the essentials of the Saṁkhya doctrines in his *Sāṁkhyasāra*. He lived in the latter half of the sixteenth century and presents the latest form of Sāṁkhya doctrines available to us. We do not find some authentic record of the personal life of Vijñānabhikṣu. His writings show his erudition as also a wide range of knowledge. His knowledge, however, never makes his writings clumsy or difficult to understand. He presents the facts in a direct way, simple language and small sentences. He must have been an aspirant of a high rank as he remarks that his findings are based upon his experience of truth. He was not a believer in dogmatism and was always trying to reconcile the Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Vedānta. At most of the places he differs from Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of the

Vedānta Sūtras and severely criticises him. In the system of Sāṁkhya and Yoga also he criticises the theories of Vācaspati Miśra and proposes new interpretations. Such a trend is more conspicuous in his writings on the epistemological problems of Sāṁkhya and Yoga. Another feature of Vijñānabhikṣu's writings is his respect for the Purāṇas and the *Bhagavadgītā*. He profusely quotes them under the authority of the smṛtis. He does not restrict himself to the evidence from the śrutis only considering them to be enough, but further corroborates the facts with the evidences from the Purāṇas and the *Mahābhārata* also. His writings are a rich source of information about philosophical doctrines.

Vijñānabhikṣu was a prolific author and has covered a wide range of subjects in his writings. We have the following published works to his credit.

1. Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya,
2. Sāṁkhyasāra,
3. Yogavārttika,
4. Yogasārasaṁgraha and
5. Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya,

In addition to these, Vijñānabhikṣu is believed to have written *Īśvaragitābhāṣya, Upadeśaratnamālā, Brahmādarśa* and a commentary called Āloka on the following Upaniṣads: Kaṭhavalli, Kaivalya, Maitreyī, Māṇḍūkya, Muṇḍaka, Praśna, Taittirīya and Śvetāśvatara. The latter set of his works is still unpublished.

The Sāṁkhyasāra is a work of matured mind as it expounds the complicated problems in a lucid style and brevity. In fact, this work alone is enough to understand Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation of Sāṁkhya. The Sāraprabhā commentary by Sri Kalipada Tarkacarya is utilised here specially for notes. In this text, the chief aim of Vijñānabhikṣu is to expound the concept of self, as he thinks, it is not sufficiently explained in

the other Sāṁkhya texts, specially the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*.[1] The entire work is divided into two parts : Earlier half (*Pūrvārdha*) and the Latter half (*Uttarārdha*).

Vijñānabhikṣu's chief contribution lies in interpreting the Sāṁkhya on the line of the Upaniṣads, and to alleviate the contradiction of the Sāṁkhya with the upanisadic śruti. Vijñānabhikṣu's zeal for reconciliation of Sāṁkhya with the Upaniṣads is more conspicuous in his interpretation of the nature of self. The early Sāṁkhya texts deduce the nature of self on the basis of its contrast from the manifest objects and the Prakṛti. It is found that like Prakṛti the Puruṣa is without cause, eternal omnipresent, immobile, non-component, non-merging, impartite and independent.[2] This differentiates the Puruṣa from the manifest objects. However, it is in contrast with the Prakṛti also insofar as unlike Prakṛti it is devoid of the guṇas, discriminative, subjective, uncommon, intelligent and non-productive.[3] From such a contrast it is further deduced that the Puruṣa is witness, isolated, indifferent, spectator and non-agent.[4] Vijñānabhikṣu also does not deviate from this general trend but his approach is different and unique. He does not solely rely upon the inference and describes the nature of Puruṣa on the basis of Upaniṣads. His main resort is the texts which positively describe the nature of the ātman and Brahman.

The Upaniṣads describe the Brahman as real, intelligent and infinite or joy to mark out his essential nature as existence (*sat*), intelligence (*cit*) and joy (*ānanda*). Vijñānabhikṣu interprets them in the framework of Sāṁkhya.

1. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 1.1.2
2. *Sāṁkhyakārikā* 10
3. *Sāṁkhyakārikā* 11
4. *Sāṁkhyakārikā* 19

The term sat, according to Vijñnabhikṣu, implies that the Puruṣa is the only ultimately existing reality while everything else is opposite to it. To develop such a thesis Vijñānabhikṣu soars very high in imagination and holds that the Puruṣa is the locus of the Prakṛti and immutable in nature. In this sense the Puruṣa is the cause of the Universe.[1] Vijñānabhikṣu clarifies it with the example of considering subtle element of water as the cause of the earth as the latter rests in the former.[2] Vijñānabhikṣu takes the Puruṣa as a locus of the Prakṛti in the sense of physical locus. Such a surmise, however, is not corroborated by any other Sāṁkhya text. The Sāṁkhyas explain the concept of *adhiṣṭhāna* as a controller through its mere presence. If both the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa are eternal and all-pervasive, no purpose is served by considering the one as existing in the other. Vijñānabhikṣu further interprets the term *sat* as *paramārtha sat* (ultimately real)[3] and denies such an existence in the case of Prakṛti which, he thinks, is finally located in Puruṣa. Such a description, however, is peculiar to Vijñānabhikṣu. He further distinguishes the nature of existence of the Puruṣa from that of the Prakṛti to clarify his notion still more. The Puruṣa is ultimately real entity because firstly it is not meant for something else; secondly it is established as it is experienced by itself; thirdly it is ultimately real; fourthly it does not require some other location for its existence and fifthly it does not require some external proof for its existence.[4] Such a nature is denied in the Prakṛti. The Prakṛti is opposite in nature to Puruṣa because it undergoes change every moment. Vijñānabhikṣu compares all the material objects to waves in the water.[5] All the material objects are *asat* insofar as they are meant for someone

1. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.2.3
2. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.2.4
3. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.2.5
4. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.2.6
5. *Saṁkhyasāra* 2.2.7

else and, hence, are proved to be existent through the existence of the other.[1] This poses a difficulty for Vijñānabhikṣu in defining the specific type of existence for the material objects. Here, he had to take resort to the advaitic concept and had to mention that the material world is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal but is of the nature of both real and unreal (*sadasadātmaka*).[2] Thus, the essence of the universe is the existing reality while everything else is non-essential and, hence, fit to be abandoned.[3]

The nature of *ānanda* (joy) again poses a problem in the case of the Puruṣa. Since the Sāṁkhyas hold that the pleasure, pain, etc., belong to Prakṛti, Puruṣa cannot have pleasure in the literal sense of the term. Therefore, Vijñānabhikṣu interprets *ānanda* as the absence of pain.[4] In fact, it goes against the meaning of pleasure commonly understood. Therefore, Vijñānabhikṣu had to adopt that such meaning of *ānanda* is technical (*pāribhāṣika*) and not the conventional.[5] Such an interpretation could not satisfy Vijñānabhikṣu himself. Hence, he offers another interpretation that the Puruṣa is metaphorically stated to be of the nature of pleasure so that the desirous of pleasure should be inclined to attain it. It is analogous to the statement of all pervasiveness through metaphorically calling it similar to space (*ākaśa*).[6] Vijñānabhikṣu offers a third alternate interpretation. The Puruṣa is of the nature of eternal joy (*nityānanda*) because everyone has the love towards the self.[7] Such a love towards other things is non-eternal and caused by ignorance. It is, however, natural to the self. From this is

1. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.2.9
2. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.2.11
3. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.2.12
4. *Sāṃkhyasāra* 2.4.2
5. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.4.3
6. *Sāṃkhyasāra* 2.2.4
7. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.4.11

inferred the nature of highest pleasure in the self.[1] Such a pleasure is different from that arising from the objects which is in reality apparent pleasure only. It is because the latter type of pleasure is acquired through a great misery and finally culminates into misery only.[2]

All the texts of the Sāṁkhya agree in considering the self as of the nature of pure consciousness. Even Śaṅkarācārya, the chief critic of Sāṁkhya, sides with the Sāṁkhyas on the point of the nature of Puruṣa as pure consciousness. In this respect the view of the Saṁkhyas, states Śaṅkarācārya, is in accordance with the Upaniṣads.[3] Vijñānabhikṣu explains the Sāṁkhya view in more details. The contribution of Vijñānabhikṣu lies in the fact of explaining consciousness of Puruṣa as different from the knowledge arising from the functioning of the Buddhi (*buddhivṛtti*).[4] The Puruṣa is said to be the experience (*anubhūti*), consciousness, knowledge and feeling or sensation (*vedanā*). Here Vijñānabhikṣu faces a problem as to how this kind of entity can be at the same time experiencer, conscious, knower and a feeler of sensations. This requirs an agency in Puruṣa and the Puruṣa is inactive in nature. Vijñānabhikṣu solves the problem by comparing the Puruṣa to the light. As the light is said to be the manifestor through its contact with the objects mansfested, similarly the Puruṣa is said to be conscious, knower, etc., through its contact with the object of knowledge and experience.[5]

Here, ihe Sāṁkhyas differentiate the pure consciousness of Puruṣa from the objective consciousness arising from the functioning of the Buddhi. The functioning of the Buddhi is a means for the manifestation of the pure consciousness of the

1. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.4.14
2. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.4.23
3. Śāṁkarabhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 2.3.50
4. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.3.2
5. *Sāṃkhyasāra* 2.3.3

Puruṣa. Hence, the conscious light has no specific form and is similar to the space having light. It exists in the state of liberation in its pure form but the light of it is not felt on account of the absence of the functioning of the Buddhi.[1] The functioning of the Buddhi, on the other hand, is with a form and is limited in magnitude like a lamp and innumerable momentary functions of similar kind are always manifested in it.[2] The power of cognising is, thus, not inherent in the Buddhi but is a medium for the consciousness of the Puruṣa to be related with the objects. Vijñānabhikṣu warns that this distinction between the functioning of the Buddhi and the pure consciousness cannot be grasped by the weak minded or ignorant people. Hence. the Naiyāyikas are confused in regarding them one.[3] Even the Buddhists ignore such a distinction and consider the consciousness to be momentary.[4] In the Sāṁkhya view, however, the realisation of such a distinction marks the end of the transmigration or attainment of the liberation.

Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation of *sat* and *ānanda* in the general framework of the Sāṁkhya is worth noting. His explanation of the nature of *cit* is a valuable contribution to Sāṁkhya system. His theory of double reflection for explaining the knowledge and experience is ingenious, though cannot claim the final word on the issue.

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1. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.3.8
2. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.3.9
3. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.3.16
4. *Sāṁkhyasāra* 2.3.17

विज्ञानभिक्षुविरचित:

सांख्यसार:

पूर्वभाग:

प्रथम: परिच्छेद:

महदाख्य: स्वयम्भूर्यो जगदङ्कुर ईश्वर: ।
सर्वात्मने नमस्तस्मै विष्णवे सर्वजिष्णवे ॥१॥

साङ्ख्यकारिकया लेशादात्मतत्त्वं विवेचितम् ।
साङ्ख्यसारविवेकोऽतो विज्ञानेन प्रपञ्च्यते ॥२॥

प्राय: सङ्कलिता साङ्ख्य-प्रक्रिया कारिकागणे ।
साऽतोऽत्र वर्ण्यते लेशात् तदनुक्तांशमात्रत: ॥३॥

साङ्ख्यभाष्ये प्रकृत्यादे: स्वरूपं विस्तरान्मया ।
प्रोक्तं तस्मात् तदप्यत्र सङ्क्षेपादेव वक्ष्यते ॥४॥

आत्मानात्मविवेकसाक्षात्कारात् कर्त्तृत्वाद्यखिलाभिमाननिवृत्त्या तत्कार्यरागद्वेषधर्माद्यनुत्पादात् पूर्वोत्पन्नकर्मणां चाऽविद्यारागादि-सहकार्युच्छेदरूपदाहेन विपाकानारम्भकत्वाद् आरब्धसमाप्त्यनन्तरं पुनर्जन्माभवेन त्रिविधदु:खात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरूपो मोक्षो भवतीति श्रुति-स्मृतिडिण्डिम: । तत्र श्रुतय:—"अथाकामयमानो योऽकामो निष्कामो न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्तीहैव समवलीयन्ते ।

आत्मानं चेत् विजानीयादयमस्मीति पूरुषः ।
किमिच्छन् कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसञ्ज्वरेत् ॥

यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः ।
अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते ॥

कामान् यः कामयते मन्यमानः स कर्मभिर्जायते तत्र तत्र ।
पर्याप्तकामस्य कृतात्मनस्तु इहैव सर्वे प्रविलीयन्ति कामाः ॥

इत्याद्याः ।

स्मृतयश्च कौर्माद्याः । यथा कौर्मे—

"रागद्वेषादयो दोषाः सर्वे भ्रान्तिनिबन्धनाः ।
कार्यो ह्यस्य भवेद् दोषः पुण्यापुण्यमिति श्रुतिः ॥
तद्वशादेव सर्वेषां सर्वदेहसमुद्भवः ।" इति ।

मोक्षधर्मे च—

"इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थाश्च नोपसर्पन्त्यतर्षुलम् ।
हीनश्च करणैर्देही न देहं पुनरर्हति ॥
तस्मात् तर्षात्मकाद् रागाद् बीजाज् जायन्ति जन्तवः ॥"

इति

ननु रागाभावेऽपि केवलकर्मवशाद् नरकादिप्राप्तेः कथं रागस्य कर्मसहकारित्वं विपाकारम्भ उपपन्नम्, नरकादौ विशेषतो रागाभावेऽपि सामान्यतो रागसत्त्वात्, निषिद्धस्त्र्यादिगामिनां स्त्र्यादिरागादेव तप्तलोहमयनारीसमालिङ्गनादिरूपनरकोत्पत्तेः । यद्यप्यविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषभयाख्यं क्लेशपञ्चकमेव जन्मादिविपाकारम्भे कर्मणां सहकारि भवति—"तदेव सक्तः सह कर्मणैति लिङ्गं मनो यत्र निषिक्तमस्य" इति श्रुतावभिमानरागद्वेषादिजन्यस्य विषयवासनाख्यसङ्गसामान्यस्यैव जन्मादिविपाकारम्भे कर्मसहकारित्वसिद्धेः ।

"यत्र यत्र मनो देही धारयेत् सकलं धिया ।
स्नेहाद् द्वेषात् भयात् वाऽपि याति तत्तत्सरूपताम् ॥"

इत्यादिस्मृतेश्च । तथा च—"क्लेशमूलः कर्माशयः", "सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगाः" इति योगसूत्राभ्यामप्यदृष्टे तद्विपाकारम्भे च क्लेशानां हेतुत्ववचनाच्च । तथाऽप्यविद्याऽस्मितासत्त्वे रागस्याऽऽवश्यकत्वाद् द्वेषभययोश्च रागमूलकत्वाद् राग एव मुख्यतो जन्मादिहेतुतया यथोक्तवाक्यैर्निर्दिश्यत इति ।

ननु "क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे" इत्यादिश्रुतेर्ज्ञानस्य प्राचीनकर्मनाशकत्वमेवोचितम्, दाहकत्वं कथमिष्यते इति चेत्, न; "ज्ञानाग्निदग्धकर्माणं तमाहुः पण्डितं बुधाः" इत्यादिवाक्यैर्दाहस्यापि श्रवणेन लाघवाद् दाहपरत्वस्यैव नाशादिवाक्येष्वपि कल्पनौचित्याद् । कर्मणां दाहश्च क्लेशाख्यसहकार्युच्छेदेन नैष्फल्यम् । कर्मणां नाशस्तु प्रारब्धभोगान्ते चित्तनाशादेव भविष्यति, अतो लोकसिद्धेनाविद्यानाशेनैव द्वारेण कर्मफलानुत्पत्तिसम्भवाद् न ज्ञानस्य कर्मनाशकत्वं गौरवादित्यादिकं योगवार्त्तिके प्रपञ्चितमस्माभिरिति दिक् ।

तस्माद् विवेकसाक्षात्कारादविद्याऽस्मितारागादिक्लेशनिवृत्तौ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरूपपरमपुरुषार्थः सिध्यतीत्युपपन्नम् । तथा च योगसूत्रद्वयम्—"हेयं दुःखमनागतम्", "विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः" इति ।

इति श्रीविज्ञानभिक्षुविरचिते साङ्ख्यसारेऽभ्यर्हितत्वादादौ विवेकख्यातिफलस्य परमपुरुषार्थस्य परिच्छेदः ।

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द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः

अथाऽऽत्मानात्मविवेकज्ञानस्य किं स्वरूपं तदुच्यते—आत्मा तावत् सुखदुःखाद्यनुभवितेति सामान्यतो लोकप्रसिद्धिः; अनात्मा च प्रकृत्यादिर्जड़वर्गः; तयोरन्योऽन्यवैधर्म्येण परिणामित्वापरिणामित्वादिरूपेण दोषगुणात्मकेन हेयोपादेयतया पृथक्त्वेन ज्ञानं विवेकज्ञानम्। तथा च श्रुतिः—"स एष नेति नेत्यात्माऽगृह्यो न हि गृह्यतेऽशीर्य्यो न हि शीर्य्यतेऽसङ्गो न हि सज्यतेऽसितो न व्यथते न रिष्यति" इत्यादिः। स्मृतिश्च—

"सोऽथ प्रतिनिवृत्ताक्षो गुरुदर्पणबोधितः।
स्वतोऽन्यां विक्रियां मौढ्यादास्थितामञ्जसैक्षत॥

अथासौ प्रकृतिर्नाहमियं हि कलुषात्मिका।
शुद्धबुद्धस्वभावोऽहमिति त्यजति तां विदन्॥

एवं देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यः शुद्धत्वेनाऽऽत्मनि स्मृते।
निखिला सविकारेयं त्यक्तप्रायाऽहिचर्मवत्॥" इति।

सूत्रञ्च एवं—"तत्त्वाभ्यासान् नेति नेतीति त्यागाद् विवेकसिद्धिः" इति। तत्त्वज्ञानस्य लक्षणञ्च मात्स्ये कृतम्—

"अव्यक्ताद्ये विशेषान्ते विकारेऽस्मिंश्च वर्णिते।
चेतनाचेतनान्यत्वज्ञानेन ज्ञानमुच्यते"॥ इति।

यद्यप्यन्योऽन्यभेदज्ञानमेव विवेकज्ञानं तथाऽप्यात्मविशेष्यकमेव तन्मोक्षकारणं भवति, "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः" इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यः। नन्वनात्मन्यात्मबुद्धिरूपा याऽविद्या पातञ्जलादिषूक्ता

तस्याः कथमात्मात्मविशेष्यकविवेकज्ञाननाश्यत्वं प्रकारादिभेदाद् इति चेत्, न; तादृशाविद्याया अनात्मविशेष्यकविवेकज्ञानद्वारेणाऽत्मविशेष्यकविवेकज्ञाननाश्यत्वादिति।

यच्च योगेन निर्विकल्पकमात्मज्ञानं जायते, तद् विवेकज्ञानद्वारैव मोक्षकारणं भवति न तु साक्षात्, अविद्यानिवर्त्तकत्वाभावात्। 'अहं गौरः कर्त्ता सुखी दुःखी' इत्यादिज्ञानमेव ह्यविद्या संसारानर्थहेतुतया श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायसिद्धा, तस्याश्च निर्वर्तिका 'नाहं गौरः' इत्यादिरूपा विवेकख्यातिरेव भवति। समाने विषये ग्राह्याभावत्वप्रकारकग्राह्याभावज्ञानत्वेनैव विरोधात्; अन्यथा शुक्तिनिर्विकल्पस्यापि 'इदं रजतम्' इति ज्ञानविरोधित्वापत्तेः। किञ्च यथोक्ताभावज्ञाने ग्राह्यज्ञानविरोधित्वस्याऽवश्यकतया निर्विकल्पकज्ञानस्य भ्रमनिवर्त्तकत्वं न पृथक् कल्प्यते गौरवात्। अपि च "अथात आदेशो नेति नेति न ह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत् परमस्ति" इत्यादि श्रुत्या विवेकोपदेशापेक्षयोत्तमोपदेशो नास्तीत्युच्यते।

"क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोरेवमन्तरं ज्ञानचक्षुषा।
भूतप्रकृतिमोक्षञ्च ये विदुर्यान्ति ते परम्॥"

इति गीतादिवाक्यैश्च विवेकज्ञानस्यैव मोक्षहेतुत्वम् उच्यते। अतो विवेकज्ञानमेव साक्षादविद्यानिवृत्त्या मोक्षहेतुः। योगेन केवलात्मसाक्षात्कारस्तु योग्यानुपलब्धिविधयोपाध्यादिगतधर्माभावमुपाध्याधिभेदञ्च ग्राहयति, ततोऽविद्यानिवृत्तिरिति।

एतेन सर्वभूतेषु समताज्ञानमात्मनः सर्वात्मकत्वादिज्ञानञ्च श्रुतिस्मृत्योर्गीयमानं विवेकज्ञानस्यैव शेषभूतं सर्वदर्शनेषु मन्तव्यम्; ज्ञानान्तराणां साक्षादभिमानानिवर्त्तकत्वात्। ब्रह्ममीमांसायां त्वयं विशेषो यत् परमात्मविवेकशेषत्वम्; साङ्ख्यशास्त्रे तु सामान्यात्मविवेकशेषत्वमिति दिक्।

ननु यथोक्तविवेकख्यातितोऽप्यत्यन्तमविद्योच्छेदो न घटते, विवेक-

ख्यातेरविद्याप्रतिबन्धकत्वमात्रत्वेन विवेकख्यातिनाशोत्तरं पुनरभिमानसम्भवात्, शुक्तिरजतविवेकदर्शिनोऽपि कालान्तरे शुक्तौ रजतभ्रमवदिति, मैवम्; दृष्टान्तवैषम्यात्; शुक्त्यादिषु जातेऽपि साक्षात्कारे दूरत्वादिरूपविषयदोषाणां पाटलादिरूपकरणदोषाणाञ्चोत्पत्तिसम्भवेन पुनर्भ्रमो युक्तः। अनात्मन्यात्माभिमाने त्वनादिवासनैव दोषः सर्वास्तिकसम्मतः, जातमात्रस्याभिमाने दोषान्तरानुपलब्धेः। सा मिथ्याज्ञानवासना यदा विवेकख्यातिपरम्पराजन्यदृढवासनोन्मूलिता तदैव विवेकसाक्षात्कारनिष्ठोच्यते। तत्पूर्वमवश्यं वासनालेशतो मिथ्यांशस्य कस्याप्यात्मनि भावात् तस्याञ्च विवेकख्यातिनिष्ठायां जातायां न पुनरभिमानः सम्भवति वासनाख्यदोषाभावादिति तु महद् वैषम्यम्। यदि तु बुद्धिपुरुषयोरन्योऽन्यप्रतिबिम्बनादिकमविवेककारणं दोष इष्यते, तदा तु तद्दोषं बाधित्वैव विवेकसाक्षात्कार उदित इति न तस्य पुनर्भ्रमहेतुत्वं फलबलेन योगजधर्मासहकृतस्यैव तस्य दोषत्वकल्पनासम्भवादिति। विवेकख्यातिनिष्ठा च गीतादिषु लक्षिता—

"प्रकाशञ्च प्रवृत्तिञ्च मोहमेव च पाण्डव।
न द्वेष्टि सम्प्रवृत्तानि न निवृत्तानि काङ्क्षति॥

उदासीनवदासीनो गुणैर्यो न विचाल्यते।
सर्वारम्भपरित्यागी गुणातीतः स उच्यते॥" इति।

गुणातीतो निवृत्तिगुणाभिमानः। अधिकन्तु ज्ञानिलक्षणमग्रे वक्ष्यामः।

नन्वेवमपि विवेकप्रतियोगिपदार्थानामानन्त्येन प्रातिस्विकरूपैः सर्वपदार्थेभ्यो विवेकग्रहासम्भवात् कथं विवेकख्यातेर्मोक्षहेतुत्वम् इति चेत्, न; दृश्यत्वपरिणामित्वादिसामान्यरूपैर्विवेकग्रहसम्भवात्। तथा हि—द्रष्टा स्वसाक्षात्प्रकाश्येभ्यो भिन्नः प्रकाशकत्वात्, यो यस्य प्रकाशकः स तस्माद् भिन्नः, यथा घटादालोको वृत्तिप्रकाश्याच्च

वृत्तिरित्यनुमानेनाऽदावन्तर्दृश्येभ्यो बुद्धिवृत्तितदारूढार्थेभ्यो विवेकतो बुद्धिसाक्षी सिध्यति। कर्मकर्तृविरोधाश्चानुकूलस्तर्कः। अत्र आत्मनि व्यभिचारवारणाय साक्षात्पदं, वृत्तिद्वारैवाऽऽत्मनः स्वविषयत्वात्।

नन्वत्रानुमाने बुद्धिवृत्तिमात्राद् विवेकः सिध्यतु, तस्या एव साक्षादात्मदृश्यत्वाद्, न प्रकृत्यादिभ्य इति चेत्, न; वृत्तीनामज्ञातसत्त्वाभावेन ह्यत्रानुमाने लाघवाद् वक्ष्यमाणतर्कगणाच्चाखिलवृत्तीनां द्रष्टा विभुकूटस्थनित्यैकज्ञानस्वरूपतयैव सिध्यति। यथा नैयायिकानां 'क्षितिः सकर्तृका कार्यत्वादि'त्यनुमाने लाघवात् कर्तुरेकत्वनित्यत्वादिकं तद्वत्। तत्र विभुत्वं परिच्छिन्नभिन्नत्वं, कूटस्थत्वादिकत्वञ्च परिणामिभिन्नत्वादिकमतो बुद्ध्यात्मनोर्दृग्दृश्यरूपतो विवेकग्रहे सति तदुत्तरानुमानेन परिणामित्वापरिणामित्वादिरूपैः सामान्यतोऽप्यात्मानात्मविवेकग्रहो घटत इति। अत एव पातञ्जले सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिरेव मोक्षहेतुतया स्थले स्थले व्यासभाष्ये प्रोक्ता। सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिरूपदृग्दृश्यविवेकग्रहोत्तरं यथोक्तरीत्या प्रकृत्यादिविवेकग्रहात्। तत्र च सत्त्वशब्दे बुद्धिस्थत्वेन बुद्धिसत्त्वमुक्तमिति। एवञ्च प्रकृत्यादिपदार्थानां विशिष्यज्ञानाभावेऽपि तद्विवेकज्ञानं घटते। एतेन दृग्दृश्यविवेकादविद्यानिवृत्तिरिति प्राचां प्रवादोऽप्युपपादितः।

किञ्चाऽऽत्मा प्रकृतितत्कार्येभ्यो भिन्नोऽपरिणामित्वादित्याद्यनुमानैरपि सामान्यतो दृश्यविवेको द्रष्टरि सम्भवतीति। यत्तु आधुनिका वेदान्तिब्रुवा दृश्यत्वेनैव प्रकृत्यादीनां द्रष्टृत्वेन च प्रकृत्याद्यखिलजडेभ्य आत्मविवेकं मन्यन्ते।

"घटद्रष्टा घटाद्भिन्नः सर्वथा न घटो यथा।
देहद्रष्टा तथा देहो नाहमित्यादिरूपतः॥"

तन्न; "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः" इत्यादिश्रुतिभिरात्मनोऽपि दृश्यत्वात्; साक्षाद् दृश्यत्वविवक्षया च प्रकृत्यादेरसङ्ग्रहात् करणद्वारैव तद्दर्शनात्। अथैवं कल्पनीयम् आत्मनो वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वमेव

दृश्यत्वं श्रुत्यादिभिर्विधीयते, न तु प्रकाश्यत्वरूपफलव्यात्यत्वं स्वयम्प्रकाशस्वरूपस्य प्रकाशापेक्षाविरहात्; अतोऽत्र दृश्यत्वं प्रकाश्यत्वम्, तच्चात्मनि नास्तीति तदपि तुच्छम्। यथा ह्यहमित्यनुभूयमानोऽप्यात्मा चैतन्याख्यफलव्याप्यो न भवतीति भवद्भिरुच्यते, तथैव बौद्धैरपीष्यते, सुखदुःखादिमत्त्वेनापि बुद्धिः स्वप्रकाशतया चैतन्यव्याप्या न भवतीति। तथा चात्मनीव बुद्धावपि दृश्यत्वासिद्ध्या दृश्यत्वेन रूपेण बुद्धिविवेकोऽत्यन्तापेक्षितोऽपि व सिध्यतीति; भाष्यादिषु चान्यान्यत्र दूषणान्युक्तानीति दिक्।

ननु सम्भवत्वेवं सामान्यरूपेण विवेकग्रहः, तथाऽपि सामान्यान्येव बहूनि सन्ति परिणामित्व संहत्यकारित्व-सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्व-चतुर्विंशति-तत्त्वादीन्यतः तैस्तै रूपैर्विवेकग्रहाणां मोक्षहेतुत्वेऽननुगमदोष इति चेत्, न; अभिमानप्रतिबन्धकज्ञानत्वेनैवानुगमादिति। अथैवं सामान्यरूपेण विवेकस्यैव सर्वाभिमाननिवर्त्तकतया 'नाहं देहो नेन्द्रियाणी' त्यादिप्रत्येकरूपैर्विवेकग्रहाणां मोक्षहेतुत्वं श्रुतिस्मृत्योरुच्यमानं कथं घटेतेति चेत्, न; अवान्तरविवेकानां सामान्यविवेकप्रपञ्चमात्रत्वादिति।

इति श्रीविज्ञानभिक्षुविरचिते साङ्ख्यसारे मोक्षहेतुविवेकज्ञानस्य स्वरूपस्य परिच्छेदः

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तृतीयः परिच्छेदः

अथ के ते प्रकृत्यादयो येभ्यः पुरुषो विवेचनीय इत्युच्यते—

"प्रकृतिर्बुद्ध्यहङ्कारो तन्मात्रैकादशेन्द्रियम्।
भूतानि चेति सामान्याच् चतुर्विंशतिरेव ते॥"

एतेष्वेव धर्मधर्म्यभेदेन गुणकर्मसामान्यानामन्तर्भावः। तत्र प्रकृतित्वं साक्षात् परम्परयाऽखिलविकारोपादानत्वम्—प्रकृष्टा कृतिः परिणामरूपा अस्या इति व्युत्पत्तेः। प्रकृति शक्तिरजा प्रधानमव्यक्तं तमो मायाऽविद्येत्यादयः प्रकृतेः पर्यायाः।

"ब्राह्मीति विद्याऽविद्येति मायेति च तथा परे।
प्रकृतिश्च परा चेति वदन्ति परमर्षयः॥"

इति स्मृतेः।

सा च साम्यावस्थयोपलक्षितं सत्त्वादिद्रव्यत्रयम्। कार्यसत्त्वादिवारणायोपलक्षितान्तम्। साम्यावस्था च न्यूनाधिकभावेनासंहननावस्था, अकार्यावस्थेति यावत्। महदादिकन्तु कार्य्यसत्त्वादिकं न कदाऽप्यकार्यावस्थं भवतीति तद्व्यावृत्तिः। वैषम्यावस्थायामपि प्रकृतित्वसिद्धये उपलक्षितमित्युक्तम्। अकार्यमिति तूपलक्षितान्तस्य निष्कृष्टार्थः।

सत्त्वादिगुणवती सत्त्वाद्यतिरिक्ता प्रकृतिरिति न शङ्कनीयम्; "सत्त्वादीनामतद्धर्मत्वं तद्रूपत्वात्" इति साङ्ख्यसूत्रेण सत्त्वादीनां

प्रकृतिस्वरूपत्वहेतुना प्रकृतिधर्मत्वप्रतिषेधात्, योगसूत्र-तद्भाष्याभ्यामपि गुणानामेव प्रकृतित्ववचनाच्च। गुणेभ्य एव कार्योत्पत्तौ तदन्यप्रकृतिकल्पनावैयर्थ्याच्च। प्रकृतेर्गुणा इत्यादिवाक्यन्तु वनस्य वृक्षा इतिवत् बोध्यम्। "सत्त्व रजस्तम इति प्रकृतेरभवन् गुणाः" इति सत्त्वादीनां प्रकृतिकार्य्यत्ववचनन्तु गुणनित्यतावाक्यविरोधेन महत्तत्त्वकारणीभूतकार्यसत्त्वादिपरमेव। महदादिसृष्टिर्हि गुणवैषम्याच् श्रूयते। तच्च वैषम्यं सजातीयसंवलनेन गुणान्तरव्यावृत्तप्रकाशादिफलोपहितः सत्त्वादिव्यवहारयोग्यः परिणाम इति। एतेनाष्टाविंशतितत्त्वपक्षोऽप्युपपादितो मन्तव्यः।

वैषम्य एव सत्त्वादिव्यवहारश्च श्रुतौ दृश्यते; यथा "तम एवेदमग्र आस तत्परेणेरितं विषमत्वं प्रयात्येतद् वै रजसो रूपं तद्रजः खल्वीरितं विषमत्वं प्रयात्येतद् वै सत्त्वस्य रूपम्' इति। सत्त्वादित्रयञ्च सुखप्रकाशलाघवप्रसादादिगुणवत्तया संयोगविभागादिमत्तयाऽनाश्रितत्वोपादानत्वादिना च द्रव्यत्वेऽपि पुरुषोपकरणत्वात् पुरुषबन्धकत्वाच्च गुणशब्देनोच्यते, इन्द्रियादिवत्। गुणानां सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वप्रवादस्तु धर्मधर्म्यभेदात्, मनसः सङ्कल्पात्मकत्वत्। तत्र सत्त्वं सुखप्रसादप्रकाशाद्यनेकधर्मकं प्राधान्यतस्तु सुखात्मकमुच्यते। एवं रजोऽपि दुःखकालुष्यप्रवृत्त्याद्यनेकधर्मकं प्राधान्यतस्तु दुःखात्मकमुच्यते, तथा तमोऽपि मोहावरणस्तम्भनाद्यनेकधर्मकं प्राधान्यतस्तु मोहात्मकमुच्यते। त एव धर्मास्तेषां लक्षणानि भवन्ति।

सत्त्वादिसंज्ञा चान्वर्था, सतो भावः सत्त्वमुत्तमत्वमिति व्युत्पत्त्या हि धर्मप्राधान्येनोत्तमं पुरुषोपकणं सत्त्वशब्दार्थः। मध्यमञ्च रजःशब्दार्थो रागयोगात्। अधमञ्च तमःशब्दार्थः अधर्मावरणयोगात्। तानि च सत्त्वादीनि प्रत्येकमसङ्ख्यव्यक्तयः, "लघुत्वादिधर्मैरन्योऽन्यं साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यञ्च गुणानाम् इति साङ्ख्यसूत्रात्। अत्र हि सूत्रे लघुत्वादिना बहूनां सत्त्वानां साधर्म्यं तेनैव रजस्तमोभ्यां वैधर्म्यम्। एवं चलत्वादिना, गुरुत्वादिना च बहूनां रजसां बहूमाञ्च तमसां तदुभयमुक्तमिति। किञ्च यदि सत्त्वादित्रय-

मेकैकव्यक्तिरेव स्यात्, तत् त्रयं विभ्वेव वक्तव्यम्, एकदाऽनेकब्रह्माण्डादिसृष्टिश्रवणात्; तथा च कार्याणामनन्तवैचित्र्यं न घटते। न च संयोगवैचित्र्यात् वैचित्र्यं स्यादिति वाच्यम्; विभूनां त्रयाणां गुणानां स्वतः संयोगवैचित्र्यासम्भवात्, द्रव्यान्तरस्य चावच्छेदकीभूतस्याभावादिति। तस्मात् सत्त्वादीन्यसङ्ख्यव्यक्तिकान्येव द्रव्याणि। तेषु त्रित्ववचनन्तु सत्त्वत्वादिविभाजकोपाधित्रयेण वैशेषिकाणां नवद्रव्यवचनवदिति सिद्धम्।

तानि च सत्त्वादीनि यथायोग्यमणुविभुपरिमाणकानि, अन्यथा रजसश्चलस्वभावत्ववचनविरोधात्, आकाशकारणत्वस्य च विभुत्वौचित्यात्, सर्वेषां कारणद्रव्याणां विभुत्वे कार्याणां परिच्छिन्नत्वानुपपत्तेश्च। नन्वेवं वैशेषिकोक्तान्येव पार्थिवाण्वादीनि प्रकृतिरित्यायातमिति चेत्, न; गन्धादिगुणशून्यत्वेन कारणद्रव्येषु पृथिवीत्वाद्यभावतोऽस्माकं विशेषात्। तदुक्तं विष्णुपुराणादिषु—

> "अव्यक्तं कारणं यत् तत् प्रधानमृषिसत्तमैः।
> प्रोच्यते प्रकृतिः सूक्ष्मा नित्यं सदसदात्मकम् ॥१९॥
> शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तद् रूपादिभिरसंयुतम् ॥२०॥
> त्रिगुणं तज् जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवाप्ययम्" ॥२१॥

इत्यादिना।

वैशेषिकाणां कारणद्रव्येषु गन्धाद्यनुमानन्तु भाष्येऽस्माभिर्निराकृतम्। अथैवमपि प्रकृतेरणुविभुसाधारणसत्त्वाद्यनेकव्यक्तिरूपत्वेऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वैकत्वाक्रियत्वसिद्धान्तक्षतिरिति, मैवम्; कारणद्रव्यत्वरूपप्रकृतित्वेनैवापरिच्छिन्नत्ववचनात्, गन्धत्वेन गन्धानां पृथिवीव्यापकतावत्, आकाशदिप्रकृतीनां विभुत्वेनैव प्रकृतिविभुत्वसिद्धान्तोपपत्तेश्च। तथा पुरुषभेदेन सर्गभेदेन च भेदाभावस्यैवैकशब्दार्थत्वात्, "अजामेकाम्" इति श्रुतितस्तथाऽवगमात्। अथाध्यवसायाभिमानादिक्रियाराहित्यस्यैवाक्रियशब्दार्थत्वात्, अन्यथा श्रुतिस्मृतिषूक्तस्य

प्रकृतिक्षोभस्यानुपपत्तेरिति । प्रकृतिगताश्चापरे विशेषा भाष्ये द्रष्टव्याः । प्रकृत्यनुमानं चेदम्—सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं महदादिकार्यं सुखदुःखमोहात्मकद्रव्यकार्यं सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वात् वस्त्रादिकार्य-शय्यादिवदिति । श्रुतिस्मृती चात्रानुग्राहकस्तर्कः ।

एवं सामान्यतोऽनुमितायाः प्रकृतेर्विशेषाः शास्त्राद् योगाच्चावगन्तव्याः, अनुमानस्यसामान्यमात्रविषयकत्वात् । नन्वन्तरेव सुखादिकमुपलभ्यते, बाह्यवस्तुषु सुखादौ किं प्रमाणं येन दृष्टान्तता स्यात् ? इति । उच्यते—अन्तःकरणस्य सुखादिहेतुतया विषयेषु सुखादिकं सिध्यति; न च रूपादिगतोत्तमत्वादिकमेव सुखाद्युत्पादने नियामकम्, उत्तमत्वादेर्जातिरूपत्वे नीलत्व-पीतत्वादिना जातिसाङ्कर्यापत्तेः, कालादिभेदैरेकस्या एव रूपव्यक्तेः सुखदुःखोत्पादकत्वाच्च । अतः सुखादिमत्त्वमेवोत्तमत्वादिकम् । किञ्च घटरूपमिति प्रत्ययवत् स्त्रीमुखं चन्दनसुखमित्यादिप्रत्ययादपि विषये सुखाद्युचितम् । अधिकन्तु भाष्ये द्रष्टव्यम् । तदेवं प्रकृतिर्निरूपिता ।

महत्तत्त्वं निरूप्यते—प्रकृतेः सकाशाद् बुद्ध्याख्यं महत्तत्त्वं जायते; तस्य धर्मादिरूपप्रकृष्टगुणयोगात् महत्संज्ञा, तदेव च लक्षणम् । महान् बुद्धिः प्रज्ञेत्यादयश्च तस्य पर्यायाः; तथा चोक्तमनुगीतायाम्—

"महानात्मा मतिर्विष्णुर्जिष्णुः शम्भुश्च वीर्यवान् ।
बुद्धिः प्रज्ञोपलब्धिश्च तथा ब्रह्मा धृतिः स्मृतिः ॥२॥
पर्यायवाचकैरेतैर्महानात्मा निगद्यते ॥३॥
सर्वतः पाणिपादश्च सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमुखः ।
सर्वतः श्रुतिमाँल्लोके सर्वं व्याप्य स तिष्ठति ॥४॥
अणिमा लघिमा प्राप्तिरीशानो ज्योतिरव्ययः ॥५॥
ज्ञानवन्तश्च ये केचिदलुब्धा जितमन्यवः ॥७॥
विमुक्ताः सर्व एवैते महत्त्वमुपयान्त्युत ॥८॥
विष्णुरेवाऽऽदिसर्गेषु स्वयम्भूर्भवति प्रभुः ॥१२॥"

इति ।

अत्र सत्त्वाद्यंशत्रयेण महतो देवतात्रयोपाधित्वात् तदविवेकेन ब्रह्मविष्णुशिवत्ववचनम् । तदुक्तं विष्णौ—

"सात्त्विको राजसश्चैव तामसश्च त्रिधा महान्"

इति ।

मात्स्ये च—

"सविकारात् प्रधानात्तु महत्तत्त्वमजायत ।
महानिति यतः ख्यातिर्लोकानां जायते सदा ॥३।१७
गुणेभ्यः क्षोभ्यमाणेभ्यस्त्रयो देवा विजज्ञिरे ।
एका मूर्त्तिस्त्रयो देवा ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वराः ॥३।१६"

इति ।

अणिमेत्यादिभावनिर्देशो धर्मधर्म्यभेदात् । ब्रह्मशङ्करापेक्षयाऽप्यादौ विष्णुरूपेणैव महानाविर्भवतीति "विष्णुरेव" इत्यर्द्धेनोक्तम् (अश्व० ४०।११) ।

इदमेव महत्तत्त्वमंशतो रजस्तमःसम्भेदेन परिणतं सद् व्यष्टिजीवानामुपाधिधर्मादियुक्तं क्षुद्रमपि भवति—"महदुपरागात् विपरीतम्" इति साङ्ख्यसूत्रात् । महत्तत्त्वस्य प्राधान्येनासाधारण्येन चाध्यवसायो वृत्तिः, महदहङ्कारमनस्त्रितयात्मकस्यान्तःकरणस्य महत्तत्त्वं बीजावस्थेति । अत्र प्रकृतेर्महान् महतोऽहङ्कार इत्यादिसृष्टिक्रमे शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणम्, अनुमानेन सामान्यतः कार्याणां सकारणकत्वमात्रसिद्धेः, न तु सृष्टौ भूतादिक्रमो वाऽन्तःकरणादिक्रमो वेत्येकतरावधारकमनुमानं सम्भवति, स्पष्टलिङ्गाभावात् । श्रुतिस्मृत्यनुगृहीतं यथाकथञ्चिल्लिङ्गन्तु महदादिक्रमेऽस्तीति भाष्येऽस्माभिः प्रदर्शितम् । महत्तत्त्वं निरूपितम् ।

अहङ्कारो निरूप्यते—महत्तत्त्वादहङ्कार उत्पद्यते, अङ्कुरात् शाखिवत् । तस्य चाभिमानवृत्तिकत्वादहङ्कारसंज्ञा, कुम्भकारसंज्ञावत्; तदेव लक्षणम् । तस्य च पर्यायाः कौर्मे प्रोक्ताः,—

"अहङ्कारोऽभिमानश्च कर्त्ता मन्ता च संस्मृतः ।
आत्मा देही च जीवश्च यतः सर्वाः प्रवृत्तयः ॥"

इति ।

स चाहङ्कारस्त्रिविधतया त्रिविधकार्यहेतुः । तदुक्तं कौर्मे—

"वैकारिकस्तैजसश्च भूतादिश्चैव तामसः ।
त्रिविधोऽयमहङ्कारो महतः सम्बभूव ह ॥१८॥
तैजसादिन्द्रियाणि स्युर्देवा वैकारिकाद् दश ॥२२॥
एकादशं मनश्चात्र स्वगुणेनोभयात्मकम् ॥
भूततन्मात्रसर्गस्तु भूतादेरभवन् प्रजाः ॥२३॥"

इति ।

वैकारिकः सात्त्विकः । तैजसो राजसः । स्वगुणेनेन्द्रियवृत्तिषु साहाय्यरूपेणोत्कर्षेण । उभयात्मकं ज्ञानकर्मोभयेन्द्रियात्मकम्; "अन्यत्रमना अभूवं नाश्रौषम्" इत्यादिश्रुत्या मनसो ज्ञानकर्मोभयेन्द्रियसहकारित्वसिद्धेरिति । एकादशेन्द्रियदेवाश्च—दिग्वातार्कप्रचेतोऽश्वि-वह्नीन्द्रोपेन्द्रमित्रकामचन्द्राश्च । इति अहङ्कारो निरूपितः ।

इन्द्रियादीनि निरूप्यन्ते – अहङ्कारादादौ मन उत्पद्यते ।

"शब्दरागाच्छ्रोत्रमस्य जायते भावितात्मनः ।
रूपरागात् तथा चक्षुर्घ्राणं गन्धजिघृक्षया ॥"

इत्यादिना मोक्षधर्मादाविन्द्रियादीनां मनोवृत्तिरागादिकार्यत्वश्रवणात् । ततश्चाहङ्कारात् सङ्कल्पपूर्वकं दशेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चतन्मात्राणि चोत्पद्यन्ते । इन्द्रिय-तन्मात्रयोश्च कार्यकारणभावस्याभावात् क्रमनियमो नास्ति । तत्रेन्द्रियेषु नास्त्यवान्तरकार्यकारणभावः, प्रमाणाभावात्; तन्मात्रेषु त्वस्ति; स यथा—शब्दतन्मात्राद् वक्ष्यमाणक्रमेण स्पर्शतन्मात्रं शब्दस्पर्शोभयगुणकम्, एवं क्रमेणैकैकगुण-

वृद्ध्या परतन्मात्रत्रयं पूर्वपूर्वतन्मात्रेभ्य उत्पद्यते, पातञ्जलभाष्ये तन्मात्रेषु क्रमेणैकैकगुणवृद्धिवचनात् । ततश्च पञ्चतन्मात्रेभ्यः पञ्चभूतानि जायन्ते । तत्राहङ्कारात् पञ्चतन्मात्राणां तद्द्वारा भूतानाञ्चोत्पत्तौ क्रमः कूर्मविष्ण्वादिपुराणेषूक्तः; यथा कूर्मे—

"भूतादिस्तु विकुर्वाणः शब्दमात्रं ससर्ज ह ।
आकाशं शुषिरं तस्मादुत्पन्नं शब्दलक्षणम् ॥

आकाशस्तु विकुर्वाणः स्पर्शमात्रं ससर्ज ह ।
वायुरुत्पद्यते तस्मात् तस्य स्पर्शो गुणो मतः ॥"

इत्यादिक्रमेणेति ।

नन्वेवमाकाशादिभूतचतुष्टयस्यापि तत्त्वान्तरारम्भकत्वेन प्रकृतित्वापत्त्या केवलविकृतित्वसिद्धान्तक्षतिरिति चेन्न; आकाशादीनां स्पर्शादितन्मात्रेष्वहङ्कारोपष्टम्भमात्रेण कारणत्वस्य पुराणेषूक्तत्वादिति । तदेवं त्रयोविंशतितत्त्वानामुत्पत्तिरुक्ता ।

तत्र पञ्चभूतानि वर्जयित्वा अहङ्कारञ्च बुद्धौ प्रवेश्य सप्तदशकं लिङ्गशरीरसंज्ञं भवति, वह्नेरिन्धनवदात्मनोऽभिव्यक्तिस्थानत्वात् । तच्च सर्वपुरुषाणां सर्गादावुत्पद्य प्राकृतप्रलयपर्य्यन्तं तिष्ठति, तेनैव चेहलोकपरलोकयोः संसरणं जीवानां भवति । प्राणश्च बुद्धेरेव वृत्तिभेदः इत्यतो न लिङ्गशरीरात् पृथक् निर्दिश्यते । तस्य लिङ्गशरीरस्य सूक्ष्माणि पञ्च भूतान्याश्रयश्चित्रादिवत्, आश्रयं विना परमसूक्ष्मस्य लोकान्तरगमनासम्भवात् । इदञ्च लिङ्गशरीरमादौ स्वयम्भुव उपाधिभूतमेकमेव जायते, तस्यैव विराडाख्यवक्ष्यमाणस्थूलशरीरवत् । ततश्च व्यष्टिजीवानामुपाधिभूतानि व्यष्टिलिङ्गशरीराणि तदंशभूतानि ततो विभज्यन्ते, पितुर्लिङ्गशरीरात् पुत्रलिङ्गशरीरवत् । तदुक्तं सूत्रकारेण—"व्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषात्" इति । मनुनाऽप्युक्तम्—

"तेषां त्ववयवान् सूक्ष्मान् षण्णामप्यमितौजसाम् ।
सन्निवेश्याऽऽत्ममात्रासु सर्वभूतानि निर्ममे ॥"

इति ।

षण्णामिति षडिन्द्रियं समस्तलिङ्गशरीरोपलक्षकम्; तथा च स्वयम्भूः स्वलिङ्गशरीरावयवान् सूक्ष्मान् अल्पान् आत्ममात्रासु स्वांशचेतनेषु संयोज्य सर्वप्राणिनः ससर्जेत्यर्थः ।

लिङ्गशरीरं निरूपितम् । स्थूलशरीरोत्पत्तिरुच्यते—दशगुणित-महत्तत्त्वमध्येऽहङ्कारः, अहङ्कारस्यापि दशगुणितस्य मध्ये व्योम, व्योम्नोऽपि दशगुणितस्य मध्ये वायुः, वायोरपि दशगुणितस्य मध्ये तेजः, तेजसोऽपि दशगुणितस्य मध्ये जलम्, जलस्यापि दशगुणितस्य मध्ये पृथिवी समुत्पद्यते; सैव स्थूलशरीरस्य बीजम्; तदेव च पृथिवी-रूपं बीजमण्डरूपेण परिणमते; तस्यापि दशगुणितस्याण्डरूपस्य पृथिव्यावरणस्य मध्ये चतुर्दशभुवनात्मकं स्वयम्भुवः स्थूलशरीरं तत्सङ्कल्पादेवोत्पद्यते, तेनैव शरीरेण स्वयम्भूर्नारायण इत्युच्यते। तदुक्तं मनुना स्वयम्भुवं प्रकृत्य—

"सोऽभिध्याय शरीरात् स्वात् सिसृक्षुर्विविधाः प्रजाः ।
अप एव ससर्जाऽऽदौ तासु बीजमवासृजत् ॥८॥

तदण्डमभवद्धैमं सहस्रांशुसमप्रभम् ।
तस्मिन् जज्ञे स्वयं ब्रह्मा सर्वलोकपितामहः ॥६॥

स वै शरीरी प्रथमः स वै पुरुष उच्यते ।
आदिकर्त्ता स भूतानां ब्रह्माऽग्रे समवर्त्तत ॥
आपो नारा इति प्रोक्ता आपो वै नरसूनवः ।
ता यदस्यायनं पूर्वं तेन नारायणः स्मृतः ॥१०॥"

इत्यादिनेति । तत एव चाऽऽदिपुरुषाद् व्यष्टिपुरुषाणां विभागा-दन्ते च तत्रैव लयात् स एव चैक आत्मेति श्रुतिस्मृत्योर्व्यह्रियते । अतो न व्यवहारपरतया नारायण एव सर्वभूतानामात्मेति श्रुति-स्मृतिविरोध इति। ततश्च स नारायणो विराट्शरीरी स्वनाभि-

कमलकर्णिकास्थानीयस्य सुमेरोरुपरि चतुर्मुखाख्यस्वयम्भुवं सृष्ट्वा तद्द्वारा अन्यानपि व्यष्टिशरीरिणः स्थावरान्तान् ससर्ज । तथा च स्मर्यते—

"तच्छरीरसमुत्पन्नैः कार्यैस्तैः कारणैः सह ।
क्षेत्रज्ञाः समजायन्त गात्रेभ्यस्तस्य धीमतः ॥"

इति ।

यत्तु शेषशायिनो नारायणस्य नाभिकमलश्रोत्रचक्षुरादिभ्यश्च-तुर्मुखस्याऽऽविर्भावः श्रूयते, तद् दैनन्दिनसर्गेष्वेव कल्पभेदेन मन्तव्यम् । दैनन्दिनप्रलयेष्वेव हि नारायणशरीरे प्रविश्यैकीभूय सुप्तानां देवानां चतुर्मुखादिक्रमेणाविभावः शेषशायिनः सकाशाद् घटते, न त्वादिसर्गेषु; दैनन्दिनप्रलय एव लीलाविग्रहेण शयनादिति ।

तदेवं सङ्क्षेपतश्चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वानि तेषां सृष्टिरूपं प्रयोजनञ्चो-क्तम् । तत्र यद् यस्मात् जायते तस्य तदापूरणेनैव स्थितिः, ततस्तस्य संहारोऽपि तत्रैव भवति—

"यद् यस्माज् जायते तत्त्वं तत् तत्र प्रविलीयते ।
लीयन्ते प्रतिलोमानि जायन्ते चोत्तरोत्तरम् ॥"

इति भारतादिभ्य इति । एते च सृष्टिस्थितिसंहाररूपाः स्थूला एव परिणामाश्चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वानां कूटस्थपुरुषविवेकाय प्रदर्शिताः । सूक्ष्मा अप्यन्ये प्रतिक्षणपरिणामा एतेषां स्मर्यन्ते । तथा च—

"नित्यदा ह्यङ्ग भूतानि भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ।
कालेनालक्ष्यवेगेन सूक्ष्मत्वात् तन्न दृश्यते ॥" इति—

अतश्च सर्वं जड़वस्तु परमार्थतः सर्वदैवासदुच्यते; ततश्च तस्मात् विरज्याऽऽत्मैव परमार्थसत्यो दुःखभीरुभिर्द्रष्टव्यः । तदुक्त-मनुगीतायाम्—

अव्यक्तबीजप्रभवो बुद्धिस्कन्धमयो महान् ।
महाहङ्कारविटप इन्द्रियाङ्कुरकोटरः ॥२०॥

महाभूतप्रशाखश्च विशेषप्रतिशाखवान् ।
सदापर्णः सदापुष्पः शुभाशुभफलोदयः ॥२१॥

आजीवः सर्वभूतानां ब्रह्मवृक्षः सनातनः ।
एतज्ज्ञात्वा च तत्त्वेन ज्ञानेन परमासिना ॥२२॥

छित्त्वा चाक्षरतां प्राप्य जहाति मृत्युजन्मनी ॥२३॥

इति श्रीविज्ञानभिक्षुविरचिते साङ्ख्यसारे विवेकप्रतियोगिनां प्रकृत्यादीनां स्वरूपपरिच्छेदः ।

इति साङ्ख्यसारस्य पूर्वभागः ।

उत्तरभागः

प्रथमः परिच्छेदः

अथ शिष्यैः सुखेनैव ग्रहीतुं पद्यमालया ।
विवेकस्यानुयोग्यात्मा पुरुषाख्यो निरूप्यते ॥१॥

तत्र सामान्यतः सिद्धो जानेऽहमिति धीबलात् ।
द्रष्टाऽतो नित्यविभ्वादिधर्मैरेव स साध्यते ॥२॥

भोक्ता नित्यस्तदर्थत्वात् तत्कर्मोत्पादितत्त्वतः ।
महदादिविकाराणां सर्वेषामविशेषतः ॥३॥

अपि चादृष्टसंस्काराधारत्वाद् बीजरूपतः ।
धीरनादिरतोऽस्याश्च सिद्धा भोक्तुरनादिता ॥४॥

स्वस्वामिभावानादित्व मृते भोक्तृव्यवस्थितेः ।
स्वभुक्तवृत्तिसंस्कार-वत्त्वं स्वत्वन्तु बुद्धिषु ॥५॥

स्वाम्यं स्वनिष्ठसंस्कार-हेतुवृत्तेश्च भोक्तरि ।
अतश्च घटते स्वत्व-नाशे कैवल्यमात्मनः ॥६॥

भोक्तुश्चानादिभावस्य विनाशे हेत्वसम्भवात् ।
न नाशो भोक्तुरस्तीति भोक्ता नित्यो हि सिध्यति ॥७॥

जन्यो ज्ञानप्रकाशोऽस्य नित्यत्वे तु न युज्यते ।
न ह्यप्रकाशे कुत्रापि प्रकाशोत्पत्तिरीक्ष्यते ॥८॥

कार्य्ये प्रकाशाख्यगुणेऽवयवानां हि तद्गुणः ।
कारणं तेन नानित्यः प्रकाशो नित्यवस्तुनि ॥९॥

प्रकाशाश्रयसंयोगात् प्रकाशभ्रम इन्धने ।
आदर्शे चावृतेर्भङ्गात् प्रकाशोत्पत्तिविभ्रमः ॥१०॥

तस्मान्नित्यात्मनो ज्ञानं नित्यं वाच्यं तथा सति ।
लाघवाज्ज्ञानमेवात्मा निराधारः प्रकल्प्यते ॥११॥

अनाश्रिततया द्रव्यं संयोगादेश्च तन्मतम् ।
अतो जानेऽहमित्यादि-बुद्धिरप्युपपद्यते ॥१२॥

पिण्डेऽहंधी हि मूढानां ध्रुवैवानादिदोषतः ।
संयोगात् तत्र पिण्डे तु ज्ञानवत्त्वमतिः प्रमा ॥१३॥

सन्तु वाऽधेयतात्पत्व-जन्मनाशाविबुद्धयः ।
श्रोत्रस्य नभसो वार्थ-ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानमात्रके ॥१४॥

तस्माल्लाघवतर्केण बाधकाभावतस्तथा ।
श्रुत्यादिभिश्च नित्यात्मा चिद्रूपेणैव सिध्यति ॥१५॥

तज्ज्ञानं विभु नित्यत्वात् देहव्यापितयाऽपि च ।
मध्यत्वे नाशिता हि स्यादणुत्वे वाऽल्पदेशता ॥१६॥

विभुत्वेऽपि स्वाधीवृत्तेरेव साक्षान्निरीक्षणात् ।
न सर्वत्र सदा सर्वभानं ज्ञाने प्रसज्यते ॥१७॥

अर्थभानं चितावर्थ-प्रतिबिम्बो मतो बुधैः ।
वृत्तेरेव चितौ साक्षात् प्रतिबिम्बनयोग्यता ॥१८॥

अतोऽसङ्गेऽपि कूटस्थ-चैतन्ये विभुनि ध्रुवे ।
वृत्तिद्वारकमेवान्य-भानं फलबलान्मतम् ॥१९॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वृत्तिजन्यतयाऽखिलः ।
वृत्त्यैकाधिकरण्येन कामादिर्धीषु नात्मसु ॥२०॥

अतोऽन्तःस्थविकाराणां स्वस्वबुद्धिष्ववस्थितेः ।
कूटस्थ एव सर्वोऽपि चिदाकाशगणः समः ॥२१॥

नित्यशुद्धो नित्यबुद्धो नित्यमुक्तो निरञ्जनः ।
स्वप्रकाशो निराधारः प्रदीपः सर्ववस्तुषु ॥२२॥

नन्वेवमेकतैवास्तु लाघवादात्मनां खवत् ।
घोष्वेव सुखदुःखादि-वैधर्म्यादिति चेन्न तत् ॥२३॥

भोगाभोगादिवैधर्म्येणैकरूपेऽपि चिद्गणे ।
श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यामुक्तेन भेदसिद्धेः परस्परम् ॥२४॥

सुखादिप्रतिबिम्बात्मा भोगोऽप्यस्य न वस्तुतः ।
तथाऽप्यस्य चितौ भावाभावौ स्यातां हि भेदकौ ॥२५॥

औपाधिकौ यथा श्याम-रागौ स्फटिकभेदकौ ।
खदृष्टान्तश्च विषमो वैधर्म्यासिद्धितोऽम्बरे ॥२६॥

इति श्रीविज्ञानभिक्षुविरचिते सांख्यसारे पुरुषस्वरूप परिच्छेदः ।

द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः

अथात्मानात्मवैधर्म्यें गुणदोषात्मके तयोः ।
वक्ष्ये विस्तरतो येन विवेकोऽतिस्फुटो भवेत् ॥१॥

सामान्यात्मघनाकाशे सान्निध्येरितशक्तिभिः ।
जायते लीयते भूत्वा भूयोऽयं जगदम्बुदः ॥२॥

त्रिगुणात्मकशक्तीनां परिणामैरतश्चितिः ।
आधारविधया विश्वोपादानमविकारतः ॥३॥

यथाऽधारतया तोयं धरोपादानमिष्यते ।
स्वस्थपार्थिवतन्मात्र-द्वारेणैवं चितिर्मता ॥४॥

अतो जगदुपादानमपि ब्रह्माऽविकारतः ।
कूटस्थनित्यपर्य्याय परमार्थसदुच्यते ॥५॥

स्वार्थत्वात् स्वानुभूत्या च सिद्धत्वात् परमार्थसत् ।
स्वतः स्थित्या स्वतः सिद्धया लौकैः सन्निति गीयते ॥६॥

प्रतिक्षणविकारेण तैस्तै रूपैरपायतः ।
प्रकृत्यादिरसत् सर्वो जडार्थोऽब्धौ तरङ्गवत् ॥७॥

यत्तु कालान्तरेणापि नान्यसंज्ञामुपैति वै ।
परिणामादिसम्भूतां तत् वस्त्वित्यादिकस्मृतेः ॥८॥

परार्थाधीनसत्त्वाच्च परदृष्टया च सिद्धितः ।
परतः सन्नसन्नेव तत्परापेक्षया मतः ॥९॥

सतोऽस्तित्वन्तु नासत्ता नास्तित्वे सत्यता कुतः ।
इति गारुडतश्चैवं सदसत्त्वव्यवस्थितेः ॥१०॥

अतो न सन्नासदिदं जगत् सदसदात्मकम् ।
असद्विषयकत्वाच्च तस्य धीस्तात्त्विको भ्रमः ॥११॥

जगद्वृक्षस्य चैतन्यं सारोऽसारस्तथेतरत् ।
प्रपञ्चस्य स्थिरांशो हि चितिरेवाविकारतः ॥१२॥

तदन्यदखिलं तुच्छमसारत्वादुदीर्य्यते ।
तथाऽनृतमसच्चापि तदपेक्ष्यस्थिरत्वतः ॥१३॥

एवंविधैवात्मसत्ता अन्याऽसत्ता च दर्शिता ।
वासिष्ठादौ विस्तरतो यथा लेशात् तदुच्यते ॥१४॥

स्वप्नो जाग्रत्यद्रूपः स्वप्ने जाग्रदसद्वपुः ।
मृतिजन्मन्यसद्रूपा मृतौ जन्माप्यसन्मयम् ॥१५॥

जगन्मयी भ्रान्तिरिति न कदाऽपि न विद्यते ।
विद्यते न कदाचिच्च जलबुद्बुदवत् स्थितम् ॥१६॥

आत्मैवास्ति परं सत्यं नान्याः संसारदृष्टयः ।
शुक्तिकारजतं यद्वद् यथा मरुमरीचिका ॥१७॥

अस्ति सर्वगतं शान्तं परमात्मघनं शुचि ।
अचिन्त्यचिन्मात्रवपुः परमाकाशमाततम् ॥१८॥

तत् सर्वगं सर्वशक्ति सर्वं सर्वात्मकं स्वयम् ।
यत्र यत्र यथोदेति तथाऽस्ते तत्र तत्र वै ॥१९॥

आविर्भावतिरोभाव-मयास्त्रिभुवनोर्मयः ।
स्फुरन्त्यतितते यस्मिन्मराविव मरीचयः ॥२०॥

असत्येव सती तोय-नद्येव लहरी चला ।
मनसेवेन्द्रजालश्रीर्जागती प्रवितन्यते ॥२१॥

ब्रह्मणा तन्यते विश्वं मनसैव स्वयम्भुवा ।
मनामयमतो विश्वं यन्नाम परिदृश्यते ।।२२।।

यो ह्यशुद्धमतिर्मूढो रूढो न वितते पदे ।
वज्रसारमिदं तस्य जगदस्त्यसदेव सत् ।।२३।।

अव्युत्पन्नस्य कनके कानके कटके यथा ।
कटकज्ञप्तिरेवास्ति न मनागपि हेमधीः ।।२४।।

तथाऽज्ञस्य पुरागार-नगनागेन्द्रभासुरा ।
इयं दृश्यदृगेवास्ति न त्वन्या परमार्थदृक् ।।२५।।

इत्यादिवाक्यैर्वासिष्ठे नात्यन्तासत्योदिता ।
जगतोऽपरवाक्यैर्हि सत् कार्य्यं प्राकृतं मतम् ।।२६।।

नामरूपविनिर्मुक्तं यस्मिन् सन्तिष्ठते जगत् ।
तमाहुः प्रकृतिं केचिन्मायामेकेऽपरे त्वणून् ।।२७।।

सुषुप्तावस्थाया चक्र-पद्मरेखा शिलोदरे ।
यथा स्थिता चितेरन्तस्तथेयं जगदावली ।।२८।।

प्रकृतिव्रततिर्व्योम्नि जाता ब्रह्माण्डसत्फला ।
इत्यादिवाक्यैः साङ्ख्यीय-सत्कार्य्याद्युपवर्णनात् ।।२९।।

इति श्रीविज्ञानभिक्षुविरचिते साङ्ख्यसारे आत्मानात्मनोः
सत्यत्वासत्यत्ववैधर्म्यपरिच्छेदः ।

तृतीयः परिच्छेदः

तदेवमात्मनः सत्ता दर्शिताऽन्यविलक्षणा ।
अथ चिद्रूपतां वक्ष्ये बुद्धिवृत्तिविलक्षणाम् ।।१।।

अनुभूतिश्चितिर्बोधो वेदनं चोच्यते पुमान् ।
वेद्यं जडं तमोऽज्ञानं प्रधानादिकमुच्यते ।।२।।

वेदन वेद्यसम्बन्धादेव वेत्त्रभिधीयते ।
यथा प्रकाश्यसम्बन्धात् प्रकाशोऽपि प्रकाशकः ।।३।।

यथा वाऽर्थोपरागेण भानमर्थस्य भासकम् ।
एवं वेद्योपरक्तस्यास्यांशस्याऽधारतांऽशिनि ।।४।।

असङ्गायां चितौ वेद्योपरागोऽयं न धीष्विव ।
किन्तु साक्षाद् द्वारतो वा चिति तत्प्रतिबिम्बनम् ।।५।।

बाह्यं वृत्त्याख्यकरणाभावादनुपरागतः ।
चितिर्नैवेक्षते चेत्यं विभुत्वेऽपि च सर्वतः ।।६।।

तथा चिदपि वृत्त्याख्य-करणाभावतोऽर्थवत् ।
स्वगोचरां वृत्तिमृते तिष्ठत्यज्ञातसत्तया ।।७।।

तदेवं चिन्निराकारा प्रकाशाकाशरूपिणी ।
तिष्ठत्यव्यक्तरूपा च मोक्षादौ वृत्त्यभावतः ।।८।।

बुद्धिवृत्तिस्तु साकारा परिच्छिन्ना च दीपवत् ।
व्यक्ता च सर्वदा तद्वदसङ्ख्या क्षणभङ्गुरा ।।९।।

जडा च परदृश्यत्वाद् घटदीपादिवन्मता ।
वृत्तेः प्रकाशता त्वर्थाकारत्वादक्षतैव हि ॥१०॥

यथाऽस्याकारतार्हत्वादादर्शस्तत्प्रकाशकः ।
सर्वाकारत्वयोग्यत्वात् सैवं सर्वप्रकाशिका ॥११॥

न पुनर्वृत्तिद्रष्टृत्वं चितस्तद्भिन्नद्रष्टृता ।
वृत्तेर्यतो गौरवं स्यात् तयोर्ज्ञातृत्वकल्पने ॥१२॥

बुद्ध्यारूढं त्वन्यवस्तु तद्द्वारा प्रतिबिम्बितम् ।
पश्यत्यनुभवो नान्यो द्रष्टा बुद्ध्यादिकोऽखिलः ॥१३॥

इत्येवं बुद्धिवृत्तिभ्यो वैलक्षण्यं चितीरितम् ।
चिदचित्त्वाख्यवैधर्म्यं देहादिभ्यः स्फुटन्त्विदम् ॥१४॥

अन्योऽन्यप्रतिबिम्बेन सारूप्याद् वृत्तिबोधयोः ।
बोधव्यवहृतिर्वृत्तौ लोहेऽग्निव्यवहारवत् ॥१५॥

नैवाल्पबुद्ध्या शक्योऽयं विवेका वृत्तिबोधयोः ।
तार्किका यत्र सम्मूढाः साङ्ख्यानां श्रेष्ठता यतः ॥१६॥

विज्ञानवादिनो बौद्धा वृत्तिबोधाविवेकतः ।
ज्ञानात्मत्वश्रुतौ मूढा मेनिरे क्षणिकां चितिम् ॥१७॥

सत्त्वपुंसो विवेकोऽयं वृत्तितद्बोधरूपयोः ।
नाशक्यः सुधियां यद्वद्धंसानां क्षीरनीरयोः ॥१८॥

एतदन्तश्च संसारो मोक्षस्तत्रैव संस्थितः ।
यद्वृत्तिभ्यो विवेकेन तद्बोधस्यावधारणम् ॥१९॥

सर्वोऽप्यनुभवं वेद न कश्चिदपि वेद ताम् ।
विवेकमात्रमस्मिन् हि भासमानेऽप्यपेक्षते ॥२०॥

आत्मा विवेक्तुं बाह्यार्थे न शक्यो वृत्तिमिश्रणात् ।
अतो वृत्तौ विवेक्तव्यो वृत्तिबोधतयैव सः ॥२१॥

यथा बुद्ध्या विवेकार्हो नाग्निरङ्गारमिश्रणात् ।
सोऽङ्गारे तु विवेकार्हो काष्ठदग्धृतया स्फुटम् ॥२२॥

अत एव श्रुतौ स्वप्ने दृश्यवृत्तिविवेकतः ।
स्वयंज्योतिःस्वरूपेण तस्या द्रष्टा प्रदर्शितः ॥२३॥

साक्षात् प्रकाशो यो यस्य स तद्भिन्नो मतो बुधैः ।
घटादिभ्यो यथाऽऽलोक आलोकाच्चापि वृत्तयः ॥२४॥

वृत्तेः साक्षात् प्रकाशत्वादतोऽनुभवरूपकः ।
वृत्तिभ्यो भिन्न आत्मेति शीघ्रो मार्गः स्वदर्शने ॥२५॥

एवमादिप्रकारेण बुद्धिसत्त्वप्रकाशतः ।
विलक्षणतया सिद्धश्चित्प्रकाशोऽस्य भासकः ॥२६॥

स्वप्नदेहादिदृष्टान्तैस्तस्माच्छ्रुत्यादिदर्शितैः ।
जाग्रद्देहेन्द्रियार्थेभ्यश्चितिभिन्नतया मता ॥२७॥

स्वप्ने देहादिकं सर्वं चिद्भिन्नं चिति भासते ।
जाग्रत्येवं विशेषस्तु यद् बाह्यमपि भासते ॥२८॥

स्वप्ने मनोमयत्वाच्च साक्षाच्चिद्विषयोऽखिलम् ।
करणद्वारतो बाह्यं चितो जाग्रति गोचरः ॥२९॥

सर्वं देहादिकं स्वप्न-जाग्रतोरेकरूपतः ।
भाति चिद्व्योम्नि नात्रार्थ-बाह्यान्तर्भेदतो भिदा ॥३०॥

चिद्व्योम्नि वासनातो धीः प्रमाणात् वाऽर्थरूपिणी ।
ततश्चितोऽर्थभानं यत् तत् समं स्वप्नजाग्रतोः ॥३१॥

तदिदं स्वानुभूत्यैव प्रोच्यते न परोक्षतः ।
स्वप्नदृष्टान्तसदृशो नोपायोऽस्त्यात्मदर्शने ॥३२॥

सुषुप्तौ हि यथा स्वप्ने स्वात्मन्येवेक्षतेऽखिलम् ।
आत्मानं चैकदेशस्थं मन्यते जागरे तथा ॥३३॥

सुषुप्तिरात्मनस्तत्त्वं स्वरूपावस्थितेस्तदा ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नौ मायिकौ तु मृषा सारूप्यतो धिया ॥३४॥

बुद्धेः सुषुप्तिस्तमसाऽऽवरणं तद्विलक्षणा ।
चितेः सुषुप्तिर्वृत्त्याख्य-दृश्यावरणशून्यता ॥३५॥

पूर्णः कूटस्थनित्यश्च स्वस्वधीमात्रवृत्तिदृक् ।
वृत्त्याख्यदृश्यविरहात् सर्वदा नेक्षते पुमान् ॥३६॥

वृत्तिदेशे यथा बोधस्तथा सर्वत्र सर्वदा ।
वृथैव तप्यते मूढ़ैर्व्ययनाशादिनाऽऽत्मनः ॥३७॥

:खदुभोगमहारोग-निदानं देहगेहिनी ।
बुद्धिर्न त्यज्यते मूढैर्महानिद्रासुखं यतः ॥३८॥

अनादिबुद्धिगार्हस्थ्यं विवेकस्त्यज्यते न चेत् ।
न मोक्षो बाह्यसंन्यासाविहामुत्रासुखं परम् ॥३९॥

समचिन्मात्ररूपेषु स्वपरात्मसु सर्वदा ।
बुद्धिमात्रविवेकेन स्वपराविभिदा मृषा ॥४०॥

चिन्मात्रे निर्गुणे स्वामिन्यारोप्यैवात्मकर्त्तृताम् ।
स्वाम्यवज्ञापराधेन बध्यते धीः स्वकर्मभिः ॥४१॥

साध्वी तु धीः पतिं दृष्ट्वा याथातथ्येन तत्परा ।
इहानन्दमयी चान्ते पतिदेहे लयं व्रजेत् ॥४२॥

नाहं कर्त्ता सुखी दुःखी चिन्मात्राकाशरूपकः ।
एवं नाथं चिन्तयन्ती न पत्युर्दुःखभागदा ॥४३॥

इति श्रीविज्ञानभिक्षुविरचिते साङ्ख्यसारे आत्मानात्मनो
श्चिदचित्त्ववैधर्म्यपरिच्छेदः ।

चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः

इत्येवमात्मनः प्रोक्तो बुद्ध्यादिभ्यो विलक्षणः ।
चित्प्रकाशोऽधुनाऽऽनन्द-रूपता वक्ष्यते तथा ॥१॥

दुःखं कामसुखापेक्षा सुखं दुःखसुखात्ययः ।
इति स्मृतेः सुखात्मत्वं नित्यनिर्दुःखताऽऽत्मनः ॥२॥

परिभाषाबलाद्रूढि-बाधः सर्वत्र सम्मतः ।
अन्यथा परिभाषेयं मोक्षशास्त्रे भवेद् वृथा ॥३॥

यद्वा परोक्षवादेन परमप्रियताऽऽत्मये ।
रूपिका सुखगीः पुंसि विभुत्वाप्त्यै खशब्दवत् ॥४॥

नानन्दं न निरानन्दमित्यादिश्रुतिभिः स्फुटम् ।
आत्मन्यानन्दरूपत्व-निषेधाद् युक्तिसंयुतात् ॥५॥

उपासाद्यर्थशून्यत्वान्नेति नेति श्रुतेस्तथा ।
निषेधवाक्यं बलवद् विधिवाक्यादिति स्थितिः ॥६॥

निर्निरानन्दमिति च स्वोपाध्यानन्दभोक्तृताम् ।
स्वामित्वरूपिणीं क्वचित न निर्धन इतीव हि ॥७॥

प्रेयोऽन्यस्माच्च सर्वस्मादिति श्रुत्या सुखादपि ।
उक्त आत्मा प्रियस्तस्य सुखत्वोक्तिश्च नोचिता ॥८॥

आनन्दाद्याः प्रधानस्य इति वेदान्तसूत्रतः ।
वेदान्तेऽपि न सिद्धान्त आत्मनः सुखरूपता ॥९॥

विस्तराद् ब्रह्ममीमांसा-भाष्येऽस्माभिः परीक्षितम् ।
चितेरसुखरूपत्वं प्रेमा व्याख्यायतेऽधुना ॥१०॥

मा न भूवमहं शश्वद् भूयासमितिरूपकः ।
निर्निमित्तोऽनुरागो यः स प्रेमा परमश्चिति ॥११॥

अन्याशेषतया बुद्धेः स्नेहोऽयं न सुखेष्वपि ।
अतः प्रियतमः स्वात्मा नान्योऽतो ह्यधिकः प्रियः ॥१२॥

आत्मत्वेनात्मनि प्रेमा न सुखत्वाद्यपेक्षते ।
अहं स्यामिति चेद् यस्मात् सुखं स्यामिति नेष्यते ॥१३॥

तथा च सुखतादुःखाभावते वाऽऽत्मताऽपि च ।
प्रेम्णि प्रयोजिका सिद्धा त्वतः प्रेमात्मतैव तु ॥१४॥

तस्माद् वस्तुत आत्मैव प्रियो नौपाधिकत्वतः ।
औपाधिकीतरप्रीतिरस्थिरत्वान्न तात्त्विकी ॥१५॥

प्रीतिरन्यत्र चानित्याऽविवेकाद्यैः सुखादिषु ।
आत्मप्रीतिस्तु नित्याऽतो नित्यानन्दः पुमान् मतः ॥१६॥

आत्मनः प्रियतां बुद्धिर्यदि पश्येत् समाहिता ।
सर्वातिशायिनीं तर्हि सुखाब्धौ किं न मज्जति ॥१७॥

प्रियदर्शनतो बुद्धेः सुखं लोकेषु दृश्यते ।
अतोऽनुमेयं परम-प्रियदृष्ट्या परं सुखम् ॥१८॥

आत्मार्थत्वेन सर्वत्र प्रीतिरात्मा स्वतः प्रियः ।
इति शश्वच्छ्रुतिः प्राह आत्मदृष्टिविधित्सया ॥१९॥

ततोऽप्यनुपमं ज्ञेयं प्रियात्मेक्षणतः सुखम् ।
भुञ्जते तत् सुखं धीरा जीवन्मुक्ता महाधियः ॥२०॥

अन्तरात्मसुखं सत्यमविसंवादि योगिनाम् ।
अपश्यन् कृपणो बाह्य-सुखार्थी वञ्चितो जनः ॥२१॥

सुखाशया बहिः पश्यन् देही ह्येन्द्रियरन्ध्रकैः ।
वातायनैर्गृहीत्वाऽन्तः सुखं वेत्ति न बाह्यदृक् ॥२२॥

दुःखलभ्यान् दुःखमयान् परिणामेऽतिदुःखदान् ।
विषयोत्थान् सुखाभासान् धिक् स्वात्मसुखरोधकान् ॥२३॥

इति श्रीविज्ञानभिक्षुविरचिते सांख्यसारे आत्मानात्मनोः
प्रियाप्रियत्ववैधर्म्यपरिच्छेदः ।

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पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः

परिच्छेदत्रयेणोक्तं सच्चिदानन्दरूपकम् ।
मीयमानं श्रुतिस्मृत्योरात्मनो लक्षणत्रयम् ॥१॥

तद्वैपरीत्यमन्येषां लक्षणञ्चेरितं स्फुटम् ।
आभ्यान्तु गुणदोषाभ्यां विवेको दोषहृत् परः ॥२॥

नैर्गुण्यसगुणत्वादि-वैधर्म्याण्यपराण्यपि ।
बहूनि वक्ष्ये सङ्क्षेपात् पुम्प्रकृत्योरतः परम् ॥३॥

धियोऽर्थाकारया वृत्त्या जनितत्वात् सुखादयः ।
सामानाधिकरण्येन कल्प्यन्ते लाघवाद् धियाम् ॥४॥

महदादेर्जडत्वेन तद्धेतुश्च जडो मतः ।
कार्य्यकारणसाजात्यं दृष्टं लोके हि सर्वतः ॥५॥

अत आत्मा बोधमात्र-तया सिध्यति लाघवात् ।
गुणाः सर्वे प्रकृत्यादेर्विकारश्चेतरेऽखिलाः ॥६॥

आत्मा तु निर्गुणस्तद्वत् कूटस्थश्च मतो बुधैः ।
चितेः कूटस्थसंज्ञा तु स्थिरत्वाद् गिरिकूटवत् ॥७॥

लेपश्चेतरसम्बन्धे तद्रूपैरुपरक्तता ।
यथा विषयसम्बन्धाद् बुद्धौ भवति वासना ॥८॥

भाण्डादौ द्रव्ययोगाच्च तत्तद्द्रव्यस्य वासना ।
लेपहेतुश्च सम्बन्धः सङ्गः सम्बन्धि चाञ्जनम् ॥९॥

अतो निरञ्जनोऽसङ्गो निर्लेपश्चोच्यते पुमान् ।
नभःपुष्करपत्रादि-दृष्टान्तैः परमर्षिभिः ॥१०॥

चिन्मात्रानन्तशक्त्यब्धौ पुमर्थपवनेरिताः ।
सत्त्वादिशक्तयो यान्ति विश्वबुद्बुदरूपताम् ॥११॥

अत ईशश्चिदात्मैव जगतः सन्निधानतः ।
मणिवत् प्रेरकत्वेन जडानामयसामिव ॥१२॥

पुमानेव जगत्कर्त्ता जगद्भर्त्ताऽखिलेश्वरः ।
स्वाम्यर्थे भृत्यवद् यस्माज्जडवर्गः प्रवर्त्तते ॥१३॥

करणानि च देहेषु राजार्थमधिकारिवत् ।
भोग्यजातं मनोमन्त्रिण्यर्पयन्ति स्वभावतः ॥१४॥

तैर्भोग्यैर्युक्तमात्मानमावेदयति धीश्चिति ।
ईक्षामात्रेण तद् भुङ्क्ते राजेवात्माखिलेश्वरः ॥१५॥

धनादेरीश्वरो देहो देहस्येन्द्रियमीश्वरम् ।
इन्द्रियस्येश्वरो बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मेश्वरः परः ॥१६॥

कूटस्थस्येश्वरस्यान्यो नास्ति प्रेरक इत्यतः ।
ईश्वरस्यावधित्वेन द्रष्टा वै परमेश्वरः ॥१७॥

अन्यस्यागन्तुकैश्वर्य्यं बहुव्यापारसङ्कुलम् ।
निर्व्यापारस्य निर्दोषमनाद्यैश्वर्य्यमात्मनः ॥१८॥

सर्वशक्तिमयो ह्यात्मा शक्तिमण्डलताण्डवः ।
संसारं तन्निवृत्तिञ्च माययाऽप्नोति हेलया ॥१९॥

सर्वातिशायि निर्दोषमैश्वर्य्यमिदमात्मनः ।
पश्यतो योगिनो ब्राह्ममप्यैश्वर्य्यं तृणायते ॥२०॥

बाह्यस्यात्मोच्यते देहो देहस्यात्मेन्द्रियाणि च ।
बुद्धिरात्मेन्द्रियाणस्य बुद्धेरात्मा तु चिन्नभः ॥२१॥

अत आत्मावधित्वेन परमात्मोच्यते चितिः ।
तथाऽन्तःकरणैर्योगाज्जीव इत्युच्यते चितिः ॥२२॥

अविद्याकार्य्यरहितः परमात्मेति च स्मृतिः ।
यस्य यद् व्यापकं तस्य तद् ब्रह्माऽतो परा विकम् ॥२३॥

प्रकृत्यन्तं भवेद् ब्रह्म स्वस्वकार्य्याद्यपेक्षया ।
सेश्वरे साङ्ख्यवादेऽपि चितेरेवानुमन्यते ॥२४॥

परे वा परमात्मत्वाविकन्तु न जडे क्वचित् ।
अध्यक्षव्यापकत्वाभ्यां परं ब्रह्म तु चेतनः ॥२५॥

तस्याध्यक्षं व्यापकञ्च न हेतुविषयाऽस्ति हि ।
असङ्ग्यात्मा नभोराशिरिविभक्तैकरूपकः ॥२६॥

सोऽतश्चिद्घनविज्ञान-घनात्मघनसंज्ञकः ।
प्रकाशस्यानपेक्षत्वात् स्वस्थ द्रष्टृतयाऽपि च ॥२७॥

स्वप्रकाशः पुमानुक्त इतरे तद्विलक्षणाः ।
भोगोऽभ्यवहृतिः सा च कूटस्थे नास्ति धीष्विव ॥२८॥

धीवृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बाख्य-गौणभोगा तु भोक्तृता ।
साक्षाद् धीवृत्तिद्रष्टृत्वाद् बुद्धिसाक्ष्युच्यते पुमान् ॥२९॥

विना विकारं द्रष्टृत्वात् साक्षी तूक्तोऽखिलस्य सः ।
चेत्योपरागरूपत्वात् साक्षिताऽप्यध्रुवा चितः ॥३०॥

उपलक्षणमेवेदमपि व्यावृत्तये जडात् ।
अतः पुमाननिर्देश्योऽणश्च सूक्ष्मश्च कथ्यते ॥३१॥

विना दृश्यमदृश्यत्वादव्यक्तश्चोच्यते स्वतः ।
अदृश्यो दृश्यते राहुर्गृहीतेन यथेन्दुना ।
अहश्यं चाऽस्यमादर्शे चित् तथा स्वस्वबुद्धिषु ॥३२॥

चित्ति विश्वस्य सङ्गश्चेद् विश्वं भासेत सर्वदा ।
विश्वाधारोऽप्यतः शून्यमिति चिद्गीयते खवत् ॥३३॥

दृश्यदोषान् मृषाबुद्धि द्रंष्टर्य्यारोप्य निर्मले ।
आदर्शे मलवद् व्योम्नि दोषदृष्टचा तु तप्यते ॥३४॥

वस्तुतश्चिति नास्त्येव मलो दृश्याश्रितः सदा ।
अतश्च निर्मलः स्वस्थो निर्दोषश्चोच्यते पुमान् ॥३५॥

सजातीयेषु वैधर्म्य-लक्षणा नास्ति यद् भिदा ।
अत आत्मा समः प्रोक्त ऐकरूप्याच्च सर्वदा ॥३६॥

देहाध्यक्षतया देही पुर्य्यभिव्यक्तितः पुमान ।
एकाकित्वादद्वितीयः केवलश्चोच्यते तु सः ॥३७॥

चिच्छक्त्यप्रतिबन्धेन प्रोच्यतेऽनावृतः पुमान् ।
सर्वस्वामितया चाऽत्मा क्षेत्रज्ञः क्षेत्रवेदनात् ॥३८॥

हृत्सरोवरधीपद्म-दलवृत्तिषु लीलया ।
चरन्निवानन्दमीनान् भुञ्जानो हंस उच्यते ॥३९॥

हकारेण बहिर्याति सकारेण विशन् पुनः ।
प्राणवृत्त्याऽनये चापि प्राण्यात्मा हंस उच्यते ॥४०॥

शरीरागारहृद्व्योम-गुहायां बुद्धिभार्य्यया ।
व्यज्यमानस्तया सार्द्धं स्वपन्निव गुहाशयः ॥४१॥

त्रिगुणात्मकमायां स्वां सान्निध्यात् परिणामयन् ।
मायीति कथ्यते चात्मा तत्कृतानृतवेषधृक् ॥४२॥

खान्येकादश भूतानि पञ्चैतानि तु षोडश ।
पुंसः कलास्तत्त्वतस्तु निरंशत्वात् स निष्कलः ॥४३॥

अहंशब्दः स्वामिवाची स्वामी साक्षी तु चेतसः ।
अतोऽहमिति शब्देन चिन्मात्रं प्रोच्यते बुधैः ॥४४॥

सर्वेश्वरः सर्ववेत्ता सर्वकर्त्ताऽद्वयः पुमान् ।
सामान्यादुच्यते यद्वद् राजा सर्वनराधिपः ॥४५॥

आत्माऽद्वैतस्य सूत्रेण जातिमात्रेण वर्णनात् ।
प्रलये हि विजातीय-द्वैतशून्यत्वमात्मनाम् ॥४६॥

असङ्गत्वान्नित्यशुद्धो नित्यबुद्धश्च चित्त्वतः ।
नित्यमुक्तस्तथा नित्य-निर्दुःखत्वात् पुमान् मतः ॥४७॥

इत्यादिगुरुशास्त्रोक्त-दिशा स्वानुभवेन च ।
वैधर्म्यादात्मनोऽनात्म-विवेकः क्रियतां बुधैः ॥४८॥

परिच्छेदचतुष्केण पुम्प्रकृत्योः सुविस्तरात् ।
वैधर्म्यगण उक्तोऽयं ध्यायिनामाशुमुक्तिदः ॥४९॥

इति श्रीविज्ञानभिक्षुविरचिते साङ्ख्यसारे आत्मवैधर्म्यगणपरिच्छेदः ।

षष्ठः परिच्छेदः

विवेकमेव सद्युक्त्या मत्वा तदनुभूयते ।
राजयोगं यथा कुर्यात् समासेन तदुच्यते ॥१॥

अशक्तो राजयोगस्य हठयोगेऽधिकारवान् ।
वासिष्ठे हि वसिष्ठाय भुसुण्डेनैवमीरितम् ॥२॥

ज्ञानावृत्तौ राजयोगे प्राणायामासने हठे ।
मुख्ये तेऽङ्गतयाऽन्योऽन्यं सेव्ये शक्त्यनुसारतः ॥३॥

विषयेऽनन्तदोषा ये श्रुतिस्मृतिसमीरिताः ।
त आदौ परिद्रष्टव्याश्चित्तस्थैर्याय योगिभिः ॥४॥

कामबीजान्यनन्तानि सम्प्ररोहन्ति यद्भुवि ।
तत्राटवीनिभे ज्ञान-पुण्यशस्यं न वर्द्धते ॥५॥

दोषदृष्ट्यग्निसन्दग्धे कामबीजे तु चेतसि ।
गुरुशास्त्रहलैः कृष्टे सुक्षेत्रे तद्विवर्द्धते ॥६॥

सत्येष्वसत्तां प्रचुरां तथा रम्येष्वरम्यताम् ।
सुखेषु प्रचुरं दुःखं पश्यन् धीरो विरज्यते ॥७॥

ब्रह्मलोकोऽपि नरको विनाशामेध्यपूरितः ।
युक्तश्च स्वाधिकैरन्यैस्त्रैगुण्यादि दुःखयुक् ॥८॥

तत्रत्यैरपि मुक्त्यर्थं यत्यते जन्मभीरुभिः ।
अतो ज्ञेयः समासेन लोकः सर्वोऽपि दुःखयुक् ॥९॥

इदं मे स्यादिदं मा स्यादितीच्छाव्यथितं मनः ।
स्वभावात् तेन विज्ञेयं दुःखं चित्तेन सङ्गतिः ॥१०॥

सुखं सुषुप्तिः परमा दुःखं विषयवेदनम् ।
सुखदुःखसमासोऽयं किमन्यैर्बहुभाषितैः ॥११॥

तस्मादनर्थानर्थाभान् परीक्ष्य विषयान् सुधीः ।
उत्सृजेत् परमार्थार्थी बालरम्यानहीनिव ॥१२॥

इत्यादिकानन्तदोष-दृष्टचया रागस्य तानवे ।
मायाविवेकतः शुद्धमात्मानं चिन्तयेत सदा ॥१३॥

इदं तदिति निर्देष्टुं गुरुणाऽपि न शक्यते ।
उदासीनस्यात्मतत्त्वं स्वयमेव प्रकाशते ॥१४॥

बुद्धिबोधात्मको बुद्धि-साक्षी बुद्धेः परो विभुः ।
कूटस्थोऽहं चिदादित्य इत्येकाग्रोऽनुचिन्तयेत् ॥१५॥

वृत्तिबोधो घटच्छिद्रमिव नाश्यल्प ईक्ष्यते ।
वस्तुतो वृत्तिबोधोऽहं पूर्णो व्योमवदक्षयः ॥१६॥

अन्तर्यद् दृश्यते सर्वं तद् बुद्धेर्वृत्तिरुच्यते ।
तम्यो दुःखात्मकेभ्योऽहं साक्षात् तद्वीक्षिता पृथक् ॥१७॥

कर्मकर्तृविरोधो हि वृत्त्या वृत्तिप्रकाशने ।
वृत्तिधाराकल्पने च गौरवादिति निश्चितम् ॥१८॥

हर्षशोकभयक्रोध-लोभमोहमदैस्तथा ।
द्वेषाभिमानकार्पण्य-निद्रालस्यस्मरादिभिः ॥१९॥

धर्माधर्मैश्च सम्पूर्णा बुद्धिर्दुःखमयी तु मे ।
आत्मानं दर्शयत्येव भास्करायेव रोगिणः ॥२०॥

अहं सर्वगतं शान्तं परमात्मघनं शुचि ।
अचिन्त्यचिन्मात्रनभो विश्वदर्पणमक्षयम् ॥२१॥

निरञ्जनं निराधारं निर्गुणं निरुपद्रवम् ।
निर्विशेषं सजातीयात् समस्तार्थावभासकम् ॥२२॥

ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेशाद्याः स्थावरान्ताश्च चेतनाः ।
अवैधर्म्यात्मकाभेदादहमित्यनुचिन्तयेत् ॥२३॥

अहमन्ये च पुरुषाः समचिद्व्योमरूपिणः ।
अत आत्मैक एवाहमिति श्रुतिषु गीयते ॥२४॥

इति पश्यन् स्वभोगैश्च योगी विश्वं प्रपूजयेत् ।
आत्मयागोऽप्ययं प्रोक्तः श्रुत्यक्तः साङ्ख्ययोगिनाम् ॥२५॥

"सर्वभूतस्थमात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि ।
समं पश्यन्नात्मयाजी स्वाराज्यमधिगच्छति" ॥२६॥

इत्येवं मनुनाऽप्यात्मयागो ज्ञानाङ्गमीरितः ।
तस्मादभयदानेन स्वभोगाद्यर्चनेन च ।
सम्मानयन् भूतजातमात्मानमनुचिन्तयेत् ॥२७॥

ब्रह्मविष्णुशिवादीनां भोगे रागश्च हीयते ।
तेषां स्वसाम्यदृष्टचाऽतः साम्यं योगी विचिन्तयेत् ॥२८॥

उत्पत्तौ प्रलये चव सर्वावस्थासु सर्वदा ।
सर्वेषामेकरूपत्वे द्रष्टू रागादिकं कुतः ॥२९॥

विष्ण्वादयो महैश्वर्यं भुञ्जाना अपि नाधिकाः ।
मत्तोऽतोऽलं तदैश्वर्यैरविवेकजनप्रियैः ॥३०॥

गुणकर्मादिभिः किञ्चिन्निरीक्ष्याधिकमात्मनः ।
तदर्थं यतते लोको नाहं पश्यामि मेऽधिकम् ॥३१॥

तथा न्यूनं न पश्यामि यदतिक्रमशङ्कया ।
देवा दैत्यजयायेव यतिष्ये तज्जयाशया ॥३२॥

अहं यथा तथैवान्ये आब्रह्म-नारका जनाः ।
दृश्यन्ते स्वात्मवत् प्रेम्णा पितृभ्रातृसुतादिवत् ॥३३॥

क ईश ईशितव्यो वा क: श्रेष्ठ: कोऽधमोऽपि वा ।
अभिन्ने भेददृष्ट्या स्यान्मृत्योर्भयमिति श्रुति: ॥३४॥

चिद्व्योमस्वेकरूपेषु ईशानीशादिरूपक: ।
रूपभेदो ह्यसन् सर्व: स्फटिके रूपभेदवत् ॥३५॥

धियां रूपै: पुमानेको बहुरूप इवेयते ।
वृकचर्मादिरूपाद्यैर्मायीव बहुरूपधृक् ॥३६॥

मामालिङ्ग्य निराकारं विविधाकारधारिणी ।
मायैवैका हि नृत्यन्ती मोहयत्यखिला धिय: ॥३७॥

पुंसां भेदो बुद्धिभेदादम्बुभेदाद् यथा रवे: ।
व्योम्नश्च छिद्ररूपेण भेद: कुम्भादिभेदत: ॥३८॥

अत: शुद्धो बुद्धमुक्त: सर्वदा सर्वगोऽव्यय: ।
अहमन्ये च तत्राहो शत्रुमित्रादिधीर्मृषा ॥३९॥

ब्रह्मणीशे हराविन्द्रे सर्वभूतगणे तथा ।
उत्तमाधममध्यत्व-विभागो मायया मृषा ॥४०॥

त्रिगुणात्मकमायायास्त्रैविध्यादात्मनोऽपि हि ।
उत्तमाधममध्यत्व-त्रैविध्यं नैव हि स्वत: ॥४१॥

यथा देहे तथाऽन्यत्र चित्प्रकाशोऽयमव्यय: ।
व्यक्तताऽव्यक्ततामात्र-भेदो ह्यन्तरबाह्ययो: ॥४२॥

एवमन्येऽपि पुरुषा बद्धमुक्ताविशेषत: ।
ईशानीशाविशेषाच्च पुरुषार्थो न मेऽस्त्यत: ॥४३॥

महानिद्रैव मे साध्वी दु:खभोगहरा प्रिया ।
अप्रिया मूढचित्तानामसाध्वी धीहृतात्मनाम् ॥४४॥

चिदादर्शे मयि धियो यद्यपि प्रतिबिम्बनम् ।
तत्वतो नैव दोषाय तथाऽपि त्याज्यमेव तत् ॥४५॥

स्वभावादस्य हेयत्वं स्वानुभूत्या हि सिध्यति ।
यथा कोऽपि परस्यापि वैरूप्यं न दिदृक्षति ॥४६॥

स्वामिन्यारोप्यात्मदोषान् साध्वीयमनुतप्यते ।
निर्दोषं स्वामिनं दृष्ट्वा निर्दोषा स्यात् पतिव्रता ॥४७॥

एवमस्या रूपभेदेऽप्येकरूपोऽस्मि सर्वदा ।
भुञ्जानो वाऽप्यभुञ्जानस्तां मदर्थामनन्यगाम् ॥४८॥

यथैकरूपतोपाधि-योगायोगदशास्वहो ।
आदर्शस्यामलस्यैव चिन्नभोदर्पणस्य मे ॥४९॥

दृश्यबुद्धिगता दोषा: साक्षात् तद्द्रष्टरि प्रभो ।
न सन्ति मयि मोहाद्या भास्करे भास्यदोषवत् ॥५०॥

दु:खैर्बद्धा स्वमात्मानं त्यक्त्वा मद्भावमागता ।
मुच्यते दु:खबन्धाद् धीर्न मे मोक्षो न बन्धनम् ॥५१॥

कूटस्थासङ्गचिद्व्योम्नि धीदु:खप्रतिबिम्बनम् ।
योऽन्यो बन्धो भोगरूप: सोऽपि चिद्दर्पणे मृषा ॥५२॥

जाग्रदादित्रयावस्था-साक्षी ताभिर्विवर्जित: ।
अहं पूर्णश्चिदादित्य उदयास्तविवर्जित: ॥५३॥

दर्पणे मुखवद् विश्वं मयि बोधे न तात्त्विकम् ।
विभुत्वेऽपि च बाह्यान्त: सुषुप्त्यादावदर्शनात् ॥५४॥

मयि वाऽन्यत्र वा पुंसि केवलानुभवे विभौ ।
भाति यत् तद्विवर्त्तो धी-प्रतिबिम्बात्मकत्वत: ॥५५॥

शक्तौ रजतवद् विश्वमतो मयि न दोषकृत् ।
मरीचौ तोयवत् तद्वत् व्योमादौ नगरादिवत् ॥५६॥

कालत्रयेऽपि नास्त्येव मयि विश्वं सनातने ।
अन्यत्रास्त्वथवा माऽस्तु बुद्ध्यादौ मम तेन किम् ॥५७॥

मयि सर्वं यथा व्योम्नि सर्वत्राहं यथा नभः ।
न सर्वं मयि सर्वत्र नाहं चालेपतः खवत् ।।५८।।

अत एवाविभागाख्याभेदेन क्षीरनीरवत् ।
ज्ञानात्मकमिदं विश्वं गायन्ति परमर्षयः ।।५९।।

जगन्मम मदर्थत्वान्मच्छरीरसुखादिवत् ।
यथा मम तथाऽन्येषां ममैवेति धियो भ्रमः ।।६०।।

वस्तुतस्तु न कस्यापि किमपि व्यभिचारतः ।
स्वामित्वस्याध्रुवत्वेन पान्थस्याऽवासगेहवत् ।।६१।।

एकं चिन्मात्रमस्तीह शुद्धं शून्यं निरञ्जनम् ।
सूक्ष्मात् सूक्ष्मतरं तत्र न जगन्न जगत्क्रिया ।।६२।।

दृश्यते सर्वदृश्याढ्या स्वस्वबुद्धिपरम्परा ।
चिन्मण्डलमहादर्शे प्रतिबिम्बमुपागता ।।६३।।

क्वचिद् व्यक्तं क्वचित् सूक्ष्मं नभः सर्वत्र तिष्ठति ।
यथा तथा चिदाकाशं धीदेशेऽन्यत्र च स्थितम् ।।६४।।

चिदाकाशमयं विश्वं यतोऽतो धीरितस्ततः ।
भ्रमन्ती तत्र तत्रैव भासतेऽर्के घटादिवत् ।।६५।।

धर्माधर्मौ जन्ममृत्यू सुखदुःखादि चाखिलम् ।
जाग्रत्यपि मृषा स्वप्न इव जन्मादिकं मम ।।६६।।

दृश्ययोगवियोगाभ्यां चितौ जन्मविनाशधीः ।
अभिव्यक्त्यनभिव्यक्ति-दोषाभ्यां शशिनो यथा ।।६७।।

महासुषुप्तौ भवजन्मृत्युदुःस्वप्नधाराः क्षणभङ्गुरा धियः ।
पश्याम्यहं ताभिरलिप्तरूपो घनैरुपेतैर्विगते रवेः किम् ।।६८।।

इत्येवं सततं ध्यायन्नेकाग्रमनसा सुधीः ।
साक्षात्करोत्यात्मतत्त्वं वागगोचररूपतः ।।६९।।

स्वरूपं निर्मलं शान्तं मनस्त्यजति चेत् क्षणम् ।
तदैव दृश्यसंस्कार-शेषात् सङ्क्षुभ्यतीन्द्रियम् ।।७०।।

उत्थितानुत्थितांस्तत्र इन्द्रियारीन् पुनः पुनः ।
विवेकेनैव वज्रेण हन्यादिन्द्रो गिरीनिव ।।७१।।

इति श्रीविज्ञानभिक्षुविरचिते साङ्ख्यसारे राजयोगप्रकारपरिच्छेदः ।।

सप्तमः परिच्छेदः

एवमात्मानुभविनो जीवनमुक्तस्य लक्षणम् ।
स्पष्टं वक्ष्ये भवेद् येन ज्ञानाज्ञानपरीक्षणम् ॥१॥

श्रवणान्मननाद् वाऽपि अन्यथाऽऽत्मज्ञताभ्रमात् ।
कुर्य्याद्‌गुरुमविद्वांसं स्याच्चाज्ञो ज्ञाभिमान्यपि ॥२॥

नैश्वर्य्यानागतज्ञत्वादिकं ज्ञानस्य लक्षणम् ।
तद्दतेऽपि हि कैवल्यं योगभाष्यकृतेरितम् ॥३॥

श्रौतस्मार्त्तानि वाक्यानि ज्ञानिनो मोक्षभागिनः ।
लक्षकाण्येव लिख्यन्ते विश्वासातिशयाय वै ॥४॥

यत्र सर्वाणि भूतानि आत्मैवाभूद् विजानतः ।
तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥५॥

यः सर्वत्रानभिस्नेहस्तत् तत् प्राप्य शुभाशुभम् ।
नाभिनन्दति न द्वेष्टि तस्य प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठिता ॥६॥

न विस्मरति सर्वत्र यथा सततगो गतिम् ।
न विस्मरति निश्चेत्यं चिन्मात्रं प्राज्ञधीस्तथा ॥७॥

नोदेति नास्तमायाति सुखे दुःखे मुखप्रभा ।
यथापूर्वस्थितिर्यस्य स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥८॥

यो जागर्त्ति सुषुप्तस्थो यस्य जाग्रन्न विद्यते ।
यस्य निर्वासना बोधः स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥९॥

रागद्वेषभयादीनामनुरूपं चरन्नपि ।
योऽन्तर्व्योमवदत्यच्छः स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥१०॥

यस्य नाहङ्कृतो भावो बुद्धिर्यस्य न लिप्यते ।
कुर्वतोऽकुर्वतो वाऽपि स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥११॥

अपि शीतरुचावर्के अत्युष्णेऽपीन्दुमण्डले ।
अप्यधःप्रसरत्यग्नौ जीवन्मुक्तो न चान्यधीः ॥१२॥

चिदात्मन इमा नित्यं प्रस्फुरन्तीह शक्तयः ।
इत्यस्याश्चर्य्यजालेषु नाभ्युदेति कूतूहलम् ॥१३॥

परव्यसनिनी नारी व्यग्राऽपि गृहकर्मणि ।
तदेवाऽऽस्वादयत्यन्तर्नसङ्गरसायनम् ॥१४॥

एवं तत्त्वे परे शुद्धे धीरो विश्रान्तिमागतः ।
तदेवाऽऽस्वादयन्तर्बहिर्व्यवहरन्नपि ॥१५॥

यो नित्यमध्यात्ममयो नित्यमन्तर्मुखः सुखी ।
गम्भीरश्च प्रसन्नश्च गिराविव महाह्रदः ॥१६॥

परानन्दरसाक्षुब्धो रमते स्वात्मनाऽऽत्मनि ।
सर्वकर्मपरित्यागी नित्यहृष्टो निरामयः ॥१७॥

न पुण्येन न पापेन नेतरेणापि लिप्यते ।
येन केनचिदाच्छन्नो येन केनचिदाशितः ।
यत्र क्वचन शायी च सा सम्राडिव राजते ॥१८॥

वर्णधर्माश्रमाचार-शास्त्रमन्त्रनयेप्सितः ।
निर्गच्छति जगज्जालात् पञ्जरादिव केशरी ॥१९॥

वाचामतीतविषयो विषयाशादृशोक्षितः ।
कामप्युपगतः शोभां शरदीव नभस्तलम् ॥२०॥

निःस्तोत्रो निर्नमस्कारः पूज्यपूजाविवर्जितः ।
संयुक्तो वा वियुक्तो वा सदाचारनयक्रमः ॥२१॥

एतावदेव खलु लिङ्गमलिङ्गमूर्त्तेः
संशान्तसंसृतिचिरभ्रमनिर्वृतस्य ।
तद् यस्य यन्मदनकोपविषादलोभ-
मोहापदामनुदिनं निपुणं तनुत्वम् ॥२२॥

तुर्यंविश्रान्तियुक्तस्य प्रतीपस्य भवार्णवात् ।
न कृतेनाकृतेनार्थो न श्रुतिस्मृतिविभ्रमैः ॥२३॥

तनुं त्यजतु वा तीर्थे श्वपचस्य गृहेऽथवा ।
ज्ञानसम्प्राप्तिसमये मुक्त एवामलाशयः ॥२४॥

न मोक्षो नभसः पृष्ठे न पाताले न भूतले ।
सर्वाशासङ्क्षये चेतःक्षयो मोक्ष इति श्रुतेः ॥२५॥

जीवन्मुक्तपदं त्यक्त्वा स्वदेहे कालसात्कृत ।
विशत्यदेहमुक्तत्वं पवनोऽस्पन्दतामिव ॥२६॥

अनाप्ताखिलशैलादि प्रतिबिम्बे हि यादृशी ।
स्याद् दर्पणे दर्पणता केवलात्मस्वरूपिणी ॥२७॥

अहं त्वं जगदित्यादौ प्रशान्ते दृश्यसम्भ्रमे ।
स्यात्तादृशी केवलता स्थिते द्रष्टर्यवीक्षणे ॥२८॥

चिन्मात्रं चेत्यरहितमनन्तमजरं शिवम् ।
अनादिमध्यनिलयं यदनाधि निरामयम् ॥२९॥

न शून्यं नापि चाकारं न दृश्यं न च दर्शनम् ।
अनाख्यमनभिव्यक्तं तत् किञ्चिदवशिष्यते ॥३०॥

इति श्रीविज्ञानभिक्षुविरचिते साङ्ख्यसारे जीवन्मुक्तिपरममुक्त्योः
परिच्छेदः

इति साङ्ख्यसारस्योत्तरभागः ।

सांख्यसारः समाप्तः ॥

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THE EARLIER PART

CHAPTER I

1. Salutations to Viṣṇu,[1] called Mahat,[2] Self-born,[3] the

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1. the term viṣṇu is derived from the root *viś* (to pervade): The scripture also says:
   Sarvataḥ pāṇipādaśca sarvato' kṣiśiromukhaḥ /
   Sarvataḥ ṣrutimānlloke sarve vyāpya sa tiṣṭhati /
2. It refers to its technical sense of samaṣṭimahattattva, the first product of the Prakṛti. The Anugītā also states:
   Mahānātmā matirviṣṇuḥ jiṣṇuḥ śambhuśca vīryavān /
   Buddhiḥ prajñopalabdhiśca tathā Brahmā dhṛtiḥ smṛtiḥ /
   Paryāyavācakairetairmahānatmā nigadyate //

   It further suggests that the Sāṁkhya philosophy was prevalent in the Brahmanical systems as a Vaiśnavite system. The Mahat is further said to be Brahmā and Śiva also. When it abounds in Sattva, it sustains the universe and is called Viṣṇu; when it dominates in Rajas, it creates the universe and is called Brahmā; when it abounds in Tamas, it destroys the universe and is called Śiva.
3. It is so because in the initial creation of universe it arises out of the Prakṛti without some particular cause like the gross material, etc., because the particular causes were not originated at that time, On the contrary the other objects like pot, cloth, etc., which are not self-born require some particular cause for their origination.

sprout of the universe,[4] the lord[5] essence of everything[6] and surpassing all.[7]

2. The element of soul is very briefly discussed by the

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4. It serves as the cause of the universe just as the sprout serves as the cause for the tree. Just as the sprout arises of the seed, the Mahat also arises of the Prakṛti. The Prakṛti is the root cause of the universe, while the Mahat is born from the Prakṛti and serves as the cause of everything else. It is superior to all the subsequent causes. It further suggests that Kapila mainly discusses the origination and the nature of the objects. He discusses the problems on liberation with comparatively less details. The Sāṁkhya should be understood with the Yoga system which discusses the problem of liberation in details.

5. Īśvara is possessed of *aiśvarya* (the lordly or supernatural powers). Though the Nirīśvara Sāṁkhya rejects such an entity, it would not object to terming the Mahat as Īśvara. Such a surmise would not be contradicted by the *Sāṁkhyasūtra*-Īśvarāsiddheḥ (1.92).

6. It is of the nature of all the objects for the effect does not essentially differ from the cause. Being the material cause of all the effects, it is found in them as their essence. Though it is a product of Prakṛti, it is found in all the subsequent objects.

7. It surpasses all the objects because of its having eminent knowledge (*jñāna*), action (*kriyā*) and power (*Śakti*). It is due to the dominance of Sattva in it.

Sāṁkhyakārika.[1] Therefore, the particular knowledge of the essence of Sāṁkhya[2] is expounded at length by Vijñānabhikṣu.[3]

3. In the collection of the kārikās[4] the Sāṁkhya way of explanation[5] is put together almost (with possible details).

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1. Hence, the importance of the text cannot be underestimated. It discusses the topics which are not sufficiently explained in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*.
2. That which cannot be refuted by critics of the Sāṁkhya.
3. Vijñānabhikṣu is aware of the fact that he is not omniscient and, hence, the reader may not be inclined towards the text with a strong belief in his statements. So, he uses the term Vijñāna for himself to suggest that he possesses the knowledge in eminence. This knowledge should be understood about the problems on creation and the nature of the elements because the Sāṁkhya system is believed to be mainly related with them. It deals with them in details along with the references to them in the pertinent texts.

   This verse suggests the four *anubandhas* of the text. The person entitled to study it is the man who has purified himself through the performance of the duties perscribed in the scriptures as also through the daily duties. The subject—matter is the essence of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. The result to be attained is the liberation through the discriminative knowledge of the Buddhi and the Puruṣa. There is the relation of cause and effect between the discriminative knowledge and the liberation. The relation between the text and the subject-matter is that of the propounder and the propounded.
4. It refers to the Sāṁkhyakārikās composed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa or to the kārikās in the latter half of the present work.
5. It refers to the process of creation, etc.

Hence, that (way) is only briefly discussed here in so far as it is not discussed in that.[1]

4. The nature of Prakṛti, etc., is discussed in details by me in the Sāṁkhyabhāṣya.[2] Therefore, that will also be discussed here in brief only.

It is proclaimed in the Śruti and the smṛtis that the liberation in the form of the absolute cessation of three kinds of misery[3] ensues when there is no next birth after the

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1. Thus, neither does the present text go against the kārikās nor does it repeat the same and, hence, its independent utility.

2. I.e., *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* on the *Sāṁkhyasūtras*, another work by the same author.

3. The misery is of three kinds : (1) that caused by bodily disorder (*ādhyātmika*), (2) that caused by other living beings (*ādhibhāutika*) and that caused by supernatural agency (*ādhidaivika*). For details see Sāṃkhyakārikā I and the commentaries thereon. The term absolute is to ward off the possibility of removal of miseries through worldly means. The misery is, as a matter of fact, momentary and diminishes in the course of time. Therefore, it would come to an end in the course of worldly existence also. However, such an alleviation of misery is not absolute because the same misery recurrs after some time. Hence, the destruction of misery should not be co-existent with its prior non-existence. The prior non-existence implies the origination of the object again because such a non-existence is not endless.

termination of the acts which have started giving their results, and those accumulated[1] do not start giving their results because the ignorance, attachment, etc., which serve as the co-adjunctor[2] are burnt, i. e., completely eredicated because through the realisation of the discrimination between the soul and the non-soul the supposition that I am an agent, etc., ceases and through the cessation of that the effects of that, viz., attachment, repugnance, virtue, etc., are not produced.[3] Here are the Śruti staments ;

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1. The accumulated acts are of two kinds : those which have started giving fruits and those which have not yet started fruition. The acts require ignorance, attachment, etc., for fruition. The discriminative knowledge of the selt and the non-self destroys the condition of ignorance which results into the cessation of the ideation of the self into the non-self. It destroys the other conditions and the acts do not bear fruit. The acts which have started fruition come to an end after giving their fruits. Even a man having diseriminative knowledge continues to live with the body as long as these acts are not exhausted through experience. This is the state of liberation still embodied.

2. The acts reach fruition only when they are accompanied with the affictions, viz., ignorance, ideation, attachment, hatred and fear of death. Cf. kleśamūlaḥ karmāśayo dṛṣṭādṛṣṭajanmavedanīyaḥ (*Yogasūtra* 1.12) and sati mūle tadvipāko jātyāyurbhogaḥ (*Yogasūtra* 1.13).

3. Here, Vijñānabhikṣu seems to imply a little difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga regarding the stress in the process of liberation. The Yoga system seems to hold that through the destruction of ignorance through discriminative knowledge, the attachment, etc. as also the ideation, etc., involving the sense of doership are

"The vital forces (prāṇas) of the one who does not long for anything and is devoid of desire for and the inclination towards the worldly objects do not go upward but are destroyed here only."[1]

"If a man realises the soul directly as 'I am this,[2], desiring what and for attaining which object would he entertain the miseries of the body."[3]

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automatically destroyed. The *Sāṁkhysāra*, however, puts a step of cessation of doership in between the destruction of ignorance and that of attachment, ideation, etc. As a matter of fact, the attainment of right knowledge implies the destruction of the feeling of doership, and hence, there is no purpose in putting it here separately as a middle step. The *Sāṁkyakārikā* includes the lack of feeling of doership, ownership, etc., in the form of the discriminative knowledge itself. Cf. *Sāṁkhyakārtkā* 64.

1. The one having no desire for the external objects gets detached towards them. Consequently, his Buddhi gets dissolved and the prāṇas located in Buddhi also are automatically dissolved. There remains nothing to lead the soul to the transmigration. This passage occurs in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* iv. 4.6 and Vijñānabhikṣu quotes *Sāṁkhyasūtra* 2.9 also to establish the attainment of liberation through detachment.
2. At this stage one directly realizes the soul as his own self as distinct from the Prakṛti, etc.
3. The knowledge of soul is the highest attainment. With this the purpose of body comes to an end. To have a body after it would imply to entertain the miseries without any purpose. Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* iv. 4.12. It is quoted here to suggest the absence of rebirth for a realized soul.

"When[1] all the desires that dwell in the heart[2] are eradicated, the mortal becomes immortal; one attains Brahman here only.[3]

"The one, who entertains the desires considering them as belonging to his own self, is born at many places in accordance with his deeds.[4] But all the desires of the one, who has satisfied all the desires[5]

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1. I.e. at the time of rise of the discriminative knowledge.
2. The term heart denotes the force-providing faculty for all the internal organs.
3. The knowledge of soul leads to the state of desirelessness, which finally culminates into liberation. The state of liberation is defined here as the situation in the form of consciousness. Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* iv. 4.12. This is quoted to stress the absence of miseries in the state of liberation.
4. The person under the sway of ignorance imposes the qualities of the Prakṛti on the soul and consequently wrongly considers the desires, etc., as belonging to the soul. He then makes efforts to fulfil these desires and accumulates virtues and vices in accordance with his efforts. Thus, he is led to the state of birth in accordance with these, so that the objects of his desires may be attained.
5. It means the one who is satisfied with the enjoyment and, thus, his desires are not roused by the experience. Or, it signifies the one who is satisfied in the soul only as he has risen above the desires for all the external objects.

and has realised the soul,[1] get dissolved here only"[2] and so on.

The smṛtis like Kūrma, etc., also (declare the same). As in the Kūrma :

"All the evils like attachment, repugnance, etc., are caused by erroneous knowledge.[3] The effects of this are the further evil of virtue. vice, etc. It is declared so in the śrutis. Through the force of that only all the bodies are produced for all."

In the Mokṣadharma[4] also (it is stated) :

"The senses and the sense-objects do not attain the person having no desire for the objects. And, the soul devoid of senses does not deserve the body again. Therefore, the living

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1. The expression kṛtātman means kṛtaḥ vivekena buddhiviṣayikṛtaḥ ātmā yena saḥ (by whom the soul is realized as different from the non-soul).

2. Since the Buddhi of such a realized one gets dissolved, the desires dwelling in it are also dissolved. The verse occurs in the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.2. It is quoted here to praise the one who has realized the soul and to reproach the one who has not realized it,

3. I.e. the evil of attachment, etc. It is to suggest that the attachment, etc., are caused by perverted knowledge and give rise to virtues and vices which cause the bondage. Thus, the perverted knowledge is the root cause in the series. The statement occurs in the *Kūrmapurāṇa* ii. 6.20-21.

4. *Mahābhārata* xii. 231.21

beings are produced by the seed in the form of attachment which is in turn of the nature of lust." And so on.[1]

Opponent : How can the nature of being co-adjunctor in attachment with the deeds as also the causality of attachment, etc., for fruition of acts be justified because the hell, etc., are attained through the force of deeds even when there is no attachment ?[2]

Proponent : It is not right because though there is no particular type of attachment towards hell, etc., yet there exists the attachment in general.[3] It is because the hell in the form of an embrace of the woman-figure made of iron and heated by fire for the persons co-habitting the prohibitted woman ensues due to the attachment towards that woman.

Though the five—ignorance, egoism, attachment, aversion and fear from death[4] are co-adjunctor of the deeds in giving rise to the fruits of the acts like birth, etc.,[5] yet the śruti states :

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1. Birth means Puruṣa's contact with the mind-body complex In the absence of the latter there will be no birth.
2. It can be deduced through the common sense that no one can have attachment for hell because one naturally strives for the alleviation of misery and not for the experience of them in hell. Even without the attachment people attain hell merely through evil deeds. Thus, the association of the attachment; etc., with deeds for the evil results stands unproved.
3. Here , there is no attachment for hell, but the attachment towards the cause of that. It is finally the attachment which accompany the deeds for evil.
4. Avidyāsmitārāgadveṣābhiniveśāḥ pañca kleśāḥ *Yogasūtra* 2.3
5. Sati mūle tadvipāko jātyāyurbhogaḥ *Yogasūtra* 2.13

"To whatever object the mind is attached to that object only the subtle body goes together with the deeds."[1] In this śruti is proved that attachment in general originated from self-conceit, attachment, aversion, etc., and called impression of the objects remaining unconsciously in the mind is the co-adjunctor of the deeds in the fruits of the deeds like birth and the rest.

It is proved through the following (statement of the) smṛti also :

> "A person attains to the nature of the object whereupon he has concentrated his mind with full consciousness through attachment, aversion or fear". Moreover, in the (two) aphorisms of the Yoga, viz.. 'the residual of actions have their roots in afflictions',[2] and 'as long as the root exists, its fruition, i. e., birth, life (or age) and experience also continue to be',[3] declare the afflictions as the cause of the unseen and for its maturity for fruition.[4] Even though such is the case, the attachment is chiefly declared to be the cause of birth, etc., in the sentences quoted above because the attachment is necessary for the existence of ignorance and egoism, and because the aversion and fear have their roots in attachment.[5]

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1. The term *karmaṇā saha* may alternatively be interpreted as through the acts performed with the attachment to its result. The quotation is from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* iv. 4.6
2. *Yogasūtra* 2.12
3. *Yogasūtra* 2.13
4. I.e. all the afflictions together form the cause for fruition ofthe acts.
5. The ignorance and self-conceit are not able to give rise to unseen without first producing the attachment, and the birth, etc., are not possible without unseen. That is why attachment is the most important factor.

Opponent : Through the force of the śruti statement that 'after realising the Supreme Self all of one's deeds are destroyed,[1] it is right to hold that all past deeds are destroyed through knowledge; how the knowledge is supposed to be their burner ?[2]

Proponent : No, since the term *dāha* (burning) occurs in the sentences like 'the wise call the one who has burnt his deeds by the fire of knowledge as awakened'[3] the word denoting burning is found. Hence, through brevity in the sentences denoting destruction it is suitable to imagine the meaning of burning also. The burning of the deeds also means to be turned fruitless through the destruction of the co-adjunctor called the afflictions.[4] The destruction of the deeds will take place with the destruction of the citta after the fruits of the deeds, which have started

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1. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.9
2. The opponent seems ta have the following distinction between the destruction and the burning of the acts. In the case of the former, the acts cease to bear fruit on account of the cessation of the afflictions while in the case of the latter the acts are physically eradicated along with the afflictions: The scriptural statement, therefore, may mean that the acts which were not completely physically eradicated by knowledge were destroyed after the realization of the highest self.
3. *Bhagavadgītā* 4.19
4. The literal meaning of burning does not hold good in the case of the acts. Burning literally means 'to come in contact with the fi-e'. It is not applicable to the acts which are not concrete in form. That is why the author gives another meaning of burning.

fruition, are experienced.[1] Therefore. since the non-production of the fruits of the acts is possible through the destruction of ignorance which is well known in the world, the destruction of acts is not through the knowledge because it involves cumbrousness. We have explained it in our Yogavārttika.[2] Hence, this much is enough to say here.

Therefore, it is correct to say that the highest end of life (liberation) in the form of the complete cessation of threefold misery is accomplishcd when the afflictions, viz., ignorance, egoism, attachment, etc., are destroyed. So declares the Yoga-sūtra :—'avoidable is the pain not yet come' (2.16) and undisturbed discriminative knowledge is the means of avoidance (2.26).

Here ends the chapter on 'Liberation resulting from the discriminative knowledge,' in the beginning of the text as it is most desired, in the Sāṁkhyasāra composed by Śrī Vijñāna-bhikṣu.

1. The accumulated acts are of two kinds; those which have started bearing fruits and those which have not yet matured for fruition. The latter are attentuated by knowledge, while the former are to be exhausted through the experience. All the acts are eradicated with the destruction of the internal organ which is the substratum of the acts. Thus, there remains no chance for the origination of fruits of the acts again.
2. *Yogavārttika* 1.1;2.13

CHAPTER II

Now[1] it is discussed as to what is the nature of the knowledge of discrimination between soul and non-soul. The soul is generally known in the world[2] to be the experiencer of pleasure, pain, etc. The non-soul is the class of non-sentient objects, the Prakṛti and the rest. The discriminative knowledge of these is the knowledge in the form that they are distinct as the one is modifiable and the other immodifiable;[3] the one is

1. Here, the term *atha* suggests the consistent relation which, in the present case, is of the nature of cause. It is stated earlier that the discriminative knowledge is the cause of liberation and, therefore, its nature is explained here. Or, the consistent relation may be taken here in the form of an introduction. In fact, the consistent relation of both the above types is possible here and, hence, both should be accepted. Two consistent relations are admitted at the hands of earlier seers also.
2. The 'Sāṁkhyas admit validity of the scripture which declares the soul as devoid of all the qualities and, hence, the quality of being an enjoyer cannot be established in conformity with the scriptures. The agent of the acts of knowledge means the substratum of these acts. And, the soul, in the theory of Sāṁkhya, is not the substratum of knowledge and, thus, cannot be the enjoyer. So, it is stated on the basis of the common worldly experience without scriptural foundation.
3. The point of distinction between the soul and the non-soul is briefly discussed in the Sāṁkhyakārikās 10-11.

defective while the other meritorious; the one is to be abandoned while the other, to be accepted.[1] Thus runs the Śruti text : The soul is not that, not that,[2] is imperceptible, is not perceived;[3] is indestructible, does not meet destruction;[4] is unattached, does not get attached;[5] is unbreakable, does not get the trouble, is not killed.[6] The Smṛtis also declare : Then[7] he, who had turned his eyes away[8] and has received the knowledge from mirror-like teacher,[9] has properly perceived[10] the modifications different from his own self as imposed upon

1. The terms defective and meritorious should not be understood in their literal sense. These are simply the reason as to why the soul is worth accepting while the non-soul is worth rejecting. The common rule is that the merit should be accepted and the demerit should be rejected since the merit is the cause of progress while the demerit is the cause of degradation.
2. It is neither Prakṛti nor vikṛti.
3. It connot be known through the organs of ordinary persons.
4. It suggests that the soul is beyond any change in the form of decreasing or increasing.
5. Is is not affected by any quality of the world.
6. Since it is without qualities, it does not undergo any change. The passage quoted occurs in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.9.26
7. I.e., after having resorted to the spiritual teacher for instruction.
8. He is unattached to the objects of senses.
9. The teacher is aptly compared to a mirror because he has got the reflection (or knowledge) of all the objects.
10. I.e. directly realised the distinction between the active and non-sentient and the non-active and sentient objects.

himself through folly.[1]

After knowing that I am not the Prakṛti since the Prakṛti is impure in nature and I am pure and intelligent (lit. enlightened) in nature, he leaves it.[2]

Thus, after realising the purity of soul in comparison with the body and the senses, the entire modifiable Prakṛti is almost abandoned[3] just like the slough by the serpent.[4] The discriminative knowledge is attained through rejecting (everything non-soul) as not this, through the study of the twenty five categories.[5] The nature of the knowledge of Reality s defined in the Matsya Purāṇa[6] as "When through the knowledge of distinction between the sentient and the non-

1. In fact the soul does not have any activity but when it comes in contact with the Prakṛti, it develops the sense of ownership towards the activities of the Prakṛti through ignorance. The qualities of the Prakṛti are falsely attributed to the soul.
2. One does not ascribe the qualities of the Prakṛti to the soul.
3. Even after the attainment of the discriminative knowledge the Prakṛti is not completely abandoned. One has to retain the body until all the acts which have started giving fruits are axhausted. Hence, it is not totally abandoned but is abandoned.
4. The example of the slough of the serpent is apt. The abandonment of the slough does not bring any change in the body of the serpent but is for his good. Similarly, the abandonment of the Prakṛti does not bring any change in the soul, but is for the good of the soul.
5. *Sāṁkhyasūtra* 3.75
6. *Matsyapurāṇa*154.55

sentient entities the Prakṛti and its modifications upto the gross elements are discussed,[1] it is called the knowledge of Reality.

Though the discriminative knowledge is the knowledge of mutual distinction, yet the knowledge which is the cause of liberation is that of Ātman as the object of the discriminative knowledge. It is proved by the śruti and the smṛtis as "the soul should be seen, etc."[2]

Opponent : How can the discriminative knowledge having the soul as its object dispel the ignorance which is defined in the works of Patañjali[3] and others as the cognition of soul in the non-soul because the peculiar characteristics are different in both the cases?

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1. The gross elements are technically called *viśeṣa* in contrast to the subtle elements which are called *aviśeṣa*. The discussion is not extended upto the further modifications of the gross objects like cow, pot, etc., because the knowledge of these is not helpful in attaining the discriminative knowledge of the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa.

2. The nature of discriminative knowledge can be expressed either as the knowledge of the Prakṛti as qualified by its distinction from the Puruṣa or as the knowledge of the Puruṣa as qualified by its distinction from the Prakṛti. It is the latter type of knowledge which is conducive to liberation.

3. Patañjali defines avidyā as anityāśuciduḥkhānātmasu nityaśucisukhātmakhyatiravidyeti. Such a type of ignorance cannot be dispelled through the knowledge of the self qualified by its distinction from non-soul. The knowledge dispelling ignorance should be opposite to ignorance in nature.

Proponent : No, because this kind of ignorance is dispelled by the discriminative knowledge having soul as its object through the mediation of the discriminative knowledge having non-soul as its object.[1] The indeterminate knowledge of soul arising through the medium of yogic practices also becomes the cause of liberation through the discriminative knowledge itself. It cannot be so directly because it cannot dispel the ignorance directly.[2] The ignorance is the knowledge in the form 'I am fair'; 'I am an agent'; I am happy'; 'I am unhappy', etc. It is known as the cause of calamities of the world through the śruti and the smṛtis and logic. Its dispeller is also the discriminative knowledge in the form 'I am not fair', etc.[3]

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1. When one acquires the true knowledge of the soul as distinguished from non-soul, he happens to attain the knowledge of non-soul as different from the soul. Thus, the direct knowledge of the soul dispells the ignorance through such a knowledge of the non-soul as distinct from soul.

2. For dispelling the above kind of ignorance it is necessary to have a knowledge having the objectivity of that object. For example, the knowledge of no-soul object should have no-soul as a characteristic feature in knowledge so that the ignorance having an opposite nature be dispelled. The indeterminate knowledge, however, is devoid of such distinguishing features in knowledge. Hence, the indeterminate knowledge may dispel ignorance through the discriminative knowledge only.

3. Though such examples do not fit in the definition of ignorance offered by Patañjali because they make the soul qualified by non-distinction, yet they suggest that the definition given by Patañjali should be interpreted in this way only.

In the case of the single object the knowledge of the absence of some object opposes (the other) only when it has the objectness of the object to be negated as its qualifier.[1] Otherwise there would arise the undesirable contingency of considering the indeterminate knowledge of the conch shell as the dispeller of the knowledge that it is silver.[2] Moreover because of the necessity of postulating the above stated negative knowledge as opposing (as the dispeller of) the knowledge of the cognised object, the indeterminate knowledge is not considered to be the dispeller of the confusion separately because it would lead to logical cumbrousness.[3] Moreover, it is stated that there is no knowledge higher[4] than that of discrimination, through

1. The knowledge having some other qualifier cannot serve this purpose. The knowledge that 'it is having the absence of a substance' does not sublate the knowledge that 'it has fire'. In the present case, the knowledge is having ātman and fair complexion, etc., as the qualifier. The dispeller of such a knowledge also must refer to the soul as the object and the absence of such a qualifier only.
2. The knowledge that 'it is silver' can be dispelled only through the knowledge that 'it is not silver'. In the indeterminate knowledge there is no qualifier. Thus, it cannot dispel some other knowledge.
3. If the knowledge of the substance only independent of the qualification is supposed to be the dispeller of the wrong knowledge that 'I am fair, etc.', any knowledge of the soul would be so. It would be dispelled even by the indeterminate knowledge of the soul. Negating the wrong factors would not necessarily be dispeller of the above knowledge. Thus, it would imply that two types of knowledge of the soul, viz., that of its nature even in indeterminate form and that with the qualifier would be the dispeller of the above knowledge. That would lead to the logical cumbrousness because otherwise only one kind may be sufficient to dispel.
4. It is the highest because it leads to liberation.

the scriptural statements as 'there is no direction (advice) more than this'; there is nothing more than this'; 'there is nothing higher than this'.[1]

Through the following statement of the Bhagavadgītā[2] also the discriminative knowledge only is stated to be the cause of liberation : 'those who know through the eye of knowledge the distinction between soul and the body and (the means of) liberation from the original cause of the elements, go to the highest'. Therefore, the discriminative knowledge being the direct dispeller of ignorance is the only cause of liberation.[3]

The realisation of the isolated soul through the yogic practices confers the knowledge of the absence of the qualities found in the limiling adjuncts, etc., hs also their distinction through the non-perception of the otherwise perceptible[4] and

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.3.6. It implies that the discriminative knowledge of the soul as distinguished from the sky, etc., is the cause of liberation as also the highest kind of knowledge.
2. *Bhagvadgītā* 13.14
3. The term *eva* implies that the cause of liberation is the discriminative knowledge of the soul as distinguished from the body, etc. It is not the indeterminate knowledge of the soul.
4. This is to prove that the yogic practices also confer the determinate knowledge only. They reveal the pure nature of the self. Such a pure nature itself implies the determinate knowledge of its distinction from the Buddhi, etc. If the pleasure and pain, etc., would be in the soul, they could have been perceived to be so. It is, however, not so. Therefore, the soul is realised to be free from them. Thus, it gives the knowledge of the determinate kind only as distinguished from the Buddhi, etc.

the thereby ignorance is dispelled. From this it should be admitted that the knowledge of equality[1] in all the beings and the knowledge of the all-pervasiveness of the soul eulogized in the śrutis[2] and the smṛtis[3] is subordinate to the discriminative knowledge itself[4] and as such it (the discriminative knowledge) is found in all the systems of philosophy because the other types of knowledge cannot destroy the self-conceit directly.[5] In the system of Vedānta it is peculiar that the knowledge is subordinate to the discriminative knowledge of Brahman.[6] In the system of Sāṁkhya the peculiarity is that it is subordinate to the discriminative

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1. It refers to the knowledge of similarity of all the souls, which leads to liberation.
2. Cf. the śruti statements like

   नित्य सर्वंगतो ह्यात्मा कूटस्थो दोषवर्जितः ।
   एकः स भिद्यते शक्त्या मायया न स्वभावतः ॥

3. The smrti statements also state the same as

   यावानात्मनि बोधात्मा तावानात्मा परात्मनि ।
   य एवं सततं वेद जनस्थोऽपि न मुह्यति ॥

4. The discriminative knowledge is principal and the knowledge of the equality of souls, etc.. cause this knowledge.
5. These types of knowledge give rise to the discriminative knowledge of the soul, which leads to the destruction of the notion of identificatian of the self with the insentient objects, which in turn ultimately results into liberation. Thus, the Sāṁkhya system does not stand in contradiction with the other systems of Indian philosophy in this respect.
6. There, the means of liberation is the realization of the nature of Brahman. Hence, everything is centred around the determinative knowledge of the supreme self.

knowledge of the soul in general.[1] This is enough (to explain).

Opponent : The final eradication of ignorance is not possible even through the discriminative knowledge of the above mentioned nature. It is because the discriminative knowledge serves only as an obstruction to the ignorance and, hence, after the destruction of the discriminative knowledge there will possibly arise the same misconception (towards the self and the worldly objects).[2] It is just as there arises again the erroneous knowledge of silver with reference to a conch shell after some time even in case of the one who has understood once the difference between the conch shell and the silver.

Proponent : It is not so because the instance cited is different from the case at hand. Even if the conch shell, etc., are directly perceived once, there is a justificaticn for the rise of erroneous knowledge at a later time because it is possible that the object may involve the rise of some defect like being placed very far and the organs of knowledge may involve the rise of some defect like membrane

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1. In the system of Sāṁkhya there is no difference in the nature of soul in its bound or isolated state. The knowledge of the nature of soul even in the worldly state as distinguished from insentilent objects leads to liberation.

2. The opponent implies that the knowledge lasts for three moments. Hence, the right knowledge of the soul in the above form would obstruct the ignorance as long as it exists. After the knowledge is naturally destroyed, the same false notion of the self will arise again and the aspirant would be dragged to the worldly bound state. This is, therefore, not the total annihilation of ignorance.

(in the eyes). It is admitted by all the orthodox systems that in the case of misconceiving something son-soul as soul the beginningless stock of unconscious past impressions serves as the defect (giving rise to it)[1], because there is no experience of some other defect for the misconception found (in every one) from the very beginning of one's birth.[2] When that stock of unconscious past impressions of ignorance is completely eradicated by the stock of stronger unconscious past impressions caused by the series of discriminative knowledge, then only the realisation of discrimination is said to have reached its culmination. It is because before that (culmination) there is certainly the presence of some part of perverted knowledge in the soul due to the occurrence of the little subconscious impressions at least in a slightest degree. Therefore, when the discriminative knowledge reaches its culmination, the misconception (towards the self and the worldly objects) does not arise again because there is at that time no presence of the defect in the form of subconscious past impressions.[3] Thus, there is a great

1. The beginningless character is not to establish their non-production. It is to suggest their recurrence in a series. There is, therefore, no impossibility of the destruction of this kind of past impressions through the discriminative knowledge. The case is analogous to that of the destructible and beginningless nature of the acts and adṛṣṭa.
2. This is to account for the difference between the two cases. In the case of the misconception about the conch shell as silver the cause still persists, but in the other case the cause of misconception is removed and as such it does not arise again,
3. In the absense of cause the effect would not arise.

difference between the two (the example and the case at hand).[1] If the above defect is understood to be the mutual reflection of the Buddhi and Puruṣa which causes the lack of discriminative knowledge, the discriminative knowledge has arisen after the sublation of that defect and thus that does not serve as a cause of erroneous knowledge afterwards. It is deduced from the result that the mutual reflection can be postulated as a defect when it is not associated with the yogic practices.[2]

And the culmination of the discriminativa knowledge is defined in the Gīta, etc. "O Pāṇḍava, one who does not hate the light (the effect of Sattva), the activity (the effect of Rajas) and the delusion (the effect of Tamas) when they are present and does not long for them when they are absent, (is said to have risen above the guṇas)".[3] "One who is seated like a netural and is not shaken by the guṇas (is said to have risen above the guṇas)".[4] "One who has abandoned all undertakings is said to have risen above the guṇas."[5]

1. In the example given by the opponent the defects giving rise to perverted knowledge are not absolutely alleviated by knowing the thing once. But in the case of the true knowledge, the causes of wrong knowledge are absolutely destroyed. Hence, the wrong knowledge would never arise after the rise of right knowledge.
2. There is rise of perverted knowledge only when the causes of that are not alleviated through the yogic practices. It is corroborated through the fact of non-rise of perverted knowledge in the state of liberated stili embodied. Such a mutual reflection does not cause bondage at this stage,
3. *Bhagavadgītā* 14.22
4. *Bhagavadgītā* 14.23
5. *Bhagavadgītā* 14.25

The term risen above the guṇas means the one who is free from all misconceptions of ownership over the guṇas.[1] We shall discuss further the definition of knower in details later on.[2]

Opponent : Even when the position is like this, how can the discriminative knowledge serve as the cause of liberation because since the objects to be discriminated are endless, there is no possibility of having the discriminative knowledge of all the objects separately ?[3]

Proponent : It is not so, because there is the possibility of their discriminative knowledge in their general form of 'being object of knowledge' and 'undergoing modification', etc.[4] To explain, the seer is different from those directly[5] mani-

1. Here, freedom is to be understood as the absolute freedom.
2. In the seventh chapter the author discusses the nature of a liberated still embodied which should be understood as a description of the knower.
3. The discriminative knowledge is that of the difference. Such a knowledge requires the knowledge of the objects discriminated. These objects are infinite in number and, hence, such a knowledge is not possible in a span of one life.
4. Though it is impossible to attain the knowledge of the particularities of the objects. yet it is easy to understand the general nature of the objects as distinguished from the objects of opposite nature.
5. The term directly may exclude the Buddhi and the soul though Vijñānabhikṣu excludes soul only through it. The objects are indirectly manifested through the Buddhi. It does not manifest the objects through its own consciousness. Further, it knows the objects through the *vṛtti* or its modification in the form of the objects and not directly. Though the self is also manifested, yet it is manifested through the functioning of the Buddhi and not directly.

fested by it because it is the subject of manifesting. That which manifests certain object is different from the object manifested just as the light from the pot. Through the inference that there is the functioning (of Buddhi) because the objects are manifested by the functioning, the witness of the Buddhi is proved to be different from the functioning of the Buddhi and the object seen in it.[1] The conformable reasoning is the contradiction in becoming the agent and the object simultaneously. Here, the term 'directly' is used to avoid the over pervasion to the self, The self becomes its objeet through the functioning of the Buddhi only.

Opponent : In the present mode of inference let the discrimination (of the soul) be from the functioning of the Buddhi only because that only is directly seen by the soul; it does not form the distinction from the Prakṛti, etc.[2]

Proponent : It is not so because firstly the inferential argument

1. This is a three member syllogism. Or, it may be indicative of five member syllogism because the *Sāṁkhyasūtra* (5.27) refers to the five member syllogism.
2. The above mode of inference proves the distinction of the soul from the Buddhi only because the soul is a witness of Buddhi only. This, however, does not exhaust the contents of the discriminative knowledge in Sāṁkhya. One requires the discriminative knowledge of the soul from Prakṛti, etc.. also which is not covered by such a case.

of the above nature involves brevity,[1] since it is not that the functioning of Buddhi is not known when it is present and through the group of arguments to be stated later on the seer of all the functionings of Buddhi is deduced to be of the nature of all-pervasive, immutable and of the form of eternal knowledge alone.[2] It is just as the following inferential argument of the Naiyāyikas which involving (the benefit of) brevity, proves the oneness, eternity, etc., of the creator : the earth is having a creator because it is an effect.[3] Here, all-pervasiveness denotes

1. The Prakṛti, etc., are known through the functioning of the Buddhi. Hence, the witness of Buddhi would know them when they become the object of the *vṛtti* of the Buddhi. If the stress is laid upon the objects, all the objects, thus, would be required to be enumerated from which the soul is differentiated. On the contrary, it grants the benefit of brevity if instead of enumerating all the objects to be known by the Puruṣa, one can say that the Puruṣa is the witness of the Buddhi and its functioning.
2. The above argument further proves the nature of immutable and eternal knower in the case of Puruṣa. So states the *Yogasūtra* 4.18. The Puruṣa is further proved to be all-pervasive. If, the soul would be atomic in size, there would not have been the cognition of pleasure, etc., pervading the entire body. If it would have been of the moderate size, it would have been non-eternal in nature. These defects will not be applicable if the soul is considered to be all-pervasive in size.
3. The Naiyāyikas put forth such an argument to prove the God as one and eternal. The inferential argument runs as the earth is an entity because it is a product. Having the nature of being created suggests the direct knowledge, desire to create and the operation for creation. The initial state of creation is the formation of the binary when two atoms are united together. Since the atoms are imperceptible, they cannot be the object of ordinary perception because the ordinary perception requires the perceptible big size. The operation on the atoms, therefore, requires eternal perception. Thus, the creator comes to be endowed with eternal knowledge and, hence, the God is eternal. The multiplicity of Gods is again logically obstructed by logical brevity. Hence, he is again proved to be one.

that different from that having limited magnitude. The immutability, etc., denote the difference from modifiable. In this way, when the discriminative knowledge of the Buddhi and the soul is acquired in the form of the seen and the seer respectively, through the further inferential argumentation the discriminative knowledge of the self and the non-self in general in the form of non-modifiable and modifiable, etc., also takes place.[1] Therefore, in the system of Patañjali at many places in the commentary of Vyāsa,[2] only the discriminative knowledge of the Buddhi and Puruṣa is stated to be the cause of liberation. It is because the discrimination of soul from Prakṛti, etc., is cognised in the above stated manner after the cognition of discrimination between the seer and the seen which results in the form of the discriminative knowledge of the Buddhi and the Puruṣa.

1. It is because the seer is established to be immutable and the seen, modifiable.
2. Cf. *Yogabhāṣya* of Vyāsa on *Yogasūtra* 1.1; 2.26, etc.

There,[1] through the term sattva is expressed the sattva composing the Buddhi.[2] And, in this way, even in the absence of knowledge with the particularity or differentia, of the objects like Prakṛti, the discriminative knowledge of above nature takes place. Through this only the belief of the ancient seers that the removal of ignorance results from the discriminative knowledge of the seer and the seen becomes justified.[3]

Moreover, through the syllogistic argument as the soul is different from the Prakṛti and effects because (unlike the latter group) it is not modifiable, the seer attains the knowledge of

1. I-e. the *Yogabhāṣya* cited above.
2. The use of the term sattva for Buddhi can be justified in view of the Sāṁkhya theory of evolution. The sequence in evolution depends upon the maxim that the quantity of sattva is more in the earlier product than the succeeding in the sequence of evolution. The sattva is in the maximum quantity in Buddhi. Hence, it can be termed sattva in comparison to the succeeding elements.
3. The discrimination between the Puruṣa and the Buddhi signifies the discrimination between the seer and the seen. The seer is, thus, automatically distinguished from the objects like Prakṛti even without knowing the peculiarities of the objects falling under the category of seen. Thus, the discriminative knowledge is between the seer and the objects seen. Otherwise, the wrong notion of the identity of soul with the non-soul objects would not be demolished, and consequently, the discrimination between the seer and the seen would not serve as the cause of liberation.

its discrimination from the seen objects in general.[1] The modern proclaiming themselves to be the follower of Vedānta philosophy believe that the knowledge of distinction of the self from all the insentient objects like Prakṛti results from the fact that the Prakṛti, ete., are the seen and the soul is the seer. Just as the seer of a pot is distinct from the pot and is in no way a pot, the seer of the body is in no way the body itself because it is in the form of 'I' and so on.[2] It is, howeve, not correct because the nature of being seen in the case of the soul is known through the scriptural statements as the soul should be seen, etc., and because the Prakṛti, etc., are not grouped together with an intention of speaking of their nature of being seen directly, since it is seen through the organs only.[3]

1. The author implies that the present inferential argument leads to the knowledge of the self as distinct from the Prakṛti, etc. It is enough to 'eradicate ignorance. Otherwise, for the eradication of the self-conceit one requires two types of knowledge, i.e., of the self and of its distinction from the non-self.
2. To be of the form of 'I' signifies that it is a seer. It serves as a reason in the above mode of argumentation, e.g., because it is of the form of a seer and so on. This is the view of the false vedāntins. This view differes from Vijñānabhikṣu's correct view in so far as the former recognises the quality of being perceived as the differentia of the insentient while the correct view recognises the nature of being modifiable as the differentia of insentient objects. According to the above Vedānta view, the soul is not perceived while Vijñābhikṣu maintains that the soul is perceived as distinct from the other objects.
3. The reason in the form of being seen proves the opposition because it is applicable to the soul also. Here, the

Opponent : In the present case it should be postulated like this. The nature of being seen in the case of the soul is ascertained by the scriptures in the sense of its being pervaded by the result in the form of being manifest, because the soul is self-illumined in nature and does not require any other illumination for it. Hence, here, the nature of being seen means to be illumined and that nature is not found in the case of the soul.[1]

Proponent : That[2] is also a very trifling argument. As you hold that the soul even though experienced in the form of 'I' is not pervaded by the result[3] in the form of consciousnes,

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Vedāntins could argue that the nature of being seen means to be seen directly. This is applicable to the Prakṛti, etc., but the soul is seen through the functioning of the Buddhi. To ward off such a possibility Vijñānabhikṣu states that the Prakṛti, etc., are also not seen directly; they are also seen through the functioning of the Buddhi.

1. The nature of being seen may mean either to be subjected to the process of being seen or to be subjected to the result of the process of seeing. Both of them are found in the case of the insentient objects. However, the latter is not possible in the case of the soul because it is asserted so in the śruti. The non-acceptance of the process also would involve the impossibility of liberation because the ignorance would ever exist. Thus the nature of being seen can serve as a valid probans to establish the distinction between the insentient objects like Prakṛti on the one hand the soul on the other.
2. It refers to the above interpretation of the nature of being seen, i.e., to be subjected to the process without being subjected to the result.
3. This is to suggest that such an experience proves the soul to be subjected to the result in the process of knowing.

similarly the Bauddhas also hold that the Buddhi even though endowed with pleasure, pain, etc., is not pervaded by the consciousness on account of its being self illumined. In this way, as in the case of the soul the nature of being seen is disproved in the case of the Buddhi also; the discrimination of Buddhi (from the soul) in the form of its being seen (unlike the soul) is not proved even though it is most desirable.[1] In the Bhāṣya, etc. other arguments are put forth at different places. It is sufficient to clarify in the present case.

Opponent : Let the discriminative knowledge be possible in the form of the generality in all the objects.[2] However, the generalities are many in number just as modifiableness, activity after blended together, being composed of pleasure, pain and indifference, being twenty-four in number, etc. If the different kinds of discriminative knowledge form the means of liberation in their respective forms, it involves the fault of not having a common factor (in different types of knowledge).[3]

Proponent : It is not so because they have a common nature in being the knowledge which obstructs ignorance (about

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1. The discriminative knowledge of the Buddhi and the Puruṣa is a must for liberation. As the Buddhi is not known, it cannot be discriminated from the Puruṣa and thus, the liberation is turned impossible. The objections against the Buddhist theory are applicable to the Advaita Vedānta also.
2. It refers to the common form of the objective world like modifiableness, etc. Cf. *Sāṁkhyakārikā* 11.
3. It involves logical absurdity because knowledge in many forms like modifiableness, etc., would separately be the cause of liberation.

the self).[1]

Opponent : If, in this way, the discriminative knowledge in general dispells all types of misconception (about self), how will the discriminative knowledges in their own particular form like 'I am not the body', 'I am not the senses' be the means of liberation, though it is propounded so in the śrutis and the smṛtis ?

Proponent : It is not so because the particular forms of discriminative knowledge are merely the diversifications of the discriminative knowledge in general.

Here ends the chapter on the nature of discriminative knowledge forming the means of liberation in the Sāṁkhyasāra composed by Śrī Vijñānabhikṣu.

1. This is the culmination of all types of knowledge of generality which finally leads to the discrimination of soul ftom the non-soul.

CHAPTER III

Opponent : Now,[1] what are those Prakṛti, etc., from which Puruṣa is to be discriminated ?

Proponent : Prakṛti, Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra, the subtle elements, the eleven senses, the gross elements, etc., are in general[2]

1. The term *atha* is to introduce a question because the seers do not open their mouth without some question for philosophical exposition. Or, it shows the consistent correlation (*sangati*) of the present chapter to the earlier. The earlier chapter prescribes the discrimination between the soul and the non-soul. The present chapter expounds the nature of the non-soul objects.
2. If each of them is taken in their specific form, they would be endless.
3. The Vaiśeṣikas may challenge the Sāṁkhyas on the number of the categories, because quality, action and generality accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas are not enumerated by the Sāṁkhyas. Vijñānabhikṣu justifies the Sāṁkhya position on the ground that the categories enumerated by the Sāṁkhyas are all of the nature of substance only. The quality, etc., are included in them only because the Sāṁkhyas believe in the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) between a substance and the quality, etc. It is because of the rejection of inherence by the Sāṁkhyas. The Vaiśeṣikas accept inherence as a particular type of relation and believe in the separate existence of quality, etc. The Sāṁkhyas, however, do not accept such a relation and, hence, no independent status is given to quality, acton, et.ci They are considered to be

those twenty-four entities. The quality, action and generality are included in them only due to the non-difference of the quality and the object qualified.

Out of them, the character of being the Prakṛti signifies its being directly or indirectly the material cause of all the evolutes because its derivative meaning is 'that whose activity is peculiar in the form of modification.'[1]

The words like Prakṛti, Śakti, Pradhāna, Avyakta, Tamaḥ Avidyā, etc., are the synonyms of the Prakṛti. The Smṛti also states that some great seers term it Brāhmi, Vidyā, Avidyā, etc., while the others call it Māyā; while the great seers, i.e., the Sāṁkhyas call it Parā Prakṛti.[2]

That (Prakṛti) is the three substances, Sattva, etc.,[3] characterised by the state of equilibrium. The expression characterised by the state of equilibrium is to exclude the Sattva, etc., in the form of products.

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the particular modes of the substance only. The notion of identity between the substance and the quality, etc., is based on general experience as the quality ete., are not observed apart from the substance. Moreover, there is the notion of the same locus in case of the substance and quality, etc.

1. Prakṛti is cause of the Buddhi directly while it is the cause of the other objects indirectly. It always undergoes modification which serves as a peculiar characteristic of the Prakṛti. At the time of dissolution the guṇas undergo a similar modification while at the state of the creation they undergo a dissimilar modification.
2. The term *parā prakṛti* is significant as it denotes the root cause while the other causes are denoted by the term prakṛti.
3. The term 'etc.' indicates Rajas and Tamas.

The state of equilibrium is the non-effect state, i. e., the state in which they are not situated in less and more quantity. The Mahat, etc.. are the Sattva, etc., in effect form and can never be in the non-effect state and, hence, are excluded. The expression 'characterised' is used to indicate that the nature of being Prakṛti is proved in the state of unequilibrium also.[1] The explicit meaning of the expression 'characterised by the state of equilibrium' is in brief that it is not an effect. One should not fancy that Prakṛti is something different from sattva, etc., as its properties, because in the Sāṁkhyasūtra, viz., the Sattva, etc., are not the properties of that because they form the very nature of essence of that,[2] the fact of being the properties of the Prakṛti (in case of Sattva, etc., is negated through the reason of their being the very essence of the Prakṛti.[3] Moreover, because in the Yogasūtras and their commentaries the Guṇas are stated to be the Prakṛti itself. Furthermore, because since the effects arise from the Guṇas themselves, it is futile to fancy the Prakṛti as something different from them. The statement, viz., 'the Guṇas of Prakṛti' should be understood on the analogy of the statement, viz., the trees of the forest.

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1. The word used is *upalakṣaṇa* which denotes unessential or temporary characteristic and not necessarily a property. Thus, the Prakṛti continues to be in both the state of equilibrium and otherwise as well.
2. *Sāṁkhyasūtra* 6.39
3. Even though the śruti and smṛti express the Sattva, etc., in both the ways as the properties and as forming the nature of the Prakṛti, yet the reasoning goes agaist the earlier case. The case comes to be like this. Whether the Sattva, etc., are the properties of the Prakṛti as effected from it or they are the external properties merely through contact just as the air of the space. The former

The statement of being the effects of Prakṛti in the case of Sattva., etc., 'viz. 'the Guṇas - Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, came out of Prakṛti', refers to the Sattva, etc., in their effect form which are the constituent cause of the Mahat element because otherwise it contradicts the statement of eternity of the Guṇas. The creation, viz., Mahat, etc., is declared in the sacred literature as taking place from the unequilibrium of the Guṇas. That state of unequilibrium caused by the mixture of the Guṇas with the others forming the class of the Guṇas is the form of the effect liable for the usage of Sattva, etc., as it dominates in or excelles others in having the quality of light

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case is not justified because there is no possibility of origination of the guṇas of variegated nature only from the Prakṛti without its association with something else. There is no propriety in postulating something contradicted by common experience. The latter case also is not justified because since the origination of the universe can be explained through the three guṇas, there is no propriety in postulating some additional principle. The expression of the distinction between the Prakṛti and the guṇas is prompted by the relation of part and whole. Or such an expression of distinction should be understood as metaphorical and not real. The statement that the Sattva, etc., are the effects of the Prakṛti, signifies the manifest state of Sattva, etc., characterised by light, etc., because that which does not inhere in it cannot be manifested. It is just like the statement of the origination of an island from the earth (*Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* 6.39).

etc., and thus distinguished from other Guṇas.[1] Through this, the view of 28 principles should be supposed to be justified.[2]

The expression of Sattva, etc., in the state of unequilibrium is found in the sacred scriptures also as—this world was tamos only in the beginning, impelled by the Highest it attained the state of inequality, this is verily the form of Rajas; that Rajas impelled by the Highest attained the state of inequality, that is verily the form of Sattva.[3] Even though the three--Sattva, etc., are substances in nature because they are further possesed of the properties like pleasure, illumination, limpdity, etc.; because they undergo conjunction and disjunction; because they are not dependent (as the properties are) and because they are having the nature of being a material cause, still they are conveyed through the term guṇa because they are helpful for or subservient to the Puruṣa and because they bind the Puruṣa (in the worldly bonds). The case is analogous to the sense organs.[4] The belief

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1. Each of the guṇas has got the particular purpose just as light, activity and restraining. The Sattva serves this purpose and may be termed the sattva in effect form. Though it is a state of modification, it may be termed through a particular guṇa insofar as that characteristic refers to the guṇa.
2. The twenty eitht principles are the set of twenty five normally accepted with the addition of the three guṇas in their effect form, which perform the particular activity.
3. *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* v. 2. The three guṇas are those forming the constituents of the intellect. The term sattva signifies the intellect dominating in sattva and so on.
4. Cf. *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* 1.61. The sense-organs render service to the soul as also bind it to the worldly

in or the popular expression of the Guṇas to be of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion is through the maxim of identity of or non-difference between the property and that qualified by it just as the means is said to be of the nature of desire.[1] Here, the Sattva is endowed with many properties like pleasure, limpidity, illumination, etc., but due to the eminence (of pleasure) it is said to be of the nature of pleasure. Similarly, Rajas is also possessed of many properties like misery, foulness and activating but is said to be of the nature of misery due to the eminence (of misery). In the same way, the Tamas also is possessed of many qualities like delusion, covering and restraining others from activity, but is termed to be of the nature of delusion on account of eminence of delusion in it. These eminent proper-

existence through their association. Still they are not the properties but are substances in nature. Similar is the case with the guṇas, Or, it may mean that the term guṇa is attached with sattva, etc., only in a derivative sense as they are subservient to the soul and bind the soul just as the strings of a rope (termed guṇas) bind an animal taking away its freedom. It is like the term *indriya* which derivatively means *indrasya ātmanaḥ liṅgam* (the inferential mark for the existence of the soul in the body) because the function of the sense—organs is not possible without the presence of the soul in the body. This is only a derivative sense, but in fact, their purpose is not this much only. They are the means for the knowledge and activity in the body.

1. Since the Sāṁkhyas do not accept the relation of inherence, they believe in the identity (*abheda*) of the quality and the qualified object as also between the act and the agent.

ties only become their distinetive features.[1]

The appelation of Sattva, etc., are conformable to their nature. Etymologically Sattva means the state of being sat (superior or high) and finally comes to mean chief and, hence, through the eminence of virtue in it, it comes to mean the supreme means of Puruṣa's purpose. The term Rajas means the intermediate (means of Puruṣa's purpose) because it is associated with attachment. The term tamas means the lowest (means fo Puruṣa's purpose) because it is associated with non-virtues and enveloping nature.[2] Each of these Sattva, etc., are infinite in number because it is stated in the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*[3] that the Guṇas are mutually similar and dissimilar in possessing the properties like 'being light', etc. In this sūtra many Sattva individual Guṇas are similar in respect of being light, etc., and through the same properties there is their dissimilarity to the Rajas and Tamas. In the same way, through movement, etc., and the heaviness, etc., both the above mentioned (form similarity among many Tamas as also the dissimilarity of Rajas and Tamas from the other Guṇas) hold good in the case of Rajas and Tamas also. Moreover, if everyone of the three-Sattva, etc., would have been single, each of the three would have been all-taught in pervasive, because the simultaneous creation of many worlds is scriptures. In that case the endless variegations in the effects does not hold good. It should not be argued that the above variegation in the effects does not hold good. It should not be argued that the above variegation is due to the variety of conglomeration in the Guṇas because the variety of contact in the three Guṇas of all-pervasive nature is not possible through them only and because there is no other substance

1. Thus, sattva is that possessing pleasure; rajas, pain and tamas, delusion.
2. *Sāṁkhyakārikā* 44, 45
3. *Sāṁkhyasūtra* 1.128

which may cut them into pieces (or may characterise them as) many effects. Therefore, the Sattva, etc., are the substance innumerable in number. The statement of being three with reference to them is through the three distinguishing characteristic conditions, like Sattva, etc.[1] It is proved like the statement of nine substances in the philosophy of the Vaiśesikas.[2] Those Sattva, etc., are both atomic and all-pervasive in size suitable to particular cases. Otherwise it would contradict Rajas's nature of being mobile, and because there is the propriety of all-pervasiveness for being the cause of space. And, if all the material causes would be all-pervasive, there would be no possibility of (or justification for) the fact of limited magnitude of the effects.

Opponent : In this case the atoms of earth, etc., mentioned in the philosophy of the Vaiśeṣikas only come to be the Prakṛti.

Proponet : No because our position is different from them since there is no character of earth, etc., in the ultimate causes insofor as these causes are devoid of the qualities like smell, etc. Is is stated in the Viṣṇupurāṇa, etc.

Whatever is the unmanifest cause, that is Pradhāna and is said by the great seers to be the Prakṛti which is subtle,

1. It may refer either to the state of being chief of Puruṣa's instrument or to the pleasure, etc. The application of three should be understood with reference to the generality *sattvatva*, etc,
2. This is to stress the difference between the atom of the earth etc., postulated by the Vaiśeṣikas and the guṇas in the Sāṁkhya theory. The former are endowed with the particular quality like smell while the guṇas are devoid of them.

eternal and of the nature of both the sat (real) and *asat* (unreal). That is devoid of sound, touch, etc.,[1] and is not possessed of form etc.[2] That composed of the three Guṇas is the cause of the universe; it is the beginningless[3] cause of everything.[4]

The inference of smell, etc.. in the substances forming the ultimate cause in the theory of the Vaiśeṣika is refuted by us in the *Bhāṣya* (on the *Sāṃkhyasūtras*).[5]

Opponent : Even when the position is like this and if the Prakṛti is of the nature of many constituent individuals like Sattva, etc., which are commonly atomic and all-pervasive in size, the theory of unlimited magnitude, oneness and inactivity of Prakṛti will come to an end.

Proponent : It is not so. The Prakṛti is stated to be unlimited in magnitude when it is identical with the substances forming the cause of the universe. It is just as the smell pervades the entire earth in the form of smell.[6] Through

1. It distinguishes the ultimate cause from the space.
2. It distinguishes the prime cause from the atoms of earth, etc.
3. The term *prabhava* should be derived as *prabhavati asmāditi prabhavaḥ utpattisthānam*.
4. *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 1.2,19-21 as also 4.18-21
5. *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* 1.62
6. Many clods of earth contain smell and, thus, the smell is different in those clods. The particular individual smell in that clod is different from others and does not cover all. Still in the capacity of the generality of smell, the smell inhering in one clod covers all clods of earth. This is deduced from the fact that no clod of earth is devoid of smell. Similarly whatever is the ultimate materlia

considering the all-pervasive nature of the cause of the space, etc., the theory of all-pervasiveness of the Prakṛti is justified. Moreover, because the word 'single' means the lack of difference of Prakṛti even though the Puruṣas are different as also the creation is different (in each cycle of creation),[1] because is understood so through the scriptural statement, the one unborn, etc.[2] Further, because the term inactive denotes only the lack of activities in the form of determinatiion, self-ideation, etc. Otherwise the agitation in the Prakṛti mentioned in the śrutis and the smṛtis is not jutified.[3] The

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cause, limited or unlimited is covered by Pradhāna, This is deduced from the fact that no material cause in the ultimate stage is uncovered by Pradhāna. Thus, Pradhāna covers all of them.

1. The oneness of the Prakṛti signifies that the same Prakṛti, limited or unlimited in nature, which undergoes modifications into the effects in this creation, undergoes the modifications into the effects in the other creation as well.
2. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 4.5
3. The evolutes of the Prakṛti into the universe require agitation. The agitation is not possible without movement. That is why the śruti like *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* and the following passage of smṛti speak of movement in the case of the Prakṛti :

   प्रधानं पुरुषं चापि प्रविश्यात्मेच्छया हरि: ।
   क्षोभयामास सम्प्राप्ते सर्गकाले व्ययाव्ययौ ॥

   Therefore, the activity denied in the case of Pradhāna should be understood as the specific activity like determination, self-ideation, desire, etc.

other peculiarities found in the Prakṛti should be known from the (*Sāṁkhyapravacana*) *bhāṣya*.[1]

The inferential argument (for the existence) of Prakṛti is as follows : ths effects like mahat which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, are the effects of pleasure, pain and indifference because they are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, just as a bed which is an effect of the cloth, etc.[2] The scriptures and the smṛtis serve here as the conformable reasoning. The peculiarities of the Prakṛti which is thus inferred in a general form should be understood from the scriptures and through the yogic experienc because the inference has generality only as its object.

Opponent : The pleasure, etc., are experienced inside (the body only); what is the evidence to prove pleasure, etc., in the external objects so that it (i.e, the example given by you) may serve as a faultless example ?

Proponent : Since the internal organ is a cause of pleasure, etc., the pleasure, etc., are proved in the objects. The highest form in the colour, etc., is not a cause (lit. restrictive factor) for giving rise to pleasure, etc. If the condition of being the highest is understood in the form of a class-character, there would be the intermixture of class-character with the state of being blue, yellow, etc.[3]

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1. *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* .61; 1.65; 1.75-6, etc,
2. Here, the general rule is whatever is possessed of some character should be supposed to be the product of something having that character.
3. The intermixture of class—character may be defined in short as it is there when something occurs in both the presence and absence of something. For example, the fact of being the best occurs with the quality of blue as

Moreover, the single form gives rise to pleasure and pain due to the difference of time. Hence, the state of being the highest, etc., are themselves of the nature of the pleasure, etc. Moreover, just as there is the experience of a form of a pot, similarly through the experience of the pleasure from a woman and the pleasure from sandal wood, etc.,[1] the pleasure in the object is justified. The further details should be seen in the commentary (on the *Sāṁkhyasūtras*).[2]

Thus is explained the Prakṛti.

The element Mahat (the great principle) is discussed now.[3] The element Mahat otherwise called Buddhi arises from the Pradhāna.[4] Since it is endowed with the excellent

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also with the white, etc. Thus, the blue colour is present in the best as well as the opposite of it. Therefore, there is an intermixture of class-characters if the fact of being the best is considered to be a class-character. The fact of being the best occurs with the blue and the white colour at a time, which are opposite to each other. The circumstances obstructing the common quality from becoming a class-character are as :

व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं संकरोऽथानवस्थितिः ।
रूपहानिरसम्बन्धो जातिबाधकसंग्रहः ॥

1. This is the argument based on common experience.
2. *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* 6.32 ff.
3. The term *atha* (now) is implied here to show the correlation of this discussion with the earlier discussion. Since the Buddhi depends upon Pradhāna, it is discussed after Pradhāna.
4. It suggests that Prakṛti is the direct cause of the Buddhi.

qualities in the form of virtue, etc., it is termed Mahat (the great one).[1] The same forms the definition of that.[2] The great, intellect and understanding are its synonyms. Thus is said in the Anugītā :[3]

Through the following synonyms the great soul (mahānātmā) is expressed : the great soul, the thinking principle, Viṣṇu, the conquering principle, Śiva, the powerful one, the intellect, understanding, knowledge and as also Brahmā; resolution and memory. He has hands and feet everywhere as also eyes, heads and mouths everywhere as is also having the ears everywhere. It exists having pervaded everything. It is the power of being atomic or minute and light, attainment of everything, lordship over everything, the light and immutable. And the few who have acquired knowledge, are free from envy and have control over anger—all these are liberated and get excellence. This becomes the mighty self-born, Viṣṇu in the initial creations. The three deities form the limiting adjunct of the same great principle through the three parts in the form of Sattva, etc. Through the ignorance of this fact there is the statement of three of (different) deties as Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva. It is stated in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*[4] :

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1. The term *iti* here stands for knowledge, detachment and lorldly powers which form the form of the Buddhi dominating in Sattva. Tarkācārya gives another opinion for terming it Mahat. It is neither atomic in size, nor all-pervasive (*paramamahat*). As such it is of the size of the body, and hence, is termed mahat.
2. At all other places determination *'adhyavasāya'* is stated to be the definition of Buddhi.
3. *Mahābhārata* 14.40.2-9
4. Viṣṇupurāṇa 1.2.34

The great one is of three kinds—abounding in Sattva, abounding in Rajas and abounding in Tamas.

And in the *Matsyapurāṇa* also it is stated :

The great element was born of Pradhāna which is modifiable in nature. It ts great element because there arises such a knowledge in the people through it. From the guṇas when agitated the three gods were born. It is the embodied form[1] wherein are the three gods Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva.

The mention of minuteness, etc., in the abstract form of a state (of minuteness) is through the maxim of the non-difference of the attributes and the substance possessed of them.[2] In the initial creation the great principle comes out having the form of Viṣṇu more dominant in it in comparison to Brahmā and Śiva, and hence, in the half of the hemistich of the verse it is stated the Viṣṇu only. The great principle when modified through the mixture of Rajas and Tamas partly (serves) as the limiting adjunct of individual living being, and endowed with virtue, etc., becomes possessed of every small virtue, etc., also. It is known from the *Sāṁkhyasūtra*[3] that the great element associated with Rajas and Tamas comes to have opposite qualities also. Ascertainment is chiefly and exclusively the function of the great elements.[4]

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1. It refers to the cosmic form of mahat.
2. The *Anugītā* mentions aṇimā, etc., as the quality to denote mahat. It does not mean that mahat is a quality. Such expressions should be understood in the sense of substance through the maxim of the identity of the quality with the qualified object.
3. *Sāṁkhyasūtra* 2.15
4. The others viz., virtue, detachment, are manifested there in the form dominated by determination.

The great element is the seed-form of the threefold internal organ, viz.. the great principle, egoism and mind. Here, the scriptural statement is the evidence regarding the order in creation that great principle arises from the Prakṛti and the egoism from the great element. Only the nature of having a cause in general in the case of the effects is proved through inference. There is no inferential evidence to ascertain whether there is the order in creation beginning with the elements or the order is that beginning with the internal organs because there is no clear inferential mark. It is shown by us in the (*Sāṁkhya-pravacana bhāṣya*)[1] that somehow there is an inferential mark supported by the śruti and smṛti in favour of the order of creation beginning with the great element.[2]

Thus the great element is discussed.

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1. *Sāṁkhyasūtra* and *bhāṣya* 2.10
2. Here, Vijñānabhikṣu raises a very pertinent point of the proof for the particular sequence of objects in the process of evolution. He maintains that the scheme of sequence is based upon śruti without any logical foundation. The modern scholars like Radhakrishnan also do not find any logical foundation in the particular order in creation (Indian Philosophy. Vol. II, p. 274) However, it can be submitted here that the order in evolution is based upon the quantity of sattva in the objects. The Buddhi has the maximum quantity of sattva while the last evolutes, viz., the gross elements have got the minimum. The evolution processes from subtle to gross because the nature of being subtle is a result of the preponderance ot sattva.

The egoism is discussed now.[1] The egoism arises from the great element just as a branch from the sprout. Since it performs the function of ideation, it is termed egoism, just as the designation of a potter.[2] That verily forms a definition of egoism.[3] The synonyms of that are mentioned in the *Kūrmapurāṇa* : The egoism is considered to be ideation, the doer and the thinker, self, individual soul and the life. Through this all the activities take place.[4] Since the egoism is of three kinds, it is the cause of three kinds of effects. It is stated in the *Kūrmapurāṇa*.

The egoism is of three kinds, viz., vaikārika (sattva-dominating), taijas (rjas-dominating) and bhūtādi (tamas-dominating) and has certainly arisen from the great element. From the taijas egoism come forth the senses, from the vaikārika egoism come out the ten deities. The mind here is the eleventh which is of the nature of both on account of its own quality. The gross elements and the

1. The term *atha* is implied here also, which suggests the correlation with the earlier discussion as the egoism depends upon the intellect.
2. The name itself suggests the meaning. Just as a potter is the one who prepares the pots, similarly the egoism is an agent of functioning of the egoism.
3. The term 'that' may signify *abhimānavṛttika* (the agent of ideation). But through the maxim of non-difference between the functioning and its agent, it is better to understand it as *abhimānavṛtti* while the agent is automatically included in it.
4. *Kūrmapurāṇa* 1.4.19

subtle elements, however, were the procreation of the bhūtādi egoism[1].

Vaikārika means sattva dominating. Taijasa means rajas-dominating. The expression 'by its own quality' means through its excellence in the form of its assistance for the functions of the senses. 'Of the nature of both' means of both the organs of knowledge and those of action. It is proved through the scriptural statement 'I had my mind directed somewhere else and hence, could not hear'.[2] And the deities of eleven sense-organs are : the direction, the wind, the sun, Varuṇa, Aśvins, Fire, Indra, Viṣṇu, Mitra, the god of sexual desire and the moon.

Thus is discussed the Egoism.

The sense organs, etc., are discussed. The mind arises forth from the egoism in the beginning. Through the statement in the *Mokṣadharma*, etc., the senses are mentioned to be the effect of the attachment, etc., which are the functioning of mind.

"Of the one who has been engaged in reflecting upon the soul, the ear is born of the attachment towards the sound, the eye from the attachment towards the form and from the

1. *Kūrmapurāṇa* 1.4.18; 22-3. This is according to Vijñānabhikṣu on the authority of the *Kūrmapurāṇa*. Vācaspati and others, however, hold that the sense-organs along with the mind come out of the *vaikārika* type of egoism and the subtle elements, from the *bhūtādi*. The *taijas* is not the material cause of anything and helps in the production from both the *vaikārika* and the *bhūtādi* through its activity.
2. Cf. *Kauśitakyupaniṣad* 3.7

desire to smell arises the nose."[1] And, then the ten organs and five subtle elements spring forth from the egoism preceded by the will. There is no settled order between the origination of the senses and the subtle elements because there is no causal relation between them. In the case of the senses also there is no mutual (or internal) causal relation because there is no evidence for that.

Among the subtle elements, however, there is the settled order. That is like this. From the subtle element of sound arises the subtle element of touch having the quality of both the sound and touch in the order mentioned before. Thus, in due order each of the three successive subtle elements arises from the preceding subtle element in due succession of increase of one quality in the succeeding one, because in the commentary on the sūtras of Patañjali[2] there is the mention of the increase of one quality in succession in the subtle elements. In this case the order of evolution of the five subtle elements from the egoism and the order of evolution of the gross elements through that is mentioned in the *Kūrma*, *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, etc., as in the *Kūrma* :

The bhūtādi (tamas-dominating) egoism when agitated gave rise to the subtle element of sound. From that is born the sky which is of the nature of space and has the characteristic quality of sound. The sky when agitated gave rise to the subtle element of touch. From that the air arises forth; the

1. *Mahābhārata* 12.213.16. It suggests that mind was produced before the senses. Since the functioning of the mind precedes the sense-organs, the mind must precede the sense-organs.
2. *Yogabhāṣya* 2.19

touch is considered to be the quality of that.[1] It is in the said order, etc.

Opponent : In this way, as the four gross elements like sky also give rise to the other elements, there will arise the undesirable contingency of their being the Prakṛti (material cause of something else) and consequently there would be the violation of the theory of their being the only effect.[2]

Proponent : No. because the sky, etc., are said to be the cause of the subtle element of touch, etc., through their support to the egoism only in the purāṇas, etc.[3]

Thus is discussed the origination of the twenty three elements.[4]

Out of these having excluded the five gross elements and having included the egoism into the Prakṛti, the group of seventeen is designated as the indicatory body because it is the place of manifestation for soul just as the fuel is for the fire.[5] And that is born in the beginning of the creation for every Puruṣa and exists upto the dissolution of the products of

1. *Kūrmapurāṇa* 1.4.24-5 (with some variation).
2. While classifying the Sāṁkhya categories on the basis of causality, Īśvarakṛṣṇa terms the gross elements the product only. Cf. *Sāṁkhyakārikā* 3.
3. The sky is only an assisting cause. The material cause is the egoism only.
4. It is because the rest of the two categories, viz., Prakṛti and Puruṣa are not product.
5. As the fire cannot exist without fuel and as such the fuel indicates the existence of fire, so the soul cannot exist without the indicatory body and as such the latter indicates the existence of the soul.

Prakṛti (for that Puruṣa).[1] Through that only the transmigration into this and the other world takes place in the case of living beings,[2] And the vital breath is a specific function of the intellect and is not mentioned separately from the indicatory body.[3] The subtle parts of the five gross elements serve as the support for that indicatory body because there is no possibility of its transmigrating to the other worlds as it is the most subtle just as the picture, etc., without a substratum. In the beginning this indicatory body is born as one only as the limiting adjunct of the 'self-born' (Brahmā), just as his gross body when called Virāṭa which is described later on. Then the individual indicatory bodies which are the limiting adjuncts of the individual living beings and which are the parts of that are separated from him just as the indicatory body of a son from the indicatory body of a father. It is stated by the author of the aphorisms that the different individual (indicatory bodies) take place due to the particular past acts (performed by them).[4] It is stated by Manu also :

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1. It suggests the duration of the existence of the indicatory body.
2. The visible gross body perishes here only while the subtle body accompanies the soul in the course of transmigration and due to its being endowed with various impressions determines the nature of further birth.
3. It justifies the rejection of the five vital airs as the components of the subtle body in the place of the subtle elements. Some consider the five vital airs to be the components of the subt'e body in the following verse :

   पञ्चप्राणमनोबुद्धिदशेन्द्रियसमन्वितम् ।
   शरीरं सप्तादशभिः सूक्ष्मं तल्लिङ्गमुच्यते ॥
4. *Sāṁkhyasūtra* 3.10

Having mixed with his own parts the subtle parts of those six having unlimited powers he created all the elements.[1]

The term 'of the six' stands for the six sense-organs; it is indicative of the entire body. The meaning is that the self-born Brahmā having mixed with his own conscious parts the subtle parts of his indicatory body created all the living beings.

Thus the indicatory body is discussed.

The origination of the gross body is discussed. In the great element which is ten times more (than the egoism) egoism arises forth. In the egoism which is ten times more (than the sky), the sky; in the sky which is ten times more (than air) the air; in the air which is ten times more (than fire), the fire; in the fire which is ten times more (than water), the-water; in the water which is ten times more (than earth), the earth. That only is the seed of the gross body. That seen in the form of the earth is modified in the form of an egg. In the midst of that in the form of egg which is ten times more (than the self-born) and serves as a cover of the earth, the gross body of the self-born Brahmā is born through the very will of Brahmā. In that very form the self-born Brahmā is said to be Nārāyaṇa. It is said by Manu through the following and the other statements with reference to the self-born.

He, desirous of creating many beings from his own body, having meditated upon created the water first and put the seed in it. That egg became golden egg radiant like the sun. In that Brahmā was born himself. The paternal grand father of the entire world.[2] He is the first corporeal being; He is indeed called a Puruṣa. He existed in the form of Brahman in the

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1. *Manusmṛti* 1.16
2. *Manusmṛti* 1.8-9

beginning of the initial creation of all the beings.[1] The waters are called Nāra. The waters are verily the offsprings of Nara (the primordial man). Those waters were the place of refuge of him earlier. That is why he is proclaimed to be Nārāyaṇa.[2] Since the individual Puruṣas are separated from that primordial Puruṣa and at the end they merge there only, the same one is expressed as the soul in the śruti and the smṛtis.[3] The śruti and the smṛtis do not contradict that from the point of view of the empirical behaviour Nārāyaṇa is the soul of all the living beings. Then embodied in the form of Virāṭ that Nārāyaṇa having created the self-born called the one having four faces, on the Sumeru mountain situated in the pericarp of the lotus in his navel, created through that the other individual bodies up to the immovable beings. It is stated in the smṛtis :

Along with the effects together with the causes born from the body of that the individual beings were born from the limbs of that intelligent one.[4]

The manifestation of the four-faced one mentioned in the śrutis from the lotus in the navel, ear, eyes, etc., of Nārāyaṇa lying on the hood of the Śeṣa serpent should be considered as taking place in the diurnal creation through different world-durations, and not as in the initial creation, because Nārāyaṇa sleeps through the body attained through sports.[5] Thus are

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1. Not found in the *Manusmṛti*
2. *Manusmṛti* 1.10
3. He is endowed with all the subtle bodies. Thus, all the subtle bodies arise from him and merge into him at the end of dissolution of the world.
4. *Padmapurāṇa* 5.3.156
5. The dissolution is said to be of four types : caused or occasional, merger into Prakṛti, absolute and usual. The dissolution caused by the sleep of Brahmā is caused or

described in brief the twenty four elements and their purpose in the form of the creation. The object exists when filled up (in essence) by the object from which it is born. Afterwards its dissolution also takes place there only. It is understood from the *Mahābhārata*,[1] etc.

The element merges in the same element from which it evolves. They are merged in a reverse order of their creation and originate from them one after the other. These gross transformations of objects into origination, sustenance and mergence are exhibited for leading to the discrimination of these twenty four elements from the Puruṣa which is immutable in nature. The smṛtis record the other subtle transformations of these which take place every moment in these objects. It is as :

The elements exist and do not exist perpetually. That is not observed because of its subtlety caused by the time the rapidity of which is not cognisable.[2]

That is why all the elements falling in the class of insentient are said to be ever non-existent from transcendental point of view. Therefore, those who are afraid of misery should realize that the soul which is unattached by nature is the transcendental Reality. That is stated in the Anugītā[3] as :

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occasional; when there is the merger of world into the Prakṛti, that is the dissolution into the Prakṛti; the merger of the individual soul into the supreme Self through knowledge is the absolute dissolution and the daily loss of consciousness at deep sleep is the regular or daily dissolution.

1. *Mahābhārata* 12.306.31
2. *Bhāgavatpurāṇa* 11.12.42
3. *Anugītā* 35.20-23

The great element consisting of the stem of intellect is a product of the seed in the form of avyakta. The great egoism serves as its branches; the sense-organs, as the sprout and caves; the subtle parts of gross elements as its twigs; the gross elements as its side branches; always with leaf, always endowed with flowers, and always give rise to the auspicious and inauspicious fruits. That eternal Brahman-tree is the resort of all the beings. Having known it fully and, thus, having cut with the sword of knowledge and having attained the immortality, one relinquishes the death and birth.

Thus ends the chapter on the essential nature of the Prakṛti, etc., which are the subject of the discriminative knowledge, in the Sāṁkhyasāra composed by Vijñānabhikṣu.

Thus ends the earlier half of the Sāṁkhyasāra.

THE LATTER HALF OF THE SĀṀKHYASĀRA

CHAPTER I

1. Now[1] the soul from which the other things are to be distinguished,[2] (technically) called Puruṣa, is described through the series of verses so that it may be easily grasped by the students.[3]

2 He, the observing principle, is proved in general through the force of the knowledge 'I know'.[4] That principle is

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1. Here atha means 'after that'. It signifies 'after discussing the elements of Sāṁkhya in general through prose'. It is used in the beginning for its force of suggesting auspiciousness.

2. Anuyogi means that related through the relation of anuyogitā. The knowledge of distinction requires the objects to be distinguished and that from which they are to be distinguished. The earlier set of objects is related through the relation of pratiyogitā and is called pratiyogin, while the latter objects are anuyogin.

3. It is easier to memorise any subject through verses than through the prose,

4. Though the soul is commonly realised to be existent by everyone through the rise of knowledge because there cannot be any kind of knowledge without it, yet it is proved thus in general. Through this one knows the

proved (now) through the qualities like eternity, all-pervasiveness, etc.[1]

3. The subject of experience (soul) is eternal because all the modifications like Mahat, etc., are commonly meant for that, because these are born, etc., due to the acts of that (soul).[2]

4. Moreover, the intellect is also eternal in its seed (causal) form because of its being the locus of the imperceptible past impressions. Hence, through that also is proved the eternity of its experience (soul).[3]

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soul only as the locus of knowledge. In the system of Sāṁkhya, however, there is no knowledge, pleasure, etc,, in the soul and, hence, there is no cognition of the soul in its essential pure form through such knowledge. Through the reflective knowledge that 'I know' the soul is known without its distinction from the internal organs. Hence, it is now discussed in its pure or essential form.

1. It should not be argued here that there is no possibility of qualities like eternity and all-pervasiveness in an entity which is held to be devoid of all the qualities. The fact of its being devoid of all the qualities signifies that it is devoid of the particular qualities which are found in the effects of Prakṛti.

2. Here, the experiencing self is the subject; eternity is to be proved; the fact of being meant for that in case of Mahat, etc., is the probans. The probans is further proved through the further reason that they are born due to the act of the soul.

3. The origination of the living beings is caused through the latent past impressions. These impressions are located

5. The specification of experience is not possible without eternity of their relation as being owned and the owner.[1] (This leads to the eternity of the experiencer soul). There is the nature of owned in the intellect in the sense of being the locus (lit. possessor) of the unconscious past impressions of the modes experienced by the soul.

6. The ownership means the existence in the experiencer of the functioning of the intellect which causes the unconscious past impressions in the owned, i. e., intellect [2]

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in Buddhi and as such the Buddhi is proved to be eternal, which implies the eternity of soul as their experiencer. Otherwise, the postulation of latent past impressions would carry no meaning.

1. The relation between the Buddhi and the Puruṣa is that of enjoyed object and the enjoyer. If the Buddhi is eternal as an object of experience, it requires the specification as 'this is the enjoyer of this Buddhi'. If such a specification is eternal, the eternity of the soul is automatically proved. Without such a specification Buddhi's nature of being an object of enjoyment cannot be expla. ined because the object of enjoyment is to have the latent impression of being enjoyed Such an impression is not possible if each Buddhi is not attached to a single soul. Otherwise, there would be the confusion of the latent past impression and, consequently, the variety of experience found in the universe cannot be explained. This proves both the existenee and the multipiicity of the souls.

2. This explains the nature of ownership in the Puruṣa. Kalipad Tarkacarya suggests that the term *prakāśakotvam* should be supplied here. The ownership, thus, finally

Therefore, there is the possibility of the isolation of the soul when the sense of ownership (in the Puruṣa) comes to an end.

7. There is no destruction of the experiencer because there is no possibility of some probans for the destruction of the experiencer which is beginningless by nature. Thus, the experiencer is certainly proved to be eternal.[1]

8. The produced type of light-like knowledge does not hold

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comes to mean the nature of reflecting the functioning of the Buddhi into the soul. The Sāṁkhyas hold that the Puruṣa is not an experiencer in the sense generally understood. The experience is notional through the reflection of the functioning of Buddhi into it It is according to the double reflection theory of Vijñānabhikṣu that the Puruṣa is reflected into the Buddhi and Buddhi having the reflection of both the Puruṣa and the reflected object is again reflected into the Puruṣa. Thus, Puruṣa's experience means the reception of the functioning of the Buddhi. The experiencing agent is the Puruṣa which receives this reflection. When such a condition comes to an end, the Puruṣa exists in its pure essential form and gets liberation.

1. This wards off the imagination of destruction of Puruṣa in the state of liberation. When the latent impressions of past acts cease to arise in Buddhi, the isolation takes place. As there is no proof for the prior negation of Puruṣa, or in other words, for the rise of Puruṣa through the functioning of the Buddhi, there is no proof for the destruction of the Puruṣa through the cessation of the functioning in the Buddhi.

good in the case of its eternity.[1] The production of light is not observed where there is no light.

9. In case the quality of light is supposed to be produced in some effect, the cause of that light is the attribution of light to the components (of that effect). Therefore, there is no non-eternal light in the eternal object.[2]

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1. The author is criticising the theory of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas that the knowledge and consciousness are not inherent in the soul but are produced by sense-object contact, etc. Since the soul is eternal, its knowledge and consciousness must be eternal. If the consciousness and knowledge would be produced and, hence, accidental in nature, the real nature of the soul would be devoid of consciousness and knowledge. If it is considered to be the possessor of knowledge and consciousnessafterwards, it would mean its deviation from the essential nature and consequently the soul would be mutable and non-eternal in nature.

2. Here, the auther wards off the possibility of an argument against the supposition of the absence of rise of light in an object having no light. The opponent may argue that a lamp having no light emits light when lit afterwards. Here, the reply is that the components of the lamp cause the light of the lamp. The components have the attributes of light because they are of the nature of light. The lamp, thus, becomes the locus of the light produced by its components. It is through the maxim of similarity of nature between the cause and the effect. There is, however, no possibility of non-eternal light in the eternal object. No logical reasoning supports such a supposition.

10. There is the illusory appearance of light in the fuel due to its contact with the locus of light (i. e , fire).[1] There is the illusory knowledge of rise of light in the mirror through the removal of the coverage (dust) from it.

11. Therefore,[2] the knowledge in the soul which is eternal in nature should be considered as eternal. In that case, on account of brevity the knowledge itself is the soul and is supposed to be without any locus of its own.[3]

12. The soul is considered to be a substance as it is not

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1. The opponent would controvert the above argument of the existence of light in the components of the lamp. The light arises in the sticks, etc., also though it does not pre-exist in them. The same may be the case with the components of the lamp. Vijñānabhikṣu contradicts the argument through maintaining that the light in fuel is conditioned through the contact with fire which actually possesses light. The author strengthens the position through the analogy of the false appearance of light in the mirror through the removal of the dirt.

2. It is because there is no rule of the rise of light in the object having no light.

3. The supposition of the soul as a locus and of the knowledge as located in it is cumbersome. Therefore, the soul is of the nature of knowledge itself. Or, the supposition of the generated knowledge in the eternal soul is cumbesome insofar as it would stand in need of the contact of soul with the mind, etc. Therefore, there is brevity in supposing that the eternal knowledge forms the essence of the soul which is not the locus of anything.

located anywhere and because of the contact, etc.[1] Hence, the knowledge that 'I know', etc., also is justified.[2]

13. The notion of 'I' with reference to the body[3] is constant in the unenlightened people due to the beginningless defects.[4] The idea of being possessed of knowledge in

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1. The author refutes the nature of quality or action in case of the soul. The soul is not related to anything through the relation of inherence. Hence, it is not a quality or action. On the contrary, there is the contact of other things with it. Hence, it is of the nature of a substance. If it would have been an action, it would have been related to the soul through inherence. If it would have been a quality, there would have been no quality in it as a quality has no further quality. But the soul has the quality of contact, etc.

2. In the expression like 'I know myself' the agent denodtə by 'I' is understood to be identical with the soul and the knowledge. If there would have been the distinction of the soul from the knowledge, such a reflexive statement would not have been possible.

3. It refers to the idea like 'I am fat', 'I am fair', etc., The opponent would contradict the above argument based upon the identity of the denotation of 'I' and the soul. Sometimes 'I' refers to body, etc., which are different from the soul.

4. The defect intended here is the unconscious latent impressions of perverted knowledge which cause further accumulation of the past impressions of acts

the case of the body is valid due to the contact (of the body with the soul).[1]

14. Just as there would be the ideas of being located, smallness, origin, destruction, etc. in case of the space of the ear, similarly, there would be the idea of being located, etc., of the knowledge, in the pure form of knowledge (the soul).[2]

15. Through the reasoning based on brevity as also from the absence of some sublating proof and on the basis of the śruti, etc., the eternal soul is proved to be of the form of consciousness only.[3]

16. The knowledge in the form of that (soul) is all-pervasive because of its being eternal as well as because of its

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1. Though philosophically it is not a valid knowledge in the strict sense of the term, yet from common level it is said to be valid because it refers to soul-body as whole and takes place there because the produced knowledge always depends upon the close contact of the soul with the body.
2. The idea of being located and the location is metaphorical in the case of the space in the ear and the space itself. As a matter of fact, the space in the ear is the unlimited space itself but when it is limited by the ear, it is expressed as limited, etc. Similarly, there is no difference between knowledge and the self. When an object like pot is known, it serves as a limiting adjunct through which the soul is said to be the locus of the knowledge of the pot as also the knowledge is said to rise in soul.
3. The position is corroborated through the scriptural statement like '*satyam jñānamanantam brahma*', etc.

pervasion over the entire body.[1] In case it is held to be of middling size, it would be liable to destruction, and in case it is atomic in size, it would imply its occupying a very short place (in the body).[2]

17. Even though the soul is all-pervasive, there does not arise the undesirable contingency of cognition of everything everywhere and always because the soul directly[3] cognises the fuctioning of psychy attached with it.[4]

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1. Here, all-pervasiveness is the probandum and the eternity, the probans However, such a reason involves logical fallacy because the eternity is not invariably associated with all-pervasiveness. The atoms are eternal, but not all-pervasive. Hence, the next part of the argument The whole argument should, therefore, be understood as *dehavyāpitvāviśiṣṭanityatvāt.* The soul cannot be of the middling size of the body also because in that case it would be considered to be non-eternal.
2. If the soul remains in a small place in the body, different feelings of pleasure and pain would not be accounted for. Sometimes one has pain in the head and at the same time the feeling of pleasure in the foot. Such cognition would not hold good if the soul exists in an atomic form in the head or the foot, because the soul would have the feeling of that place only where it is located.
3. The term 'directly' implies without the mediation of anything. That is why the soul is the witness of the fuctioning of the Buddhi and the seer of the other objects through the functioning of the Buddhi.
4. The soul cognises the objects through the functioning of the Buddhi and does not come in contact of the objects directly. The Buddhi is limited in magnitude and, thus. does not cognise all the objects simultaneously.

18. The cognition of the objects is admitted by the learned to be the reflection of the object in the self (consciousness).[1] The potency of directly reflecting the objects in the conscious principle is in the functioning (of the psychy) only.[2]

19. Consequently,[3] the cognition of some other object (than this) in that unattached, all-pervasive, ever-existing immutable consciousness is opined to take place through the functioning of the intellect only as it is deduced so through the force of the result.[1]

20. All the desire, etc., are located in the intellect and not in

1. Vijñānabhikṣu had adduced the theory of double reflection in explaining the genesis of knowledge. The Puruṣa is reflected into the Buddhi. The external object also is reflected into the Buddhi, and the Buddhi having the reflection of the Puruṣa and the external object is again reflected into the Puruṣa. The reception of this reflection is the jñāna or the resultant knowledge of the Puruṣa.
2. This is to emphasize the fact the reflection of the object into the Puruṣa is through the functioning of the Buddhi and not directly. The functioning of the Buddhi should be understood as receiving the reflection of the object and to cast the reflection back into the Puruṣa.
3. It presupposes the earlier argument that since the capability of casting the reflection of the object directly into the Puruṣa is in the functioning of the Buddhi only.
4. It is because the resultant knowledge is experienced as taking place sometimes only. If the soul would have come in contact of the objects directly without the mediation of the functioning of the Buddhi, the knowledge would have arised always and with reference to all objects.

the soul because of the positive[1] and negative invariableness,[2] because of their being produced through the functioning (of the intellect) and because they have the same locus as the functioning.[3]

21. Since all the internal modifications[4] are located in the intellect associated with a particular Puruṣa, the multitude of space-like consciousness[5] is always in the same condition and, thus, all (the souls) are equally immutable.

22. The soul is ever pure, ever conscious and ever liberated and ever free from impurities,[6] self revealed, not

1. *Anaya* precisely means that the presence of one thing invariably depends upon the presence of the other. The desire, etc., depend for their existence upon the existence of the Buddhi.
2. The *vyatireka* precisely means that the absence of some other thing is prompted or caused by the absence of the one, just as the absence of fire is the cause of the absence of smoke.
3. Thus, the desire, etc., cannot be supposed to be taking place in the soul. It is because of the rule of the same locus as the functioning of Buddhi. Both of these are located in the Buddhi. This is to refute the theory of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas that the desire, etc., are located in the soul.
4. The internal modifications signify desire, etc., which are located in the soul according to the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas.
5. The comparison of the soul with the space also suggests the immutable and all-pervasive nature of the soul.
6. The impurities meant are ignorance, etc.

supported by anything else[1] and is like a lamp for all other things.[2]

23. In this case, indeed let there be through brevity oneness of souls like space because the distinctions through pleasure, pain, etc., are found in the intellect only. If it is argued so, we reply that it is not so.[3]

24. It is because the mutual distinction is proved in the multitude of souls which have a uniform nature, through the distinction into the experience and absence of experience mentioned in the śrutis and the smṛtis.[4]

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1. If it is all-pervasive in nature, it is found everywhere and is not located at a particular place only and reveals everything.
2. All these are not the attributes of the Puruṣa, but form his very nature.
3. The Sāṁkhyas postulate the manifoldness of the soul through the different adjustment of the pleasure, pain, etc. To this, the Advaita Vedāntins may object that such an adjustment of pleasure, pain, etc., may be explained through the different adjustment of Buddhis and the soul may be considered as one. It is like the space, which is one but is designated to be many through many limiting adjuncts like, pot, etc., The Sāṁkhya, however, does not accept this position. The reason is given in the following kārikā.
4. Though the souls have got the uniform nature of consciousness, yet the śruti speaks of some souls undergoing experience and the others devoid of it, as the *Svetāśvataropaniṣad* says *ajo hyeko juṣumṇo'nuśete jahātyenām bhuktabhogāmajo'anya,* and *ātmānam trividham prāhuḥ parāparavibhedataḥ.* This is the reason for the above probandum.

25. Though the experience of the soul which is of the nature of the reflection of pleasure, etc., (in the soul), is not real, even then its (of the experience) presence and absence may be the distinguishing factors (among the souls).[1]

26. It is just as the black and red colour even serving as limiting adjuncts are the distinguishing factors of the crystals. The analogy of space is not analogous to our position because the distinction is not proved in the sky,[2]

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1. Vijñānabhikṣu alleviates the possibility of an additional argument against the Sāṁkhyas. The objector may argue on the basis of the Sāṁkhya metaphysics that the experience is also located in the Buddhi and, hence, cannot be related to the soul. Thus, it cannot bring the modification in the soul. To this, Vijñānabhikṣu replies that pleasure, pain, etc., in Sāṁkhya metaphysics mean their reflection into the soul. Even then it may cause distincttion in the souls. The soul undergoing experience may be well considered to be different from the others not undergoing the experience just as a mirror having reflection of some object may be considered different from the others not having the reflection.
2. The crystal having the reflection of an object of black colour is different from the other having the reflection of the red colour or from that having no reflection. Simi-

Thus ends the first chapter describing the nature of the Puruṣa in the Latter Half of the Sāṁkhyasāra composed by Śrī Vijñānabhikṣu

larly, the presence and absence of experience as also the differentiation into it may be the distinguishing factors for the souls. The analogy of space given by the Vedāntins is not accepted by the Sāṁkhyas because no distinction is possible in the space as the space cannot have opposite qualities reflected into it.

CHAPTER II

1. Now I shall discuss in detail the opposition between the qualities of the self and those of the non-self which form their virtues and vices[1] respectively so that the discriminative knowledge may become very clear.[2]

2. This cloud-like world[3] repeatedly arises and having come into existence merges back in the soul which is like the vast space in general,[4] through the powers agitated by the

1. The qualities of the self are said to be virtues because they are to be accepted and, hence, superior, while the qualities of the non-soul are said to vices because they are to be abandoned and, hence, inferior.
2. Consequently, it would be easily grasped.
3. The world is compared to the cloud to suggest that it lasts for a very small time like a cloud.
4. The comparison of soul to the space and that of the world to the clouds is more significant and suggestive. Just as the space is not contaminated when the cloud arises in it, nor does it attain some other form having deviated from its real nature, similarly, the soul is not contaminated by the rise of the world. It does not deviate from its essential pure nature. The soul is, however, not useless for the world because the insentient world of objects does not exercise the power of movement and acting without it. The entire world of objects functions for the purpose of the soul. Though inactive in itself, the soul sets everything in action.

proximity (of the soul).[1]

3. Thus, the conscious entity, by causing the modifications of the forces in the form of the three guṇas,[2] is the cause of the universe through the process of sustaining it because it does not undergo any change.[3]

4. Just as the water is intended to be the cause of the earth by sustaining it through the subtle element of earth located in it; similarily, the conscious entity is also intended to be (the cause of the universe).[4]

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1. The insentient objects of the world have the activity of their own, but they exercise this power for movement and action only through the proximity of the soul. If the soul would not have been there, those certainly would have been meaningless and directionless.

2. The totality of the three forces, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, is the Prakṛti which forms the material cause of the universe. That is itself intended to be meant by the expression. Even though the Prakṛti is one, still it is not a fault to state the fact through the mention of the three guṇas also because in particular circumstances a particular guṇa dominates over the other two.

3. Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that the world of insentient objects is located in the soul ultimately. Hence, it is not the material cause of the universe though it sustains the whole world.

4. The soul is the cause because it provides support to the world of insentient objects. This interpretation of adhiṣṭhāna is peculiar to Vijñānabhikṣu. Otherwise the Sāṁkhyas adduce the adhiṣṭhāna as a reason for the existence of the soul in so far as the soul causes the universe to sustain through its working for the purpose of the soul.

5. Hence, Brahman[1] even forming the cause of the universe is otherwise called immutably eternal because it does not undergo any change. It is said to be ultimately real.

6. Because of its being meant for itself[2] and because of its being proved by its own experience,[3] it is ultimately real. On account of its being sustained by itself[4] and its being proved by its own self it is proclaimed to be (existent) by the wise men in the world.[5]

7. The entire multitude of the insentient objects is non-existent[6] because of its undergoing destruction in its various forms caused in turn by the modification every

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1. It denotes the soul in the present case. It is equated with the Brahman. This is to suggest that the soul is immutable even though it is the cause of the universe. The Brahman is said to be the cause of the universe in respect of its being the location of the world.

2. It does not serve the purpose of someone else as the insentient objects do.

3. It is because the soul is self-manifesting.

4. It does not require any location for itself.

5. The ultimately real entity is not the location of erroneous knowledge as held by the Advaita Vedānta, but it is the location of the universe.

6. Here, Vijñānabhikṣu has in mind the Advaita definition of sat and asat. The sat, according to the Advaita vedantins, is that which is immutably eternal and absolutely real while the asat is changeable substance. In the Sāṁkhya sense, however, sat would be that which does not merge into the cause while the non-eternal or asat would finally merge into its cause. Thus, the Prakṛti would also be sat in Sāṁkhya. Vijñānabhikṣu seems to give an advaitic colour to Sāṁkhya doctrine. He seems to hold that Prakṛti is also located in the Puruṣa.

moment, just as the waves in the water.[1]

8. The object which does not attain to some other name brought about through the modification, etc., in the course of time (is absolutely real)[2], as it is conveyed in the smṛti statement like that substance, etc.[3]

9, On account of their dependence for existence upon the purpose of some other entity, on account of their being proved through the consciousness of some other entity,[4] (and thus) being dependent on someone else and because of their standing in need of some other entity[5] (the world of insentient objects) is certainly non-existent.[6]

10. The existent is ever having existence and the non-existence of it is never found. In case it is non-existent, how can

1. The material world is compared to the waves in the water to suggest its very short time of existence.
2. The author again stressess the fact that the absolutely real object never undergoes change while that which is modifiably eternal gets some new name as the clay attains a new name of pot. The modifiably eternal entity is not considered here as ultimately real.
3. The statement is based upon the declaration of the Visṇupurāṇa 2.13.95.
4. The insentient objects have no purpose of their own. They exist to serve the purpose of the soul.
5. The insentient objects are not known by themselves. They stand in need of the consciousness for their manifestation. If the principle manifesting them is absent, their existence is not proved as they would not be known to be existent.
6. Since they have no existence proved through them, they are non-existent ultimately.

there be its reality or existence?[1] Thus is the statement from the Garuḍapurāṇa in the context of the ascertainment of existence and non-existence.

11. Therefore, the universe is not existent,[2] nor is it absolutely non-existent,[3] (and hence) is of the nature of both-existence and non-existence. The knowledge of that is really erroneous in nature because it refers to non-existent object.[4]

1. Hence, existence is understood in the restricted sense of immutably existent. That which is not so is understood to be non-existent. Thus, the soul is proved to be absolutely and ultimately real while the insentient world of objects is opposite to it.
2. Here, to be nearer to the advaitins the author is shifting the meaning of existence from Sāṁkhya point of view. Here, he is including even the perceptible existence or even modifiable existence also under the scope of existence. He is under the impression that whatever is perceptible at empirical level cannot be absolutely non-existent. Hence, it is having empirical reality. The author seems to have in mind the truth at empirical level and that at transcendental level. To establish that the Prakṛti is real from empirical point of view, he denies its absolute existence or non-existence.
3. When the above two senses of existence and non-existence are applicable to the worldly objects, they may be both—existent and non-existent at a time. They are modifiably existent but are at the same time devoid of ultimate existence.
4. Here, again non-existence is understood as applicable to an object devoid of ultimate reality. Thus, the universe is not false or mere appearance in the sense of the Advaita Vedānta.

12. The essence of tbis world-tree is the conciousness.[1] Everything else is sapless. The undecaying or permanent part of the world is the conciousness only because it does not undergo any change.
13. Everything else than that is said to be sapless[2] on account of their being worthless. And, everything else than this is false and non-existent on account of the impermanence in comparson to that.
14. In this way is proved the existence of the soul and the non-existence of everything else, in the Yogavāśiṣṭha, etc. That is mentioned here very briefly.[3]

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1. The comparison of the world with the tree is significant and suggestive. The tree is cut and meets destruction sometime. Similarly, the world also meets destruction naturally too. Just as the essence of the tree is covered with the outer part, the soul is also inside the body covered by the physical body. The part of the tree which is not destroyed by water, fire, etc., as also the insects, etc., exists for a long time and, hence, is termed the essence of the tree. Similarly, the soul does not undergo the change in the form of modification and, hence, is aptly termed the essence of the physical world.
2. The worthlessness and saplessness of everything are not on account of their absolute non-existence or false nature. It is due to their lack of ever-lasting nature in comparison to the soul. This is the difference between the Advaita and the Sāṁkhya view of falsity.
3. It is to suggest that the non-eternity and worthlessness of the universe are not postulated by Vijñānabhikṣu himself. They are accepted on the basis of the authority of the smṛtis. For details cf. Yogavāśiṣṭha 3.13.42, 3.42.7 3.44.27, 3.44.33, 3.44.41, 3.65. 5, 3.65, 6.

15. The object of dream is non-existent in the waking state and the object of waking state is non-existent in the dream state.[1] In the state of living, the death is of the nature of non-existence and in the state of death, life is also of the nature of non-existence.[2]
16. It is never that the erroneons conception about the eternity of the universe is not there. And this world which is situated or stable only like the bubbles of water, is never permanently existent.[3]
17. The soul only is the highest reality. The other objects perceived in the world (are not so). Their permanence is just like the silver in the place of a conch shell and like the mirage in the desert.[4]

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1. Or, alternatively, the objects of dream and waking may denote these states.
2. It is because both these states are opposite in nature and cannot co-exist.
3. The existence of the world is like that of the bubble of water which exists but is liable to destruction very soon. The perceptible universe also is not finally permanent. It meets destruction after some time. The knowledge of its being finally permanent is certainly erroneous. Through this the author alleviates the objection that the perceptible reality cannot be discarded on the basis of reasoning. It is mentioned that the perceptible reality is impermanent and lasting for short time only.
4. Just as the silver erroneously cognised in place of a conch shell is not real or just as the water erroneously cognised in the place of sands in deserts is not real as their knowledge is sublated very soon, similarly, the existence for a long time seen in the case of the worldly objects is also not real. It negates the permanence of the universe and not its reality during the time of its existence.

18. The permanent highest soul is all-pervasive,[1] tranquil, pure, unthinkable, of the form of consciousness only, the highest and pervasive like the sky.[2]

19. That which is all-pervasive, omipotent, is the chief goal, is itself of the nature of everything. In whatever form it arises at the particular place (i.e., the element of intellect) in that form itself it is manifested there.[3]

20. (It is that) in which all-pervasive entity appear waves in the form of the three worlds having the nature of rising and merging back, just as the particles of light appear in the desert.[4]

21. The splendour of magic in the form of the world which appears to be existent though really non-existent[5] like[6] the river of fire having flitting waves, is arranged by the mind itself.[7]

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1. The term 'all-pervasive' means found connected with all the corporeal objects.
2. The comparison with the sky suggests its all-pervasive, untainted and unattached pure nature.
3. The Buddhi is the most close to the soul. It is the receptacle of knowledge and whatever form of the soul is postulated by the Buddhi, the same is manifested there and the soul manifests in that very form.
4. The soul, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, is more pervasive than the Prakṛti and is the locus of the Prakṛti. Hence, the Prakṛti's evolution and dissolution are located in the soul.
5. Even though the effects of the Prakṛti are transitory, they seem erroneously to be eternal.
6. The term *eva* is in the sense of *iva*.
7. Here, Vijñānabhikṣu is giving a colour of advaitic view because in Sāṁkhya the Prakṛti and its effects are not as impermanent as the imagination of mind.

22. The universe is created by the self-born Brahmā through mind only. The perceptible universe, therefore, is certainly consisting of mental images.[1]

23. The one, who is of impure intellect is deluded and is not well-versed in the state of the pervasive one,[2] considers the world which is hard as admant[3] and non-existent in nature, as existent.[4]

24. In case of the one not having the knowledge of the gold there arises the knowledge of bracelet only and there arise even slightly the knowledge of the gold.[5]

25. The unenlightended[6] has got only the terrible knowledge

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1. It is based on the śruti statements like 'the thought, I am alone, let me be many', etc. One finds the world as one conceives it.
2. It signifies the one who has not progressed in the spiritual way of realisation of the soul. It is the one whose mind is not stable in the all-pervasive.
3. The import of such a comparison is not quite clear. It may signify that it is not easy to cross the world for attaining liberation.
4. The sense is that there is no possibility of liberation for such a man because the world is not dissolved for the one without attaining the state of the soul. Thus, the world is always existent for him, though in essence it is not existent. This verse occurs in the Yogavāśiṣṭha 3.42.1
5. This is to suggest that the one who has no knowledge of the cause is always worried about the effect and never comes out of it. If one does not have the knowledge of the substratum of the universe, one is always lost in the objective world of effects and has no vision of the self. This verse occurs in the Yogavāśiṣṭha 3.42.5
6. The unenlightened does not have the vision of the self as the substratum of the caused universe.

of forts, houses, mountains, the superior elephants and he never has the reverse knowledge of the highest Reality.[1]

26. In this and the similar sentences of Vaśiṣṭha[2] there is no mention of absolute unreality of the world. Through the other sentences, however, the world is said to be an effect of Prakṛti and already existent in the Prakṛti even before its evolution.

27. The entity in which the world rests (in dissolution) without the distinctive features of name and forms, is called by some Prakṛti,[3] the others call it Māyā[4] and still others call it atoms.[5]

28. Just as the lines forming a disc or a circle lie (latent) in the midst of a stone,[6] similarly, in the state of dissolution the series of the world lie in the midst of the consciousness.[7]

1. Here, the highest Reality signifies the real nature of the soul.
2. This leads us to suppose that the world is not ultimately real. It is not that it is not real at all also. It has the reality in so far as it is an effect of the Prakṛti, the reality of which cannot be absolutely denied.
3. This is the view of Kapila, Patañjali, etc.
4. This is the theory of Advaita Vedāntins.
5. This theory is held by the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika.
6. When a circle or a lotus is carved on the stone, the lines forming them are not put from outside, but are there only. When they are carved, they are manifested.
7. The worldly objects are supposed to rest in the consciousness in the state of dissolution. This is, however, not the view of the Sāṁkhyas in the strict sense of the term. In the earlier verse itself the world is stated to rest in the Prakṛti in the state of dissolution. Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that the soul is the substratum of the Prakṛti in the state of dissolution.

29. It is because in the following and other similar statements the Sāṁkhya theory of pre-existence of effect in cause, etc., is discussed. The creeper in the form of the Prakṛti, which gives rise to the already existent fruit in the form of the world is born in the sky.[1]

Thus ends the second chapter in the latter half of the Sāṁkhyasāra composed by Śrī Vijñānabhikṣu discussing the distinction between the soul and the non-soul in the form of their being real and unreal.

1. To say that the Prakṛti is produced goes against the classical Sāṁkhya. Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that the Prakṛti rests in consciousness at the time of dissolution. Cf. Yogavāśiṣṭha 1.9.27-6, 3.100.11.

CHAPTER III

1. In this way was proved the existence of soul as different from others (non-soul)[1]. Now I shall discuss the nature of consciousness (of the soul) which is different from the psychic functioning.[2]

2. The Puruṣa is said to be the experiencer, conciousness, knowledge and feeling or sensation. The Pradhāna, etc.,

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1. In the earlier chapter the author has discussed that the soul exists as different from others, viz., Prakṛti, etc. The soul is the highest reality as it is immutable, etc., while the Prakṛti etc., being modifiable are not so. It suggets the consistent relation of this chapter with the earlier.

2. In the system of Sāṁkhya, knowledge arises and the impirical consciousness is manifested through the functioning of the Buddhi. The manifestation of empirical knowledge or consciouness means Buddhi's act of taking the form of the object, receiving the reflection of the Puruṣa and casting back its reflection on the Puruṣa. Thus, the empirical exprerience is not possible without the functioning of the Buddhi. The experience arises through the confusion of identity between the Buddhi and Puruṣa. It is not ordinarily cognised that the consciousness is different from the functioning of the Buddhi. Hence, Vijñānabhikṣu discusses the same so that one may attain the real nature of the self.

on the other hand, are said to be the object of knowledge, insentient, Tamas and ignorance.[1]

3. Through the contact with the object of experience, the consciousness is said to be knower, just as the light is the manifester through its contact with the object revealed.[2]

4. Just as the knowledge reveals an object through its being coloured by the object of knowledge, similarly there is the location of this part (knowledge) in the whole.[3]

5. The colouring by the objective forms of the knowledge of object into the conscious entity which is unattached is not in the same way as it is in case of Buddhi. On the contrary, it is the reflection of that object into the conscious entity directly or through the mediation.[4]

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1. This is the contrast in nature between the two. If the soul is conscious, the Prakṛti, etc., are the object of sensation.

2. This is a reply to the natural curiosity as to if the soul is of the nature of consciousness, how it is a knower or experiencer.

3. The knowledge has no intrinsic form but gets the form of the object after having come in contact with the form of the object. At this state, the knowledge may be said to be manifester of of the object. Similarly, the pure knowledge without the object, which forms the nature of the soul itself, comes in contact with the object and is termed the knowledge of an object as it characterised by that object. Such characterised knowledge is located in the soul which is the locus of this particular knowledge.

4. If the Puruṣa is said to be a knower, it would cease to be eternal. Knowledge requires modification and if the Puruṣa is said to undergo modification, it would not be

6. Even though the consciousness is all-pervasive,[1] it does not

immutable in nature. That is why the Buddhi is supposed to be modifiable in nature. Moreover, it would contradict Puruṣa's nature of being unattached, which is stressed in the Śruti. Vijñānabhikṣu makes a distinction between the reception of the object by the Buddhi and that by the Puruṣa. The Buddhi dominates in Sattva, and hence, undergoes the change and receives the form of the object by modifying itself into the form of the object. The reception in the case of the Puruṣa is through the reflection of the Buddhi in the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa is not affected by the object like the Buddhi. Actually, the Puruṣa does not really have the form of the object but seems to be so just as a crystal seems to have the colour of the rose flower. The Puruṣa is first reflected into the Buddhi and the Buddhi becomes sentient for all practical purposes. It is just as the iron comes into the contact with the fire and becomes hot. The fire does not enter the iron but the iron burns due to the contact of the fire. Here, the Buddhi is modifiable because it attains some more qualities due to its contact with the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa, however, receives the reflection of the object which has mounted the Buddhi and remains immutable also. Thus, the process of reception of the object by Buddhi and by Puruṣa is not the same. The Buddhi gets the dominance of Sattva in the process of knowing, but the Puruṣa does not undergo any change in the process of knowing. Hence, the Buddhi is modifiable while the Puruṣa is immutable. The reflection of the Buddhi and its functioning are directly reflected in the Puruṣa while that of the other objects is indirect through first mounting on the Buddhi.

1. The term all-pervasive denotes Puruṣa's contact with all the corporeal objects.

know all the objects together (simultaneously) because it is not affected (coloured) by the object on account of the lack of the instrumentality in the form of the external functioning.[1]

7. Just as the object is not known without the instrumentality in the form of the psychic functioning, the conscious entity also remains with its existence unknown until the psychic function, becomes visible to it.[2]

1. The external functioning means the functioning of the Buddhi and the external organs. Such a functioning means receiving the form of the object. Even though the Puruṣa is all pervasive, it is known through the functioning of the Buddhi which being limited in magnitude, does not come in contact with all the objects simultaneously. Hence, there does not arise the knowledge simultaneously in the Puruṣa.

2. The author stresses the need of the reflection of the Buddhi again in the soul. Vijñānabhikṣu is the upholder of the double reflection theory according to which the Puruṣa is reflected into the Buddhi and the Buddhi starts functioning like a sentient object. The Buddhī then having the reflection of the object of cognition is again reflected back into the Puruṣa. The objective knowledge is not possible without that. If the reflection of the Buddhi is not admitted into the Puruṣa, the Puruṣa will not have its reflective knowledge. The Buddhi receives the form of the Puruṣa and reflects it back into the Puruṣa Through this reflection the Puruṣa comes to have the knowledge of its own. Hence the need of the functioning becoming perceptible to the Puruṣa. Or, this kārikā may be understood as establishing the need of the reflection of the Puruṣa. It cannot know itself directly without its reflection into the Buddhi.

8. In this way, the conscious entity having no specific form,[1] of the nature of space having light, remains unmanifest (for empirical purpose) in the state of liberation on account of the absence of the psychic functioning.[2]

2. The psychic functioning, on the other hand, is with a form[3] and limited in magnitude, like a lamp, and innumerable momentary functionings of similar kind are always manifested in it.[4]

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1. Nirākāra can be explained as having no specific from of its own, or as having no form of some object submitted to it.

2. In the state of liberation the soul exists in its uncontaminated pure form without the contact with the functioning of the Buddhi. Hence, it does not imitate the form of the Buddhi. The consciousness is also latent because it cannot be externally manifested without functioning of the Buddhi when the external objects are nōt known. Thus, the soul remains unknown in the state of liberation on account of the absence of the functiōning of the Buddhi and since the knowledge of the soul necessarily requires the functioning of the Buddhi, It is proved to be essential for the knowledge of the soul.

3. Sākāra is opposite to nirākāra form of the soul. It may mean either that it has a form of its own or that it has the form of the object in it.

4. In this way, the nature of Buddhi is opposite to that of of the soul. The soul in its essentials is formless, unlimited, all-pervasive and eternal while the functioning of Buddhi is opposite to it.

10. The Buddhi is considered to be insentient in nature because it is revealed by another[1] just as a pot by a lamp. Their nature of revealing the object through its functioning is not harmed (by its being insentient) because it (the psychic functioning) has the form of the object in it.[2]

11. Just as the mirror reveals the face because it is capable of receiving the form of that object,[3] similarly since it is capable of receiving the form of everything, it reveals everything.

12. The power of cognising is not inherent in the functioning of the psychy. The power of cognising the functioning belongs to the conscious entity which is different from that. If both of them arc supposed to be the cognisers, it will be logically cumbersome.[4]

13. The soul in the form of experience knows the other things mounted on the Buddhi[5] and reflected by it (into the

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1. This is the definition of insentience in contrast to the sentience which is self-revealed.

2. I.e., it is related with the form of the object and appears in this form itself. It is like a mirror which reflects the form of the object in it.

3. It is just as the mirror reveals the form of the face because it recives that form. Since the Buddhi is dominated by Sattva, it has a special capability of revealing all the objects by receiving the form. Such a capability is not found in the other limbs of the body.

4. Vijñānabhikṣu is particular in maintaining that the cogniser is the Puruṣa and not the Buddhi. If the Buddhi is also considered to be a cogniser, it would imply the absurdity.

existence of two cognisers in the body, which is logically

5. It signifies that the Buddhi has received the form of that object without which the knowlegde is not possible.

Puruṣa)[1]. There is no other object as cogniser for example, the Buddhi.

14. Thus is stated the distinction of the conscious power from the psychic functioning. Its distinction from the body, etc., in terms of conscious and unconscious is very explicit.[2]

15. On account of the same form of the psychic functioning and the knowledge caused by their mutual reflection,[3] there is the expression of knowledge with reference to the psychic functioning just as there is the expression of fire with reference to the iron[4].

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1. Only the reception of the form by the Buddhi does not serve the required purpose in the process of knowledge. The form should be submitted to the Puruṣa also, which is the real cogniser.
2. The consciousness and the lack of it are cited only as examples to prove the contrast between the soul and body, etc. Such a contrast can easily be cognised. Hence the contrast between the Buddhi and the Puruṣa is discussed in detail. In the empirical state of experience the soul and the Buddhi erroneously seem to be the unified category.
3. Due to their mutual reflection, both the Puruṣa and the Buddhi seem to be opposite to their real nature. The Buddhi seems to be sentient and the Puruṣa, active.
4. The position is explained on the basis of an example of the iron ball. When the iron ball is heated, people say that the iron ball burns, though in reality, it is the fire in it which burns. Thus, the expression of consciousness with reference to the Buddhi is not real, but metaphorical. Hence, such an expression does not disprove the consciousness in the Puruṣa.

16. The discrimination between the psychic functioning and the resultant knowledge cannot be grasped by the weak minded and ignorant people,[1] where the logicians[2] are confused and because of which the Sāṁkhyas have attained the excellenee.

17. The Vijñānavādin Buddhists[3] consider the conciousness to be momentary as they are confused in the interpretation of the śruti estahlishing the knowledge as the soul, due to their non-discrimination between the psychic functioning and the knowledge.

18. The distinction between the Buddhi and the Puruṣa in the form of the psychic modification and their knowledge is not impossible to be grasped by the intelligent people[4] just as the discrimination between the water and the milk by the swans.[5]

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1. The ordinary persons are confused about the identity of the two and, hence, it requires a long training to discriminate between the two. They cannot discriminate between the modification of the Buddhi and the real self. They consider both of them as a unified element.
2. The term 'logicians'stands for the Buddhists, Nâiyāyikas, etc.
3. This school of the Buddhists consider the flitting knowledge as the consciousness or the soul. The śrutis speak of the knowledgs as soul. Such a knowledge is understood by them as the psychic modification. Through the non-discrimination between the two, they prove the soul as the momentary knowledge.
4. The intelligent people are the Sāṁkhyas, etc., whose intellect is purified.
5. The analogy is apt. Just as the discrimination between the water and the milk is very difficult for others but not

19. The worlds end there;[1] the liberation lies there[2] itself when there is the ascertainment of that knowledge as discriminated from the psychic functioning.

23. All may know the experiencing agent but no one realises this.[3] The discriminative knowledge alone is required for the realisation of that.[4]

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for the swans; similarly, the discrimination between the psychic modification and the Puruṣa is very difficult for others but not for the Sāṁkhyas.

1. One undergoes transmigration as long as the discriminative knowledge is not attained.

2. It is related to that as a producing agent. Since the discriminative knowledge leads to the attainment of highest purpose of life, it is the most excellent.

3. Every one can realise the experiencing agent as a mixed entity of the psychic modification and the soul. No One, however, knows the pure soul as not mixed with the psychic modification.

4. For acquiring the knowledge of the pure soul, one necessarily requires the knowledge of discrimination between the soul and the psychic functioning. If the soul is not cognised as different from psychic functioning, the knowledge of the soul would always be associated with the knowledge of the psychic functioning. Without the discriminative knowledge, the soul cannot be known in its pure form. Nor are the psychic functionings in their pure form.

21. The soul cannot be discriminated because the psychic functioning is mixed with the external object[1]. Hencc, the soul should be discriminated from the external psychic functioning and that depends upon the knowledge of the psychic functioning.[2]

22. Thc fire cannot be discriminated because it is mixcd with charcoal. In the charcal it can be discriminated explicitly from the fuel through the ditermination of burning the fuel.[3]

23. Therefore, in the śruti, through discrimination from the psychic function which is perceived or known in the state of dream,[4] the seer of that is shown in the form of light itself,

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1. The external object cannot be cognised without the psychic functioning because it is submitted to the soul by psychic functioning only and in that experience the soul is cognised as mixed with these psychic functions. The empirical knowledge does not discriminate among the object of knowledge, its means, viz., the psychic modification, and the cognising self.

2. In the analysis of such a knowledge, one should try to discriminate the psychic modification in the object from the pure soul. That discrimination depends upon the true nature of the psychic modifications. When these are explicitly known, one can discriminate the soul from them.

3. If one has the discriminative knowledge of fire, one can easily distinguish the fire from the charcoal. Or, one can distinguish the fire from the fuel through the idea that the fire is held in the fuel. The fire has the burning capacity while the fuel does not.

4. In the state of dream there is no reference to the external object. Only the mental image of an object is perceived.

24. Whatever is the direct revealer of some object,[1] that is opined by the intelligent to be different from that, just as the light from the pot, etc., and the functioning from the light as well.

25. On account of being the direct revealer of the psychic functioning,[2] the soul in the form of the experience is different from the psychic functioning.[3] This is the quick method for the realisation of the self.

26. In this way, the light of consciousness is proved as different from the light in the form of Sattva forming the Buddhi, as the revealer of this (light of sattva forming Buddhi).[4]

Therefore, the discrimination becomes easier. One can distinguish the soul as a seer from the psychic functioning. Thus, the discrimination between the seer and the seen arises in the knower.

1. The term sakṣātprakāśa is dissolved as sākṣāt prakāśayatīti meaning that which reveals directly. The light reveals the object like pot, and hence, is different from that. The first line gives the invariable concomitance and the second shows an example.
2. It is established earlier that the revealing entity is different from the object revealed. This is applied to the discriminative knowledge of the soul.
3. The term svadarśana may either mean in our system or the knowledge of the soul.
4. The author speaks of two types of light-that in the form of Sattva forming Buddhi and that in the form of soul. The former is called light because it reveals an object at the latter also, because it reveals the psychic functioning. In this way is proved the distinction of the soul from the Sattva forming Buddhi.

27. Therefore, through the example of the body in the dream mentioned in the śruti,[1] the consciousness is opined to be different from the body, senses and the objects in the waking state.

28. In the dream state all the body, etc., appaar in the soul as different from the soul. In the waking state, however, this is the difference that the external objects also appear[2].

59. Since everything is a modification of mind in the state of dream, it becomes the object of the soul directly.[3] In the waking state the external objects are seen by the soul through other means.[4]

30. All the body, etc., of the dreaming or the waking state appear in the concious-space[5] in the same form. There is no difference in the conciousness caused by the objects inside or outside the body.

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1. It is established earlier that the soul is different from the objects seen in the dream state. On the analogy of the same, it is intended to be different from the mind-body complex and the objects seen in the waking state.
2. In the state of dream the soul observes only the mental images with the contact of the latter. The external object, thus, can well be distinguished from the self. In the waking state, however, the Buddhi gets the form of the external object and the soul receives this form. As a result, the form of the external object is observed in addition to all those observed in the state of dream.
3. In the state of dream the Buddhi imagines the form of the external objects without the functioning of the senses.
4. The means involved here are the functioning of the senses and the Buddhi.
5. I.e,, the space-like consciousness. It suggests the all pervasive nature of the concious entity.

31. There is the knowledge in the conscious space through the latent impressions[1] or that having the form of the object through the means of knowledge.[2] Through that whatever is the same is the same in the dream-state and the waking-state.[2]

32. This is stated so on the basis of my own experience and not on the basis of some indirect means of knowledge.[4] There is no means or process of realising the soul like the analogy of the dream state.

33. Just as a man experiences everything inside his own body in the dream while asleep, in the waking state he considers himself to be a part (of the world).[5]

34. The state of deep sleep is the real nature of the soul because in that state the soul exists in its essential form.[6]

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1. It signifies the dream state.
2. It signifies the waking state.
3. In both the states the Buddhi's act of taking the form of the object is the same. That is why there is no difference from the point of view of the reception in the soul.
4. Its indirect means would be the inference based upon the behaviour of the soul-realised persons or the śruti statement,
5. It is because he is aware of his existence and the limitations caused by the body and the external object, etc.
6. It brings out the distinction between the waking and the dream states on the one hand and the state of deep sleep on the other. There is the possibility of the knowledge of the real nature of the soul in this state because there is no false identification of the soul with the Buddhi as there is no psychic functioning there. It may, however, be observed here that even in this state there is no awareness

The waking and the dream states, on the other hand, are illusory because of the false identity (of the soul) with the Buddhi.

35. The state of deep sleep of Buddhi is its being covered by the Tamas and, thus, is different (from that of soul). The state of deep sleep of the soul is the absence of the covering in the form of the knowable object otherwise called the psychic functioning.[1]

36. The Puruṣa does not have the knowledge at all the times beeause of absence of the object to be known otherwise called psychic functioning, (though) it is complete,[2] immutable. eternal and the seer of the functioning of the psychy attached to it.[3]

37. As there is the knowledge at the place of Buddhi in the same way the ignorant one considers it everywhere and

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of the true nature of the soul because the Buddhi dominates in Tamas in this state. Hence, it cannot reflect into the soul because the dominance of Sattva which is a precondition for knowledge is not present there.

1. As a matter of fact both these signify the same thing as regards the result or the effect. When the Tamas dominates in or covers the Buddhi, there is automatically the absence of the psychic functioning which presents the form of the object to the soul.
2. I.e., all-powerful or omnipotent.
3. The verse gives the reason as to why the Puruṣa is not a seer at all the times even though he is eternal. The term only (mātra) suggests that the Puruṣa does not know the objects owned by or associated with other Puruṣas.

at all the times as belonging to the soul. Thus, by the ignorant people the souls are falsely tormented by decay and destruction.[1]

38. The ignorant people do not leave the Buddhi which is the cause of the great disease of the exprience of pain and the owner of the house-like body and from which arises the pleasure of the great sleep.[2]

39. If the notion of the state of householder of the Buddhi[3] is not abandoned, the liberation cannot be attained through the external renunciation which gives only the highest

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1. The ignorant people believe in the identity of the soul and Buddhi and think that the knowledge arises everywhere and at all the times through the psychic functioning only. Thus, they consider the soul to be liable to the decay and destruction and, thus, are always tormented by this ignorance.
2. The pain is caused by the Buddhi to the soul and does not from the intrinsic nature of the soul. The ignorant people who do not discriminate between the Buddhi and the soul think that the soul is tormented. The Buddhi is a cause of the empirical pleasure also which is not pleasure in reality. It is like the pleasure in the state of sleep where the psychic functioning is stopped and the pain is not felt. The real pleasure arises through the serenity of the soul which depends upon the realisation of the soul as unattached and absolutely distinct from Buddhi. Thus, the real pleasure consists in leaving the notion of ownership of the Buddhi by the Puruṣa.
3. It suggests Buddhi's attachment to the sensual pleasure through the acquisition of worldly objects.

displeasure here and hereafter.[1]

40. One should always entertain the idea of uniformity of nature in one's own soul with that of others which are all of the form of consciousness only.[2] Through the discrimination into the different Buddhis only the distinction into ones's own soul and that of others is false.[3]

41. Having superimposed its doership on its owner soul, which is of the nature of consciousness only and is devoid of all the qualities,[4] the Buddhi is bound by its own acts due to its offence of disrespecting its owner.[5]

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1. If one does not enjoy the physical objects externally but is mentally attached to them, it is worse than externally enjoying them, By leaving the objects externally one only relinquishes the worldly pleasure and does not get the benefit of renunciation too. Even after leaving this body one does not get liberation, but falls into the state of transmigration only. Therefore, internal detachment is necessary.
2. Every soul is of the nature of consciousness and there is no differentiation with reference to the soul. The notion that this soul is mine and the other is of someone else is false. The idea of ownership or distinction with reference to the souls is the result of perverted knowledge.
3. Even though the souls are uniform in nature, they are different in each body. It is just like the light of the electric bulbs which are identical but are different. The distinction in nature is a false notion.
4. The nature of being devoid of qualities suggests its unattached nature to everything.
5. Due to the biginningless close connection of the Buddhi with the Puruṣa the Buddhi's activities are superimposed on the Puruṣa. As long as such a contact is present, one suffers from bondage. It is just as a lady, who having

42. On the other hand, the noble[1] intellect having known her lord in reality and devoted to him[2] is happy here, and at the end would get merged into the body of her lord.[3]

43. The intellect which always ponders that this [1]lord (soul) is not an agent, is not endowed with pleasure and pain and is of the form of the consciousness-space only, does not give the experience of pain to her lord.[4]

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done some offence herself ascribes it to her lord even knowing that she is telling a lie, is bound by the police man. The real suffering belongs to the Buddhi.

1. The adjectives used here are applicable to both the intellect and the lady. In the case of a lady it means chaste. In the case of the intellect it means having the dominance of Sattva in it.
2. In the case of the Buddhi it means that which is always engaged in concentration on the soul and in the case of a lady it means the one attached to her lord.
3. In the case of the intellect it means in the form of the soul and in the case of the lady it means in the body of her husband.
4. This is the process of attaining the discriminative knowledge which leads to liberation. Such a knowledge alleviates the perverted knowledge, which further results into the impossibility of pains. Through the term 'pondering' is denoted the profound meditation which is the cause of the direct realisation of the soul.

CHAPTER IV

1. Thus[1] is discussed the light of consciousness of the soul, different from Buddhi, etc. Now is undertaken the discussion of its nature of pleasure as well.[2]

2. Pain is the desire for the pleasure arising of the objects of sensual enjoyment. The pleasure is the cessation of pain. Thus is explained the nature of pleasure in the smṛtis, which is of the form of eternalabsence of pain in the soul.[3]

3. The sublation of convention through the force of technical definition is admitted everywhere. Otherwise the technical definition would serve no purpose in the scripture on liberation.[4]

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1. This suggests the connection of this chapter with the previous one.
2. In the system of Sāṁkhya the soul is devoid of pleasure, pain, etc. Hence, the term pleasure here should be understood in the sense of absence of pain. It is not something positive.
3. Pleasure is not to be understood in the Vedantic sense of positive pleasure. It is, in fact, the absence of pleasure and pain.
4. This is a reply to the possib'e argument as to if the meaning of pleasure is admitted as positive pleasure in Vedānta why the Sāṁkhyas should define it as absence of pain. The answer to it is sought through the rule of sublation. It runs like this. That which has less scope sublates the others which have wider scope. The general meaning

4. Or, the śruti statements propounding pleasure are to be understood in the secondary sense of superimposing (pleasure on soul) with the purpose of the attainment of the supreme happiness (by people) just as the expression of sky with reference to the Puruṣa is to understand its pervasive nature.[1]

5. It is clear from the statements that it is neither with pleasure nor without pleasure. It is because of statement of the nature of the soul, supported by reasoning.[2]

6. On account of its being of no use for worship, etc., and because of the śruti statement like 'it is not, it is not', it stands unrefuted that the statement of negation is more powerful than the positive statement.[3]

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has wider scope. Therefore, it is sublated by the meaning known from definition because the definition has the restricted scope in the particular scripture only. Hence, the technical sense of absence of pain should be preferred to the general meaning.

1. The sense is that the author speaks indirectly that the soul is pleasure itself because it is the means of attaining supreme pleasure so that those who hanker after pleasure also may opt for the attainment of the soul. It is just like terming the clarifies butter as long life itself. the author clarifies it with the example of calling the soul is different from sky. It is only to suggest that the soul is all-pervasive like the sky. Similarly, happiness is superimposed upon the soul to suggest that it is a means of attaining happiness.

2. The śruti not only states so but propounds it with the reasoning also. The soul is not prescribed for the purpose of worship. It is deduced from it that it does not contain pleasure as its essence.

3. It is so because the positive statement can be understood in some other way also.

7. The statement as 'not devoid of pleasure' conveys the enjoyment of pleasure forming its limiting adjunct, in the form of its being the owner of it. The case is analogous to 'not devoid of wealth'.[1]

8. Therefore, the śruti statement runs that 'the soul is stated to be dearer than the pleasure also'. Hence, the statement of its being of the nature of happiness is not correct.[2]

9. On the authority of the Vedāntsūtra, viz., 'the pleasure, etc., belong to the Pradhāna',[3] in the system of Vedānta also the soul's being of the nature of plasure is not the theory.

10. We have examined in details the soul's nature of not consisting of happiness in the Brahmamīmāṁsābhāṣya.[4] Now is explained the nature of its being dear.

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1. The terms not devoid of pleasure mean absence of not being the owner of pleasure, i.e., the owner of pleasure. It should not be understood as the absence of absence of pleasure, i.e., pleasure itself. Otherwise the absence of absence of something would mean that thing itself and the soul would come to be of the nature of pleasure. In fact, the soul is the owner of pleasure situated in Buddhi. The case is analogous to saying someone not poor which means the absence of absence of being the owner of the wealth, i.e., the owner of the wealth.

2. A statement was made earlier that the soul is said to be of the nature of happiness to justify its nature of being the dearest. Such a surmise is negated now. The happiness is also different from the soul.

3. *Brahmasūtra* 3.3.11

4. It refers to Vijñānabhikṣu's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, viz., *Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya*

11. It is not that I should not be but I should exist always, the attachment in this form without any cause is the nature of being dearest in the case of the highest consciousness.[1]

12. On account of Buddhi's being not excluded from others,[2] the above said love[3] does not refer to the objective pleasure through Buddhi also.

13. The attachment to the soul is prompted by the nature of soul only; it does not depend upon happiness, etc., because when there is the feeling 'I should ever exist', it is not the desire that 'I should be happy.[4]

14. And, in this way, the state of happiness which is the state of absence of misery and forms the nature of soul, is proved to be the prompting cause for such a love,[5] because the naure of being the soul is itself the state of love.

15. Therefore, the soul is dear due to its own nature and not due to some limiting adjunct. The love caused by the

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1. Since no one wants to part with it, it is the dearest.
2. The expression *anyāśeṣatyā* may imply as since the other things are equally the subsidiary to the soul, i.e., because the soul is the chief among the other things.
3. I.e., the desire to live ever.
4. The love is for one's existence and not for happiness. If such a love would have been prompted by the desire for happiness, the feeling would have been expressed in the terms as I should always be happy instead of 'I should ever exist'.
5. I.e., the love for ever existence. The love for the existence of soul is independent of everything and is not prompted by anything else.

limiting adjuncts is not real or caused by the nature of that thing because in that case it is temporary.[1]

16. The love for other things like happiness is non-eternal as well as caused by ignorance, etc. The love for the soul is, however, eternal. Therefore, the Puruṣa is of the nature of eternal bliss.[2]

17. If the Buddhi fully controlled (or engaged in concentration) realises the soul's nature of being dear, surpassing everything,[3] does it not dive deep in the ocean of pleasure ?[4]

18. The happiness is in Buddhi. It is seen in the world through observing through something dear.[5] From this is inferred the highest pleasure in observing the dearest thing i.e., the soul.

19. The affection or love everywhere is for the sake of the

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1. If the love is due to something else, with the removal of that the love will also come to an end and would thus be temporary, i.e., as long as that thing exists. Such a love is not real. If the love is caused by the inherent nature of that thing itself, it is real.
2. This is to prove Puruṣa's nature of eternal bliss. It is to be understood in the sense of pain as stated above.
3. This is to prove Puruṣa's nature of eternal bliss. It is to be understood in the sense of absence of pain as stated above.
4. One is plunged into pleasure and never comes out of it. This is the state of supreme bliss or liberation.
5. In the worldly dealings one gets the pleasure when the Buddhi comes in contact of something desired. On seeing the soul one attains the supreme pleasure. Thus is proved the nature of highest pleasure in the soul.

soul.[1] The soul is dear by itself.[2] Thus states the eternal śruti with a view to prescribe the knowledge of the soul.[3]

20. From this also is known (inferred) that the happiness arising through realising the soul which is dear, is uncomparable.[4] The highly intelligent people who are liberated still embodied experience that happiness.[5]

21. The pitiable man without realising the real consistent internal pleasure of the soul attained by the yogins,[6] and hankering after the external happiness, is deceived.

22. The embodied living being realising the external objects through the window like holes of the senses with the hope of getting happiness[7] and, thus, on knowing the external objects only, does not realise the internal happiness.

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1. Here, the author seems to have in mind the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.5-6 that everything is dear for the sake of the soul.
2. This is the excellence of the soul over everything else.
3. Since everything else is dear for the soul and the soul is dear for itself, one should make a serious effort to attain the knowledge of the soul.
4. There is no pleasure equal to this.
5. Therefore, one should try to attain the state of being liberated still embodied.
6. Such happiness is not attained by those who are extrovert. It is attained by the yogins who control their internal and external organs.
7. The hope of getting the internal happiness is futile in the persons who are satisfied wiih the knowledge of the external objects only.

23. Fie upon the apparent happiness[1] arising of the (experience of) the objects, attainable through difficulties, consisting of miseries, ultimately resulting in a lot of miseries and which obstructs the happiness arising of one's own soul.

Here ends the chapter on the distinction into dear and not dear between the soul and the non-soul in the Sāṁkhyasāra composed by Śrī Vijñānabhikṣu.

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1. These look like happiness, but are actually of the nature of misery.

CHAPTER V

1. Through the three chapters are discussed (the three comnents of the) definition of soul in the form of existence, consciousness and pleasure appraised in the śruti and the smṛtis.[1]

2. The definition given by others to this is also clearly mentioned.[2] The discriminative knowledge arising through these qualities and defects[3] is supreme remover of the faults.[4]

3. After this I shall briefly discuss many other qualities of the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti like absence of properties and

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1. In the first chapter is discussed the nature of the soul. In the second chapter the author has described the soul's nature of existence, the third chapter discusses its nature of consciousness while the fourth chapter discusses its nature of pleasure otherwise called happiness.
2. The definitions in terms of absence of existence, consciousness, etc., are also discussed.
3. The qualities of the soul which are prescribed to be acquired are excellences and the others not forming its essential nature are to be given up as the defects. These are discussed in the second chapter of the latter half of the Sāṁkhyasāra.
4. The fault intended here is the latent impressions of perverted knowledge which is the cause of rebirth and repeated transmigration.

being possessed of properties.[1]

4. Since the pleasure, etc., arise through the functioning of the Buddhi in terms of modifying into the form of the object,[2] they are postulated through brevity[3] as belonging to the Buddhi through the maxim of the same locus (of the cause and its products).

5. Through the nature of being insentient in the case of Mahat, etc., its cause is also admitted to be insentient. The similarity between the effect and cause is observed everywhere in the world.[4]

6. Thus, through brevity the soul is proved to be of the nature of the cognition only.[5] All the qualities belong to the Prakṛti, etc., and all other things are the modifications of that.

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1. The nature of being devoid of the properties goes with the Puruṣa while the nature of being possessed of properties goes with the Prakṛti.
2. The empirical feelings of pleasure and pain arise when the Buddhi transforms itself into the form of the object. Hence, they are supposed to be located into the Buddhi.
3. If they are considered to belong to the soul, there will arise the need of postulating so many causes. If, on the other hand, they are supposed to belong to Buddhi, only the manas will suffice to be the cause and, hence, the brevity.
4. For example, a pot is of the nature of earth. Its material cause, viz., clay is also the earth itself. It is not some other object or some dissimilar thing. Thus is proved the analogy.
5. This is to prove that the soul is of the nature of cognition and not the locus of it. If the soul would be supposed to

7. The soul is devoid of qualities and similarly it is admitted by the intelligent people to be immutable as well. The designation of 'immutable' in the case of consciousness is due to its being steadfast like the summit of a mountain.[1]

8. Its (apparent) defilement is when it comes in contact with the other and is coloured by the form of that. It is just as the latent unconscious impressions take place in the Buddhi through its contact with the objects.[2]

9. Due to the contact of the substance[3] there is the impression[4] of the particular object in the pot, etc. Their contact and union is the cause of the spot and the related object is the ointment.

10. Therefore, the Puruṣa is said to be without blemish, unattached and stainless, by the supreme seers through the

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be the locus of the knowledge, it would require the relation of causality between the soul and knowledge which would be cumbersome. Hence, through brevity, it is supposed to be of the nature of consciousness.

1. The sense is just as the soul is devoid of all the qualities, it is permanently steadfast also.
2. The soul is intrinsically undefiled. Due to the ignorance one confuses the identity of the soul with the Buddhi and the form of the object in Buddhi is superimposed on the Puruṣa. This is precisely the apparent defilement of the Puruṣa. It is like the form of the object in the Buddhi when it comes in contact with the object.
3. Like madder.
4. I.e., the colour, etc., of the object are attached to the pot.

examples of sky and the lotus-leaf, etc.[1]

11. The powers in the form of sattva, etc., attain the form of bubble-like world in the ocean like limitless power in the form of mere consciousness, set in motion by the wind-like purpose of the Puruṣa.[2]

12. Thus, the conscious soul itself is the lord of the universe through its contact with the world because it stimulates the insentient object as the magnet is the stimulator of the iron.[3]

13. The Puruṣa itself is the creator of the universe,[4] the pro-

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1. Just as the sky and the lotus-leaf are not affected by something and the water respectively coming into their contact, similarly, the soul is not affected by the worldly objects.
2. The Sattva, etc., are set in motion by the purpose of the Puruṣa and evolve into the objects which are transient in nature just as the water of the ocean agitated by the wind transforms into the bubbles which are transient in nature.
3. The Sāṁkhyas do not accept some entity like Īśvara apart from the Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The Puruṣa itself is the Īśvara. It controls the objects of the universe and sets them in motion. It is, however, without active agency. He does so merely through his contact with the objects. It is like the magnet which controls and sets the iron in motion through its contact with the iron. It explains Puruṣa's nature of being lord without agency in it.
4. The soul is the instrumental cause of the universe because everything is set in motion by him, though inactive in itself. The three guṇas of the Prakṛti start acting and evolve into the universe so that the purpose of the Puruṣa may be served.

tector of it,[1] lord of everything, because the group of insentient objects proceeds to act because of him just as the servant acts for the lord.[2]

14. The organs in the body acting like the officers for the king submit the object of enjoyment to the minister like mind by their very nature.[3]

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1. The Puruṣa is the sustainer of the universe as well because the objects of the universe evolve to serve the purpose of the Puruṣa and exist as long as the purpose of the Puruṣa is not served. Thus, their existence depends upon the Puruṣa and as such he can metaphorically be called their sustainer without involving any activity.
2. This is again to explain the lordship of the soul over the insentient objects. The lordship is invested in the entity for the purpose of which the others act. The insentient objects act to serve the purpose of the Puruṣa and being, thus, governed by his purpose are under his control and, hence, the lordship of the soul.
3. The organs act for the purpose of the Puruṣa. This is clarified with an analogy. Just as the officers collect the taxes from the people and submit it to the minister which in turn submits it to the king similarly, the organs receive the objects of the enjoyment and submit it to the mind. Just as the ministers think over or examine the objects collected by the officer, the mind ponders over the objects submitted by the organs and submits them through Buddhi to the Puruṣa. It is just as the ministers submit the taxes to the king through the prime minister. Just as it is the purpose of the king which makes the ministers and the officers work, similarly, it is the purpose of the Puruṣa which makes the internal and the external objects work. The king is the enjoyer without actually working and considers himself rich or poor by identifying himself with

15. The Buddhi endowed with the objects of enjoyment presents itself to the soul and the soul which is the lord of everything enjoys it merely through observing it just as the king does.[1]
16. The body is the master of the wealth, etc., the senses are the master of the body; the Buddhi is the master of the senses: the soul is the supreme lord of the Buddhi.[2]
17. Since there is no stimulating agent of the Iśvara which is immutable in nature and since the Iśvara is the (upper) limit, the supreme lord is the seer.[3]

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the prime minister. Similarly, the Puruṣa is an enjoyer without being an agent and feels himself happy or sorry by falsely identifying himself with the Buddhi considering the functioning of the Buddhi his own.

1. This explains Vijñānabhikṣu's theory of experience of the Puruṣa. The Buddhi takes the form of the object known with the help of Puruṣa's reflection into it, and is reflected back into the Puruṣa along with the form of the object. The Puruṣa observes it as his own and experiences through the reflection of the Buddhi. It is just as the king experiences the victory of his soldiers without actually fighting in the battle field. Since everything is meant for the soul, it is of the supreme importance in the body.
2. This is to suggest that the soul is supreme lord. The hierarchy is that the controlled one serves the purpose of the controller. The external objects like wealth are for the body, the body for the senses, the senses for the Buddhi and the Buddhi for the Puruṣa. The Purusa is the supreme master because it is not meant for anything else.
3. The stimulation by Iśvara or soul does not involve active agency in it. It is through the purpose to be served. The

18. The others have got the adventitious lordship or nature of being controller as it (such a lordship) is associated with many acts.[1] The beginningless lordship of the soul which is devoid of activity is without any fault.

19. The soul is having all the powers and is the dancing (manifestation) of the assemblage of powers.[2] It attains the world and its cessation in sport through illusion.[3]

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purpose of the Puruṣa stimulates everything. Thus, the Puruṣa is the supreme stimulating master of everything.

1. Though the lordship of the body, senses, etc., as well as that of the soul is common, there is a vast difference in the nature. The difference is explained in the present verse. The lordship of the body, senses, etc., is through activity, but that of the soul is not so. Such a lordship in the soul does not involve any defect also. It may involve two types of defects. Firstly, if it is lord or controller, it would imply activity which in turn involves modification and, consequently, non-eternality. Secondly, it will give rise to the query as to how and when such a lordship comes to be associated with the soul. The author alleviates the first objection by maintaining that the soul being without activity does not involve the defects involved in it. As to the second, the author replies that it is beginningless and, hence, there arises no question of how and when the soul comes to be the lord.
2. The soul does not depend upon anything, and everything else is dependent upon it for existence and acts in accordance with the purpose to be served by the objective world.
3. There is no purpose in the initial creation. Vijñānabhikṣu takes resort to vedantic explanation for the problem

20. The supremacy of the soul is surpassing all. For the yogins who realise the soul, the supremacy of the Brahman is also worthless.[1]

21. The body is the soul of the external object; the senses are the soul of the body; the Buddhi is the soul of the senses and the space of consciousness is the soul of the Buddhi.[2]

22. The soul in the form of consciousness is called the supreme soul because of its being the upper limit of (supremacy).[3] Similarly, the same consciousness is called individual self (jiva) due to its association with the internal organs.

23. It is stated in the smṛtis that the supreme soul is devoid

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maintaining that the soul comes in contact with the world just as a man is inclined to sports. The contact of the soul with the world is not real but illusory. In reality, the cycle of the world and its cessation belong to the Buddhi.

1. This is again to suggest that the supremacy of the soul is surpassing all in greatness. The supremacy of Brahman is also treated insignificant in comparison to the supermacy of the soul.
2. The internal is the soul of the external one. The higher category is more independent, dearer and conscious-manifesting in nature in comparison to the lower and external.
3. In the hierarchy given above the soul is the supreme as there is no soul of the soul, since it is the limit in hierarchy.

of the effects of ignorance.[1] Whatever is more pervasive is the Brahman of the less pervasive. This holds good in earth, etc.[2]

24. The concept of Brahman will extend upto the Prakṛti from the standpoint of their own effects.[3] In the theistic Sāṁkhya also the nature of supreme Brahman is admitted to be in the consciousness only.[4]

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1. The things said to be the souls on a lower level are associated with the effects of ignorance while the supreme soul is devoid of them. This is the difference between the soul at two levels.
2. Each of the pervasive objects is Brahman for the pervaded one. The pervasiveness meant here should be understood in the restricted sense of causal relation. The cause pervades the effect because the effect cannot remain without the cause. The earth, etc., are Brahman in comparison with the effects like pot. The subtle elements are Brahman in comparison with the gross elements like earth. Thus the series of causal relation goes on. The soul is the supreme because it does not depend upon any cause. As a matter of fact, the causal series will reach upto the Prakṛti. However, since the Prakṛti also, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, depends upon soul, the soul is the supreme Brahman.
3. The Brahman is understood in the form of causal pervasiveness. Every cause upto the Prakrti is Brahman in comparison to the respective effect.
4. Vijñānabhikṣu seems to have the yoga concept of Iśvara in mind. The Yogasūtra (1,24) remarks that Iśvara is a particular Puruṣa which is ever liberated and has never come in contact with affliction, etc., which cause the soul to transmigrate.

25. The nature of being the Supreme Self is in the highest and nowhere in the insentient objects, on account of being superintendent[1] and all-pervasive the highest Brahman is sentient in nature.[2]

26. His nature of being superintendent and all-pervasive is not caused by something else.[3] He is in the form of innumerable souls,[4] the multitude of space[5] and having a single undivided form.

27. He is termed a mass of conciousness, a mass of knowledge and a mass of souls, because he does not require some light (for its illumination) and because of its own nature of being an observer.[6]

28. The Puruṣa is said to be the self-illumined; the other thing are opposite to that in nature. Its enjoyment is the experience (of the objects). Such an experience is not in

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1. The act of superintending is that of an observer and, hence, can never occur in case of an insentient entity.
2. The object having a limited magnitude may be insentient in nature. But, the self and all-pervasiveness are invariably associated.
3. He is the illuminator of everything and nothing illumines him, because he is of the nature of consciousness.
4. This is to suggest that the multiplicity of soul is of its very nature and not caused by some limited adjunct.
5. The comparison with space is to suggest their all-pervasive nature.
6. Nothing else can be termed so because everything else is opposite to it in nature.

the immutable as it is found in the Buddhi.[1]

29. The enjoyment or experience (of the Puruṣa) is the enjoyment in the secondary sense as reflecting the mode of Buddhi.[2] directly the Puruṣa is called the witness of the Buddhi.[3]

30. He is said to be the witness because he is the perceiver of the entire world without undergoing any change.[4] The witnesshood of the consciousness (i.e., Puruṣa) is also non-eternal because it is of the form of colouring (of the Puruṣa) by the objects of knowledge.[5]

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1. The actual experience of the objects is in the Buddhi while it is through Puruṣa's false superimposition of ownership in the Puruṣa. Thus, the nature of experience is different in the case of the Puruṣa and the Buddhi. The latter takes the form of the object to experience it with the Puruṣa's reflection into it. The Puruṣa experiences the object through the reflection of the mode of the Buddhi into it.
2. Here, the crux of the problem is as to how an object which is immutable in nature can be agent of experienee, because the agency involves modification or deviation from the original nature. Therefore, experience of Puruṣa is not in the primary sense.
3. This is to suggest the difference between an observer and a witness. The witness is a direct perceiver while the observer may know the things even with modification.
4. It is on the analogy of the worldly experience. A witness perceives the things without taking sides. Similarly, the Puruṣa also is not affected by the situation through deviating from its original nature.
5. The objects of the world do not come into his contact always. The nature of his being their witness depends upon such a contact and is also non-eternal.

31. This is also an indicative so that it may be distinguished from the insentient objects.[1] Therefore, the Puruṣa is said to be unparticularised, atomic and subtle.[2]

32. The Puruṣa by itself is said to be unmanifest because it is not observed without the object to be observed.[3] It is just as Rāhu though invisible by itself is observed through the moon seized by it. It is (again) just as the face invisible by itself is visible in the mirror, similarly, the consciousness though invisible by itself is visible in the respective Buddhi attached to it.

33. The world appears only when there is the contact of the world with the consciousness.[4] Therefore, the consciousness forming the support of the world is said to be void

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1. Such a distinguishing mark may be permanent or temporary. The former is an adjective (viśeṣaṇa) while the latter is an indicative (upalakṣaṇa). The purpose of both of these is to distinguish the qualified object from others. The qualifications like being endowed with all powers, etc., are stated to distinguish the Puruṣa from everything else like Prakṛti. They are found only in the state of Puruṣa associated with Prakṛti and not otherwise. Hence, these are temporary in nature and, thus, form the indicative marks and not the adjectives. If they are supposed to be adjective, Puruṣa's nature of being unparticularised, etc., would be contradicted.
2. These are to stress his nature of being subtle.
3. The self is not realised to be existent without its being reflected into the Buddhi. By itself it cannot be manifest.
4. It is because everything is illumined by the soul.

like sky.[1]

34. The Buddhi having falsely superimposed the defects of the perceptible objects on the perceiver which is taintless, like superimposing the dirt on the mirror or the sky,[2] is tormented by the sensorious view.

35. Really there is no defect in the consciousness; those are always located in the objects of knowledge. Therefore, the Puruṣa is called taintless (always) abiding in its own nature[3] and free from all defects.

36. Since there is no differentiation in the form of the dissimilarity in the objects of its own class, the souls are said to be of identical nature,[4] as also because of its being of the same nature (in all conditions and states).

37. On account of its being the controller of the body and also because of its manifestation in the body,[5] the Puruṣa is the owner of the body. And, because of its being single it is called without other and alone.

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1. The sky gives space to immeasurable things but when devoid of the contact with them is said to be void. Similarly, the self can be called void in the absence of its contact with the objects though it illumines everything in the world.
2. Since the Puruṣa is taintless by nature, all the objects superimposed upon him would be naturally false. The Buddhi's experience of pain is also falsely attributed to the Puruṣa.
3. This is to explain as to why the Brahman is taintless. The Puruṣa never deviates from its original nature.
4. There is no differentiation in the souls. Hence, knowing one soul, all the souls are known.
5. *Puri* may alternatively be interpreted as the subtle body because the Pusuṣa is really manifested in the subtle body only.

38. Because of the lack of obstruction or the restricting factor of the conscious power the Puruṣa is said to be uncovered.[1] It is called ātman because of its being the owner of everything.[2] And, since it knows all the bodies, it is termed the knower of bodies.[3]

39. The soul is called haṁsa (a swan) because it enjoys the fish like pleasure sportively moving as if in the group of lotus like modes of Buddhi in the tank-like heart.[4]

40. The soul in the form of the vital powers is said to be a haṁsa (a swan) on account of the functioning of the vital breath for sustaining the life as it comes out making ha sound and enters the body again making the sa sound.[5]

41. It is said to be dwelling in the hiding place as it manifests in the secret place like space in the heart in the house-like

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1. I,e., the Puruṣa is free from limitations.
2. The term ātman should be derived here as *atati gacchati sarvam svāmitvena vyāpanotiti*, i.e., that which pervades everything through ownership.
3. The body is called *kṣetra* because it is residing place of the soul, just as the field is a residing place for the grains.
4. Just as a swan enjoys the fish moving freely and in sport in the group of lotus plants, the soul also enjoys the pleasure by moving freely and sportively in the modes of Buddhi which are found in the heart.
5. This is another way of justifying the application of the term haṁsa with reference to the soul. When one meditates upon the soul by uttering the term haṁsa, he concentrates upon the outgoing breath through *ha* and the inhaled breath through *sa*.

body with the Buddhi-like wife and as if sleeping with her.

42. The soul is said to be possessed of māyā making its māyā composed of three guṇas to evolve through its presence[1] and assuming the false garbs prepared by the māyā.[2]

43. The sixteen, viz., the eleven holes in the body[3] and the five elements are the sixteen parts of the Puruṣa. Being devoid of parts, it is actually partless.

44. The term 'I' denotes the owner, the owner here is the witness of the Buddhi. Therefore, by the term aham is conveyed the mere consciousness by the wise.

45. The Puruṣa, the lord of all, the knower of everything,[4] the agent of everything[5] and non-dual, is generally said to be so just as a king is said to be the king (lit. protector) of all the human beings.

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1. The Puruṣa makes the Prakṛti evolve through its mere presence just as the magnet moves the iron towards it through its very presence.
2. It means that he receives the reflection of material objects. This reflection is actually superimposed on the Puruṣa and is, thus, unreal. The Puruṣa is, thus, the bearer of a false rob prepared by the Prakṛti.
3. This refers to the five organs of sense, five organs of action and mind. However, they appear to be parts and not actually so.
4. He is metaphorically said to be so through the concept of the Buddhi.
5. Or, the expression may be rendered as the 'producer of everything'. It is because he helps in the production of everything as everything is produced from the Prakṛti only through the contact of the Puruṣa with it.

46. The oneness of soul is described by the sūtras from the point of view of the class.[1] In the state of dissolution, however, there is absence of non-dualism of the soul from the point of view of the objects of the other class.[2]

47. The Puruṣa is considered to be ever pure because of its lack of attachment, it is ever illuminator because of its being of the nature of consciousness;[3] and it is ever liberated as it is ever free from misery[4].

48. Through such an indication mentioned by the teacher and in the holy scriptures, as also through one's own experience,[5] the intelligent people should discriminate the soul from non-soul through their dissimilarity.

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1. The multiplicity of the souls is stressed in Sāṁkhya. In the Sāṁkhyasūtras it is stressed that the statements regarding the unity of the soul in the scriptures are with reference to the class of souls. Vijñānabhikṣu has the following *sūtra* in mind *nādvaitaṣrutivirodho jātiparatvāt* (*S.S.* 1.154). Further, nor does it deny the existence of the objects of the other class, since Prakṛti is also there.
2. In the state of dissolution also the non-dualism is denied. Such a denial is to deny the absence of dualism of both its own class as well as the other class because the multiplicity of the souls as also the Prakṛti exists there as distinct from the Puruṣa.
3. As such its nature of being illuminator is never obstructed.
4. This is due to the fact that even in the empirical state the puruṣa is free from miseries as the miseries are located in and are really experienced by the Buddhi. They are only superimposed on the Puruṣa.
5. It stands for the direct perception of the super natural objects through the power generated through the yogic practices, etc.

49. Thus is elaborately mentioned the heap of dissimilarities between the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti through the four chapters, which quickly grants liberation to those contemplating like this.[1]

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1. It suggests that the Sāṁkhya system is very useful to realise the highest end of life. The term *dhyāyin* suggests that the Sāṁkhya system lays stress on contemplation. It is suggested in the following descriptions also :

आत्मध्यानं परं केचित् सांख्यतत्त्वार्थवेदिनः (*Narsingh.* 64.4) and कपिलः मात्रे सविशेषं ध्यानयोगं प्रोवाचेति (*Devibhāgvata* 8.3.18)

CHAPTER VI

1. Having reflected upon[1] the discriminative knowledge through valid reasoning,[2] one realises it.[3] (To attain it) the way of observing the Rājayoga is briefly stated here.
2. The one not capable for Rājayoga is entitled for Haṭhayoga. This is described by Bhusuṇḍa to Vaṣiṣṭha in the Yogavāṣiṣṭha.[4]
3- There is the repetition of (discriminative) knowledge in the Rājayoga; while in the Haṭhayoga control over breath and physical postures are eminent; they are mutually complementary and should be observed according to one's capacity.
4. The defects in the objects (of enjoyment) enumerated in the śruti and smṛtis should be realised first by the aspirant for concentration (or stability) of citta.
5. In whatever forest-like mind innumerable seeds of desires sprout, the plant of knowledge and meritorious deeds do not grow there.[5]

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1. This is the second stage in the process of realisation of the truth prescribed in spiritual treatises. The first is hearing about the truth (śravaṇa) and the last is its final realisation.
2. I.e., through the reasoning which does not violate the śruti and the smṛtis.
3. It refers to the true nature of spirit.
4. It suggests that the haṭhayoga is easier to practice.
5. It is because the person full of desires will perform the deeds prompted by desire while the acts without desires only can lead to the attainment of knowledge.

6. The mind in which the seeds of desires are completely burnt in the fire of realisation of the defects (of the objects of enjoyment) is the good ground toiled by the plough of teachings of the preceptor, where those (knowledge and meritorious deeds) sprout.[1]

7. The strong minded aspirant realising much (i.e, real) non-existence of the (seemingly) existent object, unpleasantness in (seemingly pleasant objects and much pains in (seemingly) pleasurable objects, gets detached.

8. The Brahmaloka also is just like hell only as it is full of impurities; it is also endowed with unequality as well as it is associated with misery on account of its being composed of the three guṇas.[2]

2. By the people living there and afraid of rebirth an effort is made for liberation. Therefore, it should be precisely known that all the worlds are associated with misery.[3]

10. The mind[4] is always tortured by the intention 'this should be mine' and, 'this should not be mine'. Therefore, the contact with citta should be understood to be misery naturally.[5]

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1. The import is that the teachings of the preceptor are effective only when the mind is taintless.
2. Cf. Sāṁkhyakārikā 2
3. The reasons for such a supposition are given in the preceding verse.
4. Here, Vijñānabhikṣu takes mind or citta as denoting the same.
5. Cf. Sāṁkhyasūtra 6.8

11. Pleasure is (just like) the deep sleep[1] and the misery is the knowledge of the objects.[2] This is briefly the nature of pleasure and pain. What is the use of speaking at length?

12. Therefore, an intelligent man desiring for liberation after having examined the objects which are seeming and undesirable, should abandon them like the snake by a child.[3]

13. Thus, when the attachment is diminished through observing innumerable faults mentioned above, one should concentrate upon the true self discriminating it from illusory manifestation.[4]

14. It cannot be pointed out by the preceptor also that 'this is the soul'. The element of soul itself shines in case of a man who is indifferent to worldly objects.[5]

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1. Just as the individual soul is not in contact with the mind and the latter is free from its contact with the objects in deep sleep, in the state of liberation also where there is no pain the same conditions are present.
2. Or, the word viṣayavedanam may be interpreted as the contact of citta with the objects. In this case *vedanam* is to be understood as 'through which something is known'. The entire word comes to mean the means of knowing the objects, viz., the contact of citta with the objects.
3. Just as a snake is charming to the children attracting them by its variegated colour and hood, but in reality it is the thing to be avoided, the objects of enjoyment also attract an ignorant man, but in reality they are worth avoiding.
4. This is the sign of vedantic influence on Vijñānabhiksu, where the pure self is to be discriminated from its illusory manifestation into wordly objects.
5. It suggests the superiority of indifference over the instructions by the preceptor also.

15. One should concentrate on soul without deviation (to the other objects). (Thinking that) 'I am immutable consciousness,[1] the intellect is of the nature of understanding.[2] The witnessing self is the all-prevasive one beyond the Buddhi.[3]

16. The knowledge arising of the functioning of Buddhi is observed to be destructible and small like a hole in pot.[4] As a matter of fact,[5] the knowledge in the form of 'I' arising of the functioning of the Buddhi is complete and indestructible like sky.

17. Whatever is observed inside is said to be the functioning of Buddhi. The knowledge of the 'I' principle[6] is directly[7]

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1. Cf. *Sāṁkhyakārikā* 64
2. If it is of the nature of determinative knowledge (adhyāvasāya).
3. Cf. *Koṭhopaniṣad* 3.11.
4. The nature of *vṛttibodha* is explained later on. It refers to the form of the Buddhi modified in the form of an object, which brings all the limitations in knowledge. Thus, this expression of its being destructible and limited is metaphorical. The limitations of the functioning of the Buddhi are ascribed to the knowledge. It is just like the limitations of pot superimposed on the space occupied by it.
5. If the limitations of the Buddhi are not superimposed on the knowledge, it is viewed in its essential pure form free from such limitations.
6. It refers to the knowledge of the soul.
7. I. e. without the mediation of the functioning of the Buddhi. It is further stated that it is also seen through the functioning of the Buddhi. It suggests that the Buddhi functions as long as one attains the direct

different from the functioning of the Buddhi which is of the nature of pain.

18. If the psychic functioning is supposed to be illumined by the psychic functioning, contradiction in the object and subject (comes in the way)[1]. And, it is certain that the postulation of the series of psychic functionining is contradicted because it is cumbersome.[2]

19. The Buddhi,[3] full[4] of joy, grief, fear, anger, avarice, delu
20. sion, passion, hatred, self-conceit, wretchedness, sloth,

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knowledge of the soul. After such a realisation of the subtle inner principle, the psychic functioning comes to an end and one is possessed of the true knowledge. It is because the effect of psychic functioning is painful in nature, but such a condition comes to an end after the realisation.

1. The agent itself cannot be the object and, hence, the psychic functioning cannot reveal itself.
2. If it is admitted that one functioning reveals the o hers and so on and so forth, it would lead to the clumsy postulation of immeusurable functionings.
3. The sāṁkhya philosophy aims at the alleviation of miseries. The misery is a kind of feeling located in the Buddhi. All these feelings are the misery itself because they torment the persons. The misery is nothing but Buddhi's state of having the above feeling of misery and can be alleviated through the realisation of the self. Thus, who the Buddhi is compared to a sick and the soul to person can treat it.
4. Such an adjective itself serves as a reason for Buddhi's state of being full of misery. To be composed of misery is the Buddhi's state of being endowed with all these things.

idleness and sexual desire, etc.,[1] as also virtues and vices, is composed of misery. It exposes itself to the 'I' principle just as a sick man exposes himself to a doctor.

21- One should entertain the feeling that 'I am all-pervasive,[2]
22. contented,[3] the supreme self, pure,[4] beyond thought (unthinkable), the space of the form of consciousness alone,[5] the locus of the reflection of the world (lit. the mirror for the worid),[6] undecaying, uncontaminated, supportless, devoid of qualities,[7] not subjected to clamity or injury, having no differentiation from the objects of its own class[8] and the illuminator of all the objects.

23. One should think that all sentient beings right from Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva upto the immovable beings are

1. 'Etc'. indicates the feeling of hunger, thirst, etc.
2. Through that idea one should try to transcend the limitation caused by the association of the mind-body complex.
3. Through this feeling one will not get agitated in his dealings.
4. Thinking thus one will not accumulate further worldly contaminations.
5. This is to suggest the all-pervasive nature of the conscious entity.
6. In Sāṁkhya philosophy the things are of the nature of the impression they {cast in the self. The self casts its reflection on Buddhi which having the form of the object is again reflected into the self and, thus, the self is said to be mirror, the reflection into which decides the nature of the object.
7. The self is devoid of specific qualities only.
8. All the puruṣas have got a uniform nature.

identical with the self itself due to the non-difference in the form of lack of dissimilarity.[1]

24. Myself and the other Puruṣas are equally of the nature of consciousness in the form of space. Therefore, it is declared in the scriptures that the self is one only realised in the form of one's own self.[2]

25. A yogi should worship the universal Self realising this and through experience.[3] This is said to be the ātmayoga also mentioned in the scriptures as observed by the followers of Sāṁkhya-Yoga.[4]

26. A person performing the sacrifice of the self realising one's own self[5] as situated in all the beings and all the beings in one's own self, attains liberation.[6]

1. The Purusas are many but similar in nature. It is because no one of the selves has specific qualities.
2. Here Vijñānabhikṣu sets at rest the contrast between the Advaita Śruti and the Sāṁkhya concept of multiplicity of the souls.
3. Worshipping through own experiences here means to employ one's acts and mind for the realisation of the self everywhere in the above mentioned manner.
4. Or the expression Sāṁkhyayogin may alternatively mean the way adopted by those performing the practice of knowledge.
5. The same is mentioned as the 'yoga of the self' in the Bhagavadgītā.
6. The term *svarāṭ* means the self-refulgent. The term svārājya, therefore, means the state of that. It ultimately signifies the state of liberation because the self shines in its own form in the state of liberation.

27. This, in the same way, is termed by Manu also as 'Yoga of the self' and an auxiliary to knowledge. Therefore, one should ponder upon the self through giving a guarantee of safety, through worshipping it by means of one's own experience, etc.,[1] and through respecting all the living beings.[2]

28. And the avarice for the enjoyment attained by Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva[3] diminishes through considering them similar to one's own self. Therefore, the Yogi should ponder upon the similarity.

29. If all are identical in nature in the state of origination, dissolution as also always in all the states, how can there be avarice, etc., in case of a seer ?

30. Viṣṇu, etc., even enjoying great wealth are not better than myself.[4] Therefore, that wealth serves no purpose as it is dear to the persons having no discriminative knowledge.

31. Having seen something superior to oneself in respect of virtues, acts, etc., the worldly person makes an attempt

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1. This refers to the realisation of the self as distinct from everything else. It means by implication one's resorting to the knowledge of the discrimination of the self considering it to be eminent.
2. One has to consider the living beings [eminent because they are identical in nature with one's own self.
3. Their enjoyments are supposed to be eminent because they are possessed of lordly powers.
4. The experience of any kind is rooted in ignorance. The ignorance located in Viṣṇu, etc. and an ordinary aspirant is identical in nature and, hence, the aspirant is in no way less than Viṣṇu, etc. That is why the enjoyment is sought after by the ignorant people only.

for that. I do not find anything more than that I have.

32. I do not consider anyone less than me so that I may act through the hope of winning over him (otherwise) suspecting that he will overpower me just as the gods attempt to win over the demons.[1]

33. The living beings beginning from Brahmā to those in the hell are just like myself. They appear to be one's own self through affection like parents, brother and son.

34. Who would then be the lord and the one to be ruled upon as also who would be the best or the worst ? It is declared in the revealed scripture that the fear of death arises through viewing the differentiation where there is no differentiation.[2]

35. All differentiations into the forms of a ruler and the ruled in case of the conscious-space are unreal just as the differentiation of forms in a crystal.[3]

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1. To show one's superiority is a natural tendency in the human beings. This is exercised through overpowering the inferior and by trying to accumulate more powers than the superior. An aspirant, however, who does not take into account the material superiority and inferiority, does not find anyone different from oneself. Therefore, an aspirant does not make any attempt in that direction.
2. The fear of death is indicative of the fear of birth as well. The wrong knowledge is the cause of revolving in the cycle of birth and death.
3. The denial of differentiation automatically denies the relations like the ruler and the ruled. The unreality of such relations is exemplified as various forms reflected in a crystal.

36. The Puruṣa even a single entity (in essence) attains as if many forms due to the variety of forms of the Buddhi. It is just like a magician who acquires many forms through the form of the skin of a wolf.[1]

37. Having come into close contact with me, the illusive power acquires many forms, though I am devoid of any form. The single illusive power alone moves around having deluded all the Buddhis.[2]

28. There is the differentiation of the Puruṣas through the differentiation of the Buddhis just as there is the differentiation of the sun due to the differentiation of waters as also of the sky through the differentiation of pot, etc.,[3] in accordance with the form of the holes therein.[4]

39. Hence, the Puruṣa is pure, ever conscious and liberated, all-pervasive[5] and immutable. In that case the knowledge

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1. The differentiation occurs in the form of the Buddhi and is superimposed on the Puruṣa. It is like a magician who acquires many forms due to its contact with many upper garments. Essentially, he does not get many forms. These forms are all apparent and unreal.
2. Here, Vijñānabhiksu explains the multiplicity of the Puruṣas in the empirical state in the Vedāntic fashion. The Puruṣa appears to be many due to its association with various Buddhis. Here, the question naturally arises as to what makes it so. The agency of such a delusion is ascribed to Māyā or Buddhi to conceive its identity with the Puruṣa and, thus, the Puruṣa appears to have many forms.
3. The term *ādi* stands for cloth, etc.
4. The differentiation comes to be unreal and apparent.
5. The all-pervasive is that which is contacted with all corporeal objects.

as 'myself' nad 'others' as also as 'friend' and 'enemy', etc., is false.[1]

40. In the case of Brahmā, the Iśvara, Hari, Indra as the multitude of beings, the division into the best, the lowest and mediocre is caused by Māyā[2] and is false.[3]

41. On account of Māyā's being possessed of three guṇas due to its threefoldness, the soul is also so. Thus, three kinds into the best, the lowest and the mediocre are not essentially of the soul.[4]

42. The immutable light of consciousness is present at other places as it is present in the body. There is only differentiation into manifest and non-manifest between that present inside the body and that outside.[5]

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1. Since all the Puruṣa are equal in respect of having these qualities and are consequently of the same nature, there is no one essentially friend or enemy. All the relations are mental images.
2. Such a division is made through māyā because the Māyā is of three forms in accordance with its components of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. The dominance of any of them makes the one the best, etc. Such a division does not pertain to the nature of the soul.
3. Since it does not form the essential nature of soul, it is false.
4. Whatever is not essential is superimposed and is, therefore, false.
5. This stresses the all-pervasive nature of the soul. It is present inside and outside the body. The difference is this much only that inside it is manifest while outsid it is not experienced so. The contact of the conscious entity with the Buddhi is a factor for its manifestation. In the absence of this, the consciousness remains unmanifest outside the body.

43. In the same way, the other Puruṣas are also similar.[1] Because of the lack of differentiation into the states of bondage and release as also through the lack of differentiation into being a lord or otherwise, there is no purpose to be attained by me.[2]

44. The sound sleep is dear to one as it is good[3] insofar as it alleviates the experience of misery.[4] The knowledge of the persons whose internal organ is infatuated[5] and who have killed their conscious,[6] (and hence), not good, is not dear to me.

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1. There is no differentiation in the nature of Puruṣas outside or inside.
2. Since the Puruṣa always remains in its isolated and natural form of pure consciousness, there is no differentiation through bondage and release in him. There remains nothing in the state of bondage which is to be alleviated and that in the state of release which is to be attained. Therefore, release would not be aspired for.
3. It ts beneficial.
4. It is not that the attainment of pleasure only is desirable and the absence of miseries is not desirable.
5. It refers to those who always crave only for the pleasure arising of the experience of the objects.
6. It refers to those who have not realised the soul on account of their perverted knowledge.

   Kalipada Tarkācarya thinks that the *Mahānidrā* means liberation. The present verse refers to two kinds of liberation : (1) that leading to the absence of all miseries and (ii) that desired by worldly men in the form of the worldly pleasures. The former is desired by the Sāṁkhyas while the latter is rejected. The wording of the verse, however, does not allow the recurrence of *mahānidrā* in the next line also. The interpretation given above is more literal.

45. Even though the reflection of the Buddhi in myself, the mirror of consciousness, is not essentially harmful, yet it should be avoided.[1]

40. Its nature of being worth avoiding through ones's inherent nature is proved on the basis of one's experience. It is just as one intends to see the dissimilarity even in one's enemy.

47. The virtuous one is tormented after having imposed its guilts on its owner.[2] The chaste again becomes free from guilts and after knowing her master is guiltless.[3]

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1. As long as the Puruṣa is associated with Buddhi, it gets its reflection. The reflection of the internal as well as the external object in the Buddhi makes the nature of a man. The Puruṣa develops the sense of ownership to it through ignorance. Hence, essentially it is the ignorance which is to be avoided. Only reflection unaccompanied by ignorance does not lead to harm. Butstill, it should be avoided because it is not useful also.
2. Due to the contact of the Buddhi with the soul, the Buddhi is reflected back into the Puruṣa and, thus, the characteristics of Buddhi like pleasure, plain, etc., are falsely imposed on the self. As a matter of fact, the pain, etc., are located in the Buddhi, but falsely appear into the Puruṣa. As long as the process of reflection continues, the Buddhi always gets tormented.
3. This analogy clarifies the Sāṁkhya theory of bondage and liberation. A virtuous wife starts doubting her husband suspects in him the guilts coming into her mind. Thus, she always gets tormented as long as she continues to do so. However, when her doubt about the character of her husband is clear, she stops suspecting him and lives peacefully. Similarly, the Buddhi reflects the impressions of the

48. I am always essentially of the same nature even though the forms of this (Buddhi) are changed[1] and even though I may be experiencing that which is meant for me and which does not go to someone else.[2]

49, Just as the clean mirror remains in its single form in the states of having an adjunct or otherwise, similar is the case of the mirror of my conscious-like-sky.[3]

50. The faults like infatuation, etc., which are located in the Buddhi which is an object of knowledge, do not directly exist in me the lord who is the knower, just as the defects of the object to be illumined are not found in the sun which is the illuminator.[4]

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external objects into the Puruṣa and is tormented. But when it realizes the pure and uncontaminated nature of the Puruṣa, there ensues liberation and both of them exist in their pure form. Then there is no misery.

1. All changes belong to the Buddhi and the soul remains immutable even in the empirical state.
2. The Buddhi is compared to a lady which is meant for a single man and does not go to be enjoyed to someone else. The Buddhi attached to one soul does not become the object of some other soul.
3. The defects of the object reflected into the mirror do not belong to the mirror but really belong to the object only and are falsely superimposed on the mirror. Similarly, the defects belong to Buddhi and are superimposed on the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa is called the consciousness-sky to stress its all-pervasiveness and untainted nature.
4. This is again to stress the Puruṣa's nature of being pure and isolated. He finally knows the objects having illumined them, receives their reflection and knows them even stan-

51. When Buddhi, which had bound itself with the miseries, having abandoned its own nature attains my nature, then it is liberated from the bondage of misery. There is no bondage or liberation for me.[1]

52. The bondage in the form of Puruṣa's experience is also unreal in the case of this mirror of consciousness.[2] Such an experience is the reflection of misery located in Buddhi, into the Puruṣa which is immutable unattached space of consciousness.

53. I (the Puruṣa) am the witness of the three states of waking, etc., and devoid of them.[3] I am again the full sun of consciousness devoid of rising and setting.[4]

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ding as their witness. The above analogy could have been more meaningful if it would have been understood as the Sun reflected in the water and, thus, illumining the objects is not tainted by the faults of the water and the objects.

1. There is no cause of bondage of Puruṣa. It cannot be caused by the acts because the soul is never attached to them. The bondage cannot be natural to the Puruṣa because otherwise in the absence of bondage, the Puruṣa would deviate from its own nature. When there is no bondage in Puruṣa, the liberation a lso cannot belong to him.
2. Since the cxperience of Puruṣa is apparent, the absence of it would also be apparent.
3. The three states of waking, dream and deep sleep belong to the Buddhi and, hence, the Puruṣa is related to them as their witness only because it is immutable as well as not attached to them.
4. In the case of the Puruṣa, rising and setting mean birth, death, etc.

54. The world does not really exist in me, the consciousness, just like a face in a mirror.[1] It is because, though it is all pervasive and present everywhere outside and inside, it is not experienced in the state of deep sleep, etc.[2]

55. Whatever is reflected in the Puruṣa, located in my body or that of others and pure experience[3] as well as all-pervasive in nature, is the illusory manifestation as it is the reflection of the Buddhi.[4]

56. The world (in relation to me) is like the silver in a conch-shell and, hence, does not defile one. It is like the water

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1. The reflcction of a face in the mirror is not a real facc. Similarly, the external world is different and its reflection into the Puruṣa is different. The former is real while the latter is unreal.

2. If the world would have been really in Puruṣa, in other words, if the contact of the Purusa would have been with the real world, such a contact would be experienced in the state of deep sleep also. Hence, the contact of the Puruṣa is only with the reflection of the world.

3. It comes to mean the Puruṣa in its pure form. In the system of Sāṁkhya the Puruṣa is an agent of experience while the objective universe form the object of experience. That is why the pure experience without any mixture of the object of experience with it denotes the pure consciousness.

4. The term *vivarta* is defined as the illusory knowledge of something at some other place (*atattvato 'nyathā prathā*). Since the objective knowledge falsely appears as belonging to the Puruṣa, it is very well a case of illusory manifestation.

in a mirage and, similarly, like the city, etc., in the sky.[1]

57. The world never exists in me, the eternal one, in all the three periods of time. Let it occur or not elsewhere in the Buddhi, it makes no difference to me.[2]

58. Everything exists in me just as in the sky and I am everywhere just as the space. (In reality) nothing is in me; nor am I in anything due to my nature of being unattached like sky.[3]

59. Therefore, through non-difference in the form of non-separation (or non-discrimination) like water and milk.

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1. The Sāṁkhyas hold the *sadasatkhyāti* in illusory perception. The world is real in itself but is unreal insofar as it appears to be related with the Puruṣa. It is like the silver which is real in itself but is unreal as far as it is wrongly perceived in a conch-shell. Since the world is not really put in or really related with the Puruṣa, it cannot defile the nature of the Puruṣa.

2. It further strengthens the view that the world does not defile the Puruṣa. It is because the Puruṣa is ever unattached to the world. The reflection of the objects in the Buddhi also brings no change in puruṣa.

3. Since the Puruṣa is all-pervasive, everything is contained in it. As an all-pervasive entity the puruṣa is also found everywhere inside and outside the beings. Inspite of it, nothing is related to the Puruṣa and nor is the Puruṣa related to anything because it is unattached in nature just as the sky is connected with everything. But nothing brings any change in the sky because it is not attached to, i.e., form an integral part of anything.

the great seers declare the world to be of the nature of knowledge (or consciousness)[1].

60. The world is mine insofar as it is meant for me as is the case with the happiness and the body.[2] As it is mine, it is of the others also. The notion that it is mine only is the illusio in the Buddhi.

61. As amatter of fact, nothing belongs to anyone because of the deviation; it is in turn because of the uncertainty of ownership like a house for the travellers in which no one lives (permanently)[3]

62. The only one of the nature of consciousness, pure, space[4] and untainted, more subtle than the subtle exists (as real).

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1. The world is not of the nature of knowledge through the relation of identity. It is only because of the mixture and inseparable nature of the two. Still, it does not mean that they cannot be distinguished. The example of water and milk is apt. Ordinarily the two cannot be distinguished but the swan can do so. Similarly, the world appears to be an inseparable mixture of conscious and unconscious entities, the yogins *can* distinguish the two.

2. It clarifies the expression of 'mine' with reference to the world. Through this feeling one should not get attached to the world because it belongs to the others also in the same way. The sense of ownership actually is the perverted knowledge which binds the soul and leads it to transmigration.

3. The same thing may belong to one today but to the other the other day. Hence, the ownership is changing. Nothing (therefore) belongs permanently to anyone.

4. It is void because it has no definite form like space.

World and the worldly activities do not exist in him.[1]

63. Whatever is experienced is the series of one's own Buddhi endowed with all the perceptible objects reflected in the great mirror of the disc of consciousness.[2]

64. Just as the space exists everywhere; somewhere manifest[3] and somewhere in subtle form,[4] similarly the conscious-space is situated at the place of the Buddhi and elsewhere as well.[5]

65. Since the whole world consists of consciousness, the Buddhi moving at many places illumines everywhere, as the pot, etc., in the sun.[6]

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1. It is because he is of the nature of pure consciousness and, hence, naturally devoid of all activities.

2. The two things involved here are the reflection of the objects into the Buddhi and the reflection of the Buddhi having the reflection of the object into the Puruṣa. The object is experienced when it has got the elements of both. Thus, what is really experienced and known is the modification of Buddhi when it is reflected back into the Puruṣa.

3. It is manifest in a pot or a hollow of a tree, when the space can be made out.

4. It is in subtle or unmanifest form inside the thick substances just as in the interior of a tree having sap.

5. The space of consciousness exists everywhere, but is manifested in the Buddhi only and not everywhere else, because the Buddhi being dominating in sattva is fit for such a manifestation.

6. Though the Sun is all-pervasive, still whenever some object like pot comes into its contact, it is reflected. Similarly, the consciousness is all-pervasive, but whatever comes into the contact of Buddhi only is reflected.

66. My virtues and vices, birth and death,[1] and all the pleasure, pain, etc.,[2] are false even in the waking state[3] just as the birth, etc., in the dream.[4]

67. There is the notion of the rise and destruction of the consciousness through its connection and its absence with the object of experience, just as the notion of rise and destruction of the moon through the defects of non-manifestation and manifestation.[5]

68. The origination and destruction of the world in the grand sleep are the series of a bad dream (and consequently) the momentary notions. I observe everything with my essen-

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1. Birth and death in the case of puruṣa do not mean the production and destruction of Puruṣa but the association of the Puruṣa with body etc., and the dissociation of the same.

2. The term *etc.* denotes the other mental modes like knowledge and ignorance.

3. This is to stress the immutable nature of the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa is above all these. All these belong to the Buddhi and are falsely ascribed to the Puruṣa.

4. Just as the objects in dream are experienced at the time of dream to be true, similarly, Puruṣa's connection with all these seems to be true, though essentially it is false.

5. The knowledge and its absence depend upon the connection and its absence with the knowable object. Therefore, knowledge is manifested or otherwise and is not originated or destroyed. The example of rise and setting of the moon through its manifestation or otherwise clarify the posion.

tial nature untainted by them. What difference is caused to the sun by the clouds or their absence.[1]

69. A wise man[2] should uninterruptedly contemplate like this with the concentrated mind.[3] He then realises the soul in the form beyond the reach of speech.

70. If the mind leaves the taintless tranquil form even for a moment, that disturbs the sense-organs through the remainder of the impressions of the objects of experience.[4]

71. One should strike repeatedly the enemy-like senses-whether agitated or not, with the thunder bolt-like discriminative knowledge, just as Indra (strikes) the mountains.[5]

Here ends the sixth chapter in the latter half
of the Sāṁkhyasāra composed by
Śrī Vijñānabhikṣu

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1. Just as there is no change in the Sun when the clouds cover it with the force of the wind and are dispelled away by the same, the origination of the world, etc. bring no change in the soul which is only immutable witness without participating in the worldly activities.

2. I.e. the one who has purified one's mind through detachment.

3. It is to be brought through the yogic practices,

4. With the concentration of the above form the mind is also transformed in the same form. But, if it is deviated from that form even for a single moment, it is drawn to the objects of experience through the past impressions. This is to stress the experience through the past impressions. This is to stress the significance of the uninterrupted concentration.

5. One should withhold the mind from the objects of the senses through the control over the senses, and direct it to the soul and should practice it uninterruptedly and thus, one can get liberation.

CHAPTER VII

1. Now[1] I shall discuss explicitly the definition of liberated still embodied who has realised the soul,[2] so that there may be the test of knowledge and ignorance.[3]

2. Either one should select one as a spiritual preceptor through testing his hearing of vedantic statements or one would select an ignorant as a spiritual guide through erroneously considering him the knower of the self.[4] The ignorant also may have a high opinion of his being a knower.[5]

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1. That is after discussing the cessation of the functioning of the senses through discriminative knowledge.
2. The ignorance of the person liberated still embodied is totally dispelled even in his embodied state.
3. It amounts to saying that the knowledge which destroys the ignorance and leads to liberation is valid. Otherwise it is ignorance only from metaphysical point of view.
4. One should select a man having true knowledge of self as a spiritual teacher. Otherwise one may face disaster insofar as he would not acquire true knowledge.
5. This speaks of the reason as to how one sometimes may select an ignorant person also as a teacher. If one selects an ignorant teacher, he will receive the wrong knowledge and, thus, it would be like a blind man guided by another blind man.

3. The lordly powers[1] and the state of being the knower of the future[2] etc.,[3] are not the essential features of knowledge, because it is mentioned by the Yogabhāṣya that the liberation arises even in absence of those also.[4]

4. The statements in the śrutis and the smṛtis are written as indicating indirectly the state of knowers who have got liberation[5] for the excess of faith in them.[6]

5. In the state when all the beings have become the very soul of the realised one,[7] where is the delusion or grief for him who perceives the one only everywhere.[8]

6. He who is everywhere without attachment having attained different fair and foul and neither likes nor dislikes, his Buddhi is well set in equanimity.[9]

7. Just as the one which always moves, i.e., air, does not forget to move, similarly, the Buddhi having the discrimi-

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1. The powers refer to the power of being atomic in size, etc.
2. The term anāgata is indicative of past also.
3. The term etc., suggests other visible effects of yoga like vibhūtis.
4. Cf. Yogabhāṣya 3.55 na hi dagdhakleśabījasya jñāne punarapekśā kācidasti.
5. It is to suggest that a knower of Reality will behave in this way. It does not mean that a man behaving in this way without having knowledge would also be liberated.
6. It would strengthen the faith because it has a foundation of the śruti and the smṛtis. One would not doubt the veracity of their authority.
7. One who has got the discriminative knowledge.
8. I,e., one who does not find the differentiations.
9. Cf. Bhagvadgītā 2.57. The sense is that such a man is above all attachment and hatred.

native knowledge never forgets the pure consciousness devoid of all objects of knowledge.[1]

8. The lusture of whose face does not increase after attaining happiness and does not vanish in misery, such a man always situated in the same condition (or does not leave the condition), is called the liberated still living.[2]

9. One who is situated in the state of sleep in the waking state of the body;[3] who is devoid of waking state[4] and whose knowledge is devoid of latent impression of the perverted knowledge, he is called a liberated still living.[5]

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1. In the embodied form the consciousness is experienced in the presence of the object of knowledge. The seer possessing the discriminative knowledge, however, can perceive the consciousness without the object. It is actually the self-revealed form of consciousness which cannot be realised in its pure form by some ordinary person.
2. Such a man is situated in the same immutable mental mode always.
3. The waking state is that of the experience of the external objects suitable to an ignorant person. Such a condition does not apply to the soul.
4. This is the reply to the possible objection as to if it is not in the waking state, whether it always remains in the state of sleep. There is no state of sleep or waking for the soul. It refers to the organs associated with that particular soul.
5. The knowledge in the worldly state is always associated with the past impressions of perverted knowledge, while the realised soul is not having them. Hence, he can be reckoned to be different from the bound person,

10. Though behaving in accordance with attachment, hatred and fear, etc., the one who is pure or unpolluted like the space inside (the heart) is called a liberated still embodied.[1]

11. The one who is free from the egoistic feeling[2] and whose Buddhi is not tainted while doing something or not doing something,[3] is said to be liberated still embodied.

12. Even if the rays of the sun become cold and even if the disc of the moon becomes very hot and even if the flames of fire spread downwards, the liberated still embodied does not attain to some other state of mind.[4]

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1. Even though he is engaged in acts in accordance with his past acts which have started bearing fruits and, hence, is under the sway of attachment, hatred, etc., still he is different from the bound one insofar as the internal organs of the bound one are prompted by the attachment, hatred etc., while those of the liberated are prompted only by the acts which have started giving fruits because his internal organs are free from attachment hatred, etc.
2. He does nos entertain the feeling that I am doing that thing or not doing that. It is feeling of doership which binds and not an act itself. The term *ahaṁkṛtobhāvaḥ* may be alternatively interpreted as the one who is devoid of the state of a person associated with egoism.
3. When one performs the acts through attachment, etc., it adds to the afflictions in Buddhi which lead to bondage, but when one performs something through detachment, such an act causes the purification of the Buddhi and makes it fit for discriminative knowledge.
4. This is again to stress that there is possibility of anything looking impossible, still there is no possibility of change in mental state of a liberated still embodied. The expres-

13. Thinking that these powers always spring forth[1] in the one who has become the consciousness itself, there arises no wonder in the one even in the presence of the net of miracles.[2]

14- The woman intently attached to someone else then her husband even while busy in her household work enjoys in her internal organ the pleasure arising of attachment to that paramour. Similarly, the one who has attained repose in the pure highest element, enjoys that only inside even performing the external duties.

16. The one who is always absorbed in the self,[3], is introvert[4] and happy, and is deep[5] and pacid just like a

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sion *anyadhi* may mean that the Buddhi of a liberated still embodied does not become otherwise in feeling, i.e., is not attached to the objects of enjoyment or his Buddhi is not directed to anything else than the soul.

1. The wonders experienced in the world are the modifications of the Prakṛti itself.
2. I.e., if some modification of the Prakṛti is wonderful. He does not deviate from his nature in the presence of so called wonders because these, he knows, are caused by the Prakṛti which is his own power.
3. It also means the one who is intent upon the concentration on soul. From such a concentration he derives pleasure as it is not that he avoids the miseries only by avoiding the external objects without channelising his inclinations to wards the soul.
4. In the case of the water tank it means unfathomably deep and in the case of the liberated still embodied it means that his external activities are not observed because he has controlled all the external functioning.
5. In the case of the water tank it means that having clean water and in the case of the liberated still living it means that he is devoid of all the blemishes of the internal organs.

great tank in the mountain, (is a man liberated still embodied).

17. He is not disturbed by the enjoyment of the highest bliss[1] and rejoices in the self through his own self, renounces all the acts,[2] always happy,[3] and is always free from any indisposed condition.

18. He is neither tainted by virtuous deeds nor by vicious deeds nor by something else,[4] even if covered by anything[5], even fed by anyone[6] and even sleeping anywhere like a king.

19. He was (once) liked by following the code of the caste system, the conduct prescribed for the stages of life, the scriptures, the holy chants and the rightful way of life, goes out of the snare of the world like a lion from a cage.[7]

20. He is not subjected to the speech[8] and is abandoned by

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1. This through secondary sense means the ever lack of misery. It cannot be taken in a positive sense because in the state of liberation one is free from pleasure as well.
2. It means that one renounces the desire for the fruits of one's acts.
3. It suggests that one is ever contented as he is free from the desire for pleasures.
4. I.e., pleasure, pain, etc.
5 I.e., the torn cloth or the like.
6. I.e., even when is offered the despised food or even when fed by the mean people like a cāṇḍāla or a low class person.
7. The world is called a snare because it binds the soul as it is a heap of latent past impressions which bind a man.
8. He is above the description through the vedic statements, etc.

the state of desire for the objects,[1] has attained some lusture just like the firmament in the winter season.

21. He never speaks heigh of himself, never salutes others,[2] does not worship the worth worshipping[3] and may or may not be associated with the performance of the course of conduct followed by the gentle men.[4]

22. The following is the characteristic of the one having no characteristic,[5] calm and free from the transmigration and the perverted knowledge entertained for a long time; his body is always perfect (undisturbed) in sexual feelings, anger, grief, avarice, delusion and calamities.[6]

23. In the case of the one who has attained a repose in the turiyā state and is adverse to the ocean of the world,

1. Precisely it means the one situated in a state devoid of all desires for the objects of enjoyment.
2. This is also to stress that such a man never deviates from his original nature. Generally it is observed that the one deserving salutations starts speaking very heigh of himself and the other having known the inferiority starts saluting others. Such a liberated man, however, is free from superiority or inferiority complex.
3. The term *pūjyapūjāvivarjita* may alternatively mean even though he is venerable, still is not honoured.
4. Even though he follows the noble course of conduct, still on account of the lack of self-conceit, he is not tainted by his acts and, hence, there arises no question of his being bound by the acts he performs.
5. I.e., otherwise he does not have any worldly characteristic.
6. He is not disturbed in all these situations.

there is no significance of whatever is done or of not done, nor has he got some confusion regarding the śrutis and the smṛtis.[1]

24. He may leave his body in some holy place[2] or in the house of an outcaste, he is liberated only at the time of attainment of knowledge with his intentions purified.[3]

25. The liberation is not somewhere at the back of (or across) the sky, under the earth or on the earth.[4] The liberation is the destruction of the internal organ when all the desires are given up.[5]

26. Having left the state of liberated still embodied when one's own body is destroyed,[6] one enters the state of

1. He is above the limitations of the state of waking, dream and deep sleep and is always situated in the God in the fourth state. Consequently, he has not to serve any worldly purpose and is above the ignorance of any kind, and, hence, entertains no confusion regarding the meaning of the śruti and smṛtis.
2. It refers to the places of pilgrimage like Kashi.
3. It means that what matters is the attainment of knowledge and not any other condition accepted by others to be the means of liberation.
4. This is to stress that the liberation is not attained through going to some place.
5. This gives the nature and the process of liberation. Unlike other Sāṁkhya thinkers Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the internal organ is destroyed through knowledge, which is the state of liberation.
6. Due to the force of the acts which have started giving

absolute liberation just as the wind attains the state of motionlessness.[1]

27- Just as there is the state of a pure mirror in a mirror

28. having only its pure form in the absence of all the reflections of mountain, etc., similar is the condition of isolated pure form of the seer without seeing the things when the delusion about the perceptible objects in the form of I, you, the world, etc., is removed.[2]

29-30. Whatever remains is that which is mere consciousness without something to be cognised,[3] boundless,[4] devoid of old age,[5] undecaying, auspicious,[6] devoid of beginning,

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their results one is embodied even after attaining the knowledge. When, these acts are exhausted, one's body is destroyed and the absolute liberation is attained.

1. Even though the existence of the element of consciousness exists, it is not in the earlier state of experience. It does not undergo any essential change in the state of absolute liberation.
2. It again stresses that the soul exists in its own pure form in the state of liberation. When the soul does not have the contact with the vṛtti of the Buddhi, the misapprehension of the reflection of the objects in the soul comes to an end as the internal organ also is destroyed. The soul remains in its pure state of an observer, but there is no object to make it an objective consciousness.
3. It has no contact with the objects of cognition.
4. It has no spacial limits.
5. It suggests the absence of bodily conditions and indicates childhood, youth, etc., also.
6. It is because it is devoid of all miseries.

existence and merger, without (mental)miseries and bodily disorders, that which is neither void, nor possessed of some form, is neither perceptible nor the perceiver, and is inexpressible[1] and unspoken of.

Thus ends the seventh chapter of the treatise Sāṁkhyasāra composed by Vijñanabhikṣu.
Here ends the present treatise.

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1. It cannot be indicated as this or that.